Shooting Aceh's messenger, killing peace hopes

Lesley McCulloch, School of Asian Studies, University of Tasmania, Australia

The pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Aceh has been viewed with skepticism by many for some time. But now confirmation of the Indonesian government's lack of commitment to the peace process seems imminent. Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is visiting Aceh to discuss with local military and political leaders the prospects for imposing a state of emergency in the violence-racked province.

Such a step would be a definitive rejection of the possibility for a negotiated settlement to the conflict any time in the near future.

And indeed, five negotiators who represented the pro- independence Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF, commonly known as GAM) at peace talks in Geneva in May have already been threatened with arrest. They are Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, Tgk. Muhammad Usman, T. Kamaruzzaman, Amni bin Marzuki, and Amdi bin Hamdani.

They have been ordered to leave the Kuala Tripa Hotel in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh, in which they have been living since June 2000, or be taken into custody.

The negotiators initially took up residence in the hotel to facilitate regular contact with the office of the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), facilitators of the fruitless peace talks. But after the killing by the military of a sixth member of the delegation, Zulfani bin Abdul Rani in October 2001, residence in the hotel turned from a choice into a necessity.

The government has not been willing to attack the remaining five negotiators under the eyes of the hotel's international guests and HDC staff. But the group now fear, not unreasonably, that if they comply with the order to return to their villages, they too will eventually be killed. As Amni bin Marzuki said in an interview on Thursday, "We are on stand-by here for anything to happen. But we are refusing to move."

The fate of these men is of particular interest and import, since it serves as a litmus test of the Indonesian government's commitment -- or lack thereof -- to a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Aceh. Negotiators are embodiments of a process of peaceful dialog. Without negotiators, how can dialog continue?

Diplomatic immunity is one of the most ancient principles of what we now codify as international law. Successful negotiations depend on the safety of the negotiators involved, not just during meetings but for as long as they are within the reach of their partners in dialog.

Were Aceh recognized under international law as a state -- even one at war with Indonesia -- the negotiators' immunity as diplomats would be guaranteed. As it is, their safety is no more assured than that of any of the 600 Acehnese who have died at the hands of government troops in the last six months alone.

ASNLF Central Bureau for Information spokesperson Teungku Isnander argues that the Indonesian government should behave according to internationally agreed best practice, that is, the pursuit of peaceful solution to a conflict. This includes giving a degree of protection to those involved in brokering peace.

An important model for such protection can be found in the Philippines. There, the government took the signal step in February 1995 of signing with the opposition National Democratic Front a joint agreement on safety and immunity guarantees.

The agreement extends protection to negotiators, consultants, staffers, and other personnel participating in peace negotiations. Under the Joint Agreement, all duly accredited persons are guaranteed free and unhindered passage in all areas of the country.

They further are guaranteed immunity from surveillance, harassment, search, arrest, detention, prosecution and interrogation, or any other similar punitive actions due to involvement in the peace negotiations.

The agreement has been a cornerstone of the Philippine peace process. It serves as an example that all governments that are genuinely committed to negotiated peace processes should follow. The Indonesian government should sign a similar agreement with the ASNLF, as well as with the independence movement in West Papua, as soon as possible.

Indeed, the achievement of such an agreement should be a major objective of all of Indonesia's governmental and non-governmental partners in the international community.

Further peace talks between the ASNLF and the government were originally scheduled for later this month. They have now been postponed. In the light of recent events, one has to wonder if further talk will in fact be possible. Certainly the majority of Acehnese are battle-weary and want the violence to end.

But if the Indonesian government is willing to shoot the messengers, what hope can there be for a negotiated peace in Aceh?

The writer is conducting research on the conflict in Aceh.