Should Indonesia consider new ties with Australia?

Should Indonesia consider new ties with Australia?

By Siswo Pramono

CANBERRA (JP): The recently released Australian defense white
paper calls for new defense ties with Indonesia. Indonesia-
Australia relations have crashed since East Timor crisis. Deep
suspicion, rather than trust, is now the basis of the bilateral
relationship. Should Indonesia consider the call?

Mutual distrust is acute in the relations of the two nations.
Many Australians still believe that hostile forces will come from
the North. Ironically, history records Australian military
operations in the Indonesian archipelago, from the start of World
War II until post-ballot East Timor; while the Indonesian army
has never engaged in any combat with the Australian military.

After East Timor, and now facing the delicate issue of
separatism in Papua, some Indonesians also believe that Australia
poses a threat to Indonesia's integrity.

This is because, despite assurances from the Australian
government that Irian Jaya is an integral part of Indonesia, "the
battle lines over the West Papuan cause are being drawn in
[Australia]" (Paul Kelly, The Australian, Nov. 1).

With mutual distrust lingering on both sides, the relations
are hard to get off the ground.

The Australian defense white paper is not a panacea of this
mutual distrust but rather a starting point for confidence
building measures. It might be useful to see how Australia is now
positioning Indonesia in the new defense policy. The defense
white paper emphasizes three main issues.

The first is a slight increase in defense spending.
Notwithstanding the increase, Australia would hardly threaten
Indonesia or anyone else in the region because the extra defense
spending of A$23.5 billion over 10 years is actually less then
two percent of the gross domestic product.

Conversely, with half a million internal refugees, an acute
political crisis, and the worst nightmare scenario of
disintegration, it is Indonesia that poses a "threat" through the
possible influx of refugees that might burden Australia.

The second is greater self-reliance. The so-called Howard
Doctrine, portraying Australia as a "deputy" of the United
States, earlier irritated Indonesia. But now the defense white
paper assures that Australia is not becoming anyone's deputy.
Australia can no longer take the U.S. for granted if a crisis
developed in its vital northern approach.

East Timor is a recent example of how the U.S. abandoned
Australia. Conversely, while the alliance with the U.S. remains
strategically important, Australia is now unlikely to allow its
ground troops to be deployed to defend U.S. interests in North
Asia (e.g. to defend Taiwan against China or to defend South
Korea against North Korea).

If Australia were to join U.S. maneuvers in North Asia, it
would provide only diplomatic support or, at the most, some naval
and aerial support. Thus, Australia is now learning to stand on
its own.

The third is the restructuring of Australia's military
capability. The main tasks of the Australian Defense Force are
to defend the mainland and to secure its immediate neighborhood.

The white paper seems to have reconciled the contending
strategies of "fortress Australia" and "forward defense" when it
comes to promoting the stability of Australia's immediate
neighborhood.

This neighborhood looks pretty messy with various hotspots,
starting from Aceh, to Maluku, Papua, East Timor, Bougainville,
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Fiji. The Indonesian
archipelago provides straits for international navigation, which
are vital for the life and well being of Australians.

The fact that the Indonesian archipelago now represents the
sea of instability is Australia's concern. Anything that happens
in Indonesia will directly affect Australia.

With its neighborhood in a state of instability, the white
paper commits the Australian Defense Forces to become a mobile
force capable of sustaining operations outside Australia.

The commitment will be met with an increase in the size of
regular army infantry battalions to allow deployment of a brigade
for extended periods.

The big procurement of early warning aircraft, 100 aircraft to
replace existing F/A-18s and F-111s, as well as the upgrades for
the Anzac frigates and Collins-class submarines will foster
Australian military capacity to operate outside the mainland.

For Indonesia, this new commitment can be reassuring or
disturbing. And the worst of it is the collapse of the 1995
Indonesia-Australia defense treaty, following Australian military
involvement in East Timor.

Any military build up of one side can easily trigger suspicion
and hence, insecurity of the other. However, it might be
exaggerating to consider this improved Australian military muscle
as a threat to Indonesia.

The improved military capacity might be useful to sustain a
limited deployment in small areas such as East Timor or
Bougainville, but it is not big enough to support operations in
an area the size of Irian Jaya.

Thus, it would be naive to think that Australia would secure
its interest in the northern neighborhood entirely through
military support.

Australia knows too well that unless its relations with
Indonesia are normalized, it is unlikely for Australia to enjoy
maximum security in its forefront area. The white paper positions
the strategic relationship with Indonesia as one of the main
pillars of Australian defense strategy.

In this regard, it pledges to establish "a new defense
relationship that will serve our enduring shared strategic
interests".

Labor's opposition leader has signaled support for such
intensified diplomatic strategy of engagement (Kim Beazley, The
Sydney Morning Herald, Dec. 6). And Minister Downer has already
called for renewed military ties with Indonesia.

Surely, both countries have interlocking interests in defense
and security matters. Indonesia is a catalyst for the security
of Australian frontage. Australia is a catalyst for the security
of the eastern part of Indonesia.

One should remember that the separatist issue in Irian Jaya
remains a potential obstacle for bilateral relations. As a
territory bordering the South Pacific, Papua has added to the
long strained relations with Jakarta by internalizing the endemic
crisis of national identity.

Irian Jaya could not escape the political dynamics of the
South Pacific. Papua, Bougainville, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands
and Fiji have all experienced the vertical conflicts challenging
their respective central government authorities.

There are great expectations from the Papuan secessionists
that Australia and the South Pacific will help them break away
from Indonesia.

Australia considers the South Pacific its strategic backyard.
Irian Jaya has strong ties with the South Pacific for ethnic and
geopolitical reasons.

Indonesia must consider an intensified diplomatic engagement
with Australia, and hence, the South Pacific part of the solution
of the Irian Jaya problem. Thus, it is timely for Indonesia to
consider Australia's call for new defense ties.

The writer is a doctoral student at the department of
political science, Australian National University in Canberra.