Sino-U.S. pact oversold by the West and downplayed by China

By Harvey Stockwin

After 13 years of negotiations and six days bargaining in Beijing, China and the United States have finally reached an agreement on the terms under which China could join the World Trading Organization (WTO), provided China reaches further agreements with the European Union, Canada, India and several other nations. This is the first of two articles.

HONG KONG (JP): Seldom in the history of modern diplomacy has there been so much hype generated by so many on the basis of so few facts.

I am referring to the initial agreement signed at 4.03 pm on Nov. 15 between China and the U.S. on the terms and conditions under which the U.S. agrees to support China's entry into WTO.

Immediately, the overselling of the accession agreement gained thrust from the very top of the political pyramid, as President Bill Clinton, speaking faraway in the Turkish capital of Ankara, pronounced it to be "good for the U.S., good for China, good for the world economy". Clinton might have left it there, with that hyperbole, but he didn't.

Perhaps he was worried lest future Chinese comments might fail to back up his overblown rhetoric. "Today China embraces the principles of economic openness, innovation and competition, that will bolster China's economic reforms and advance the rule of law".

Clinton went on to praise President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji for showing "genuine leadership". The trade deal, Clinton insisted, was part of a broader agreement "to bring China into global systems on issues from nonproliferation to regional security to environmental protection to human rights".

Just in case anyone had any residual doubts, Clinton added that "this is a very good day for American diplomacy. ...the overall relationship between our countries is strengthened".

Within twenty three minutes of the signing, Clinton's hyperbole had sped round the world in an AP dispatch. Needless to say, where Clinton led, many were happy to follow.

All those economic analysts and researchers, whose main task in life appears to be telling their bosses what they want to hear, or giving them reasons to believe what they want to believe, quickly weighed in with upbeat assessments of the WTO deal.

Within thirty six hours, the Sino-American accession agreement had become, at the extreme, either a vehicle which, by itself, would make China a modern nation, or the means whereby the rule of law would finally be instituted all over China, or even the mechanism for quietly overturning the current Chinese leadership's rejection of any meaningful political reform.

Sad to say, far too much of the global media, after reporting all the hype, joined in this naive and sycophantic chorus.

However, there were a few bright spots. To its credit, the New York Times ran a long series of articles examining the claimed agreement from many different angles. The Asian Wall Street Journal ran one short piece which cautioned against expectations of the sudden arrival of Chinese openness by pointing out that Japan had been a member of GATT and WTO for nearly 50 years --and had still managed to avoid embracing the principles of economic openness as the Western world understood them.

Two days later, the South China Morning Post perfectly juxtaposed two analytical articles. One warned of the many devious ways in which the Chinese bureaucracy would now seek to replace overt trade barriers with covert impediments to foreign economic intrusions. The companion piece confidently predicted that if history was any guide, enormous quantities of Chinese energies would now be devoted to making a successful end-run around and between all such bureaucratic obstacles.

These insights were the exceptions, as the China apologists -- those who never tire of putting whatever China does in the best possible light, ignoring more balanced judgments -- had a field day.

Additionally, those suffering from the "oil lamps for china" syndrome flourished in full bloom. The alleged enormous hidden potential of that allegedly huge Chinese market once again tantalized businessmen's imaginations.

Only a very few voices were raised to suggest that Chinese fascination with exporting to the definitely huge American market was likely to be the main beneficiary of Chinese membership of WTO. This point was emphasized by the latest trade figures released on Nov. 19 which revealed that China had secured the largest ever monthly surplus by any nation in trade with the U.S. ,US$ 6.9 billion, in September 1999.

There are many other reasons for deep seated doubts concerning the anticipated great advance that the Sino-American WTO agreement is supposed to usher in.

For a start, there was no reciprocal hype within China where, as ever, the news was strictly controlled and carefully presented.

If the agreement was as far-reaching and as important to the future of China as commentaries outside the country were maintaining, then there was only one way in which "genuine leadership" should have been exercised.

Either President Jiang Zemin, who evidently supervised the Sino-American negotiations, or Prime Minister Zhu Rongji who clearly played a significant role in making agreement possible, should have appeared on television to give an address to the nation.

Whichever leader undertook the task would have looked the Chinese people straight in the eye, told them what had been agreed and why, explained the economic pain which would probably ensue and what would be done to lessen it, and then placed the agreement in the context of China's drive to be a modern nation, and to be true to the opening up to the outside world initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the famous Third Plenum in December 1978.

To have spoken directly to the people in this way would have been modern, would have focussed the Chinese nation as to where it was headed, and would have helped the communist government combat unrest in the probably economically painful years that lie ahead. Needless to say, this approach was not tried -- and probably not even considered.

Instead the Middle Kingdom grappled with the situation in what has become its traditional way. The first item on the main nightly television news showed the American negotiators being treated like the representatives of tributary states throughout the ages -- paying their respects to the Emperor, in this case President Jiang Zemin.

Neither their voice nor that of President Jiang were heard. While in the video footage Jiang did most of the talking, it was, as usual, the newscaster who said what he said. Naturally what the Americans were giving was stressed. What China was conceding was ignored or downplayed. The same was true of the second item in the news -- the actual signing ceremony.

In short, The Middle Kingdom had once again received its due and had been true to itself. There was little mention of what it had given in exchange.

This contrasted with the situation outside China where the agreement was being oversold in the naive belief that China was making the greatest concession of all -- that of finally joining the world economy and therefore ceasing to be the Middle Kingdom.