Shift in allocation of ambassador posts

Shift in allocation of ambassador posts

By Desra Percaya

LONDON (JP): Foreign minister Alwi Shihab recently said that
he would prefer non-career diplomats to occupy only between 5 and
15 percent of all ambassadorships abroad. While conceding the
current allotment as unfair and likely to cause jealousy, he
noted that about 33 percent of the 105 ambassadorial posts abroad
are currently held by non-foreign ministry officials. What is the
significance of Shihab's statement?

It would be interesting to examine the role of the military in
foreign policy and its implications for the allocation of
ambassadorial posts.

Traditionally, foreign policy-making is centered in the chief
executive and his foreign minister. However, as P.M. Kamath
argued, foreign policy-making is not an exclusive sphere of
influence for traditional policy-makers.

In this regard, the military (read the Minister of Defense and
the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces) play an important
part in the formulation of foreign policy. Other parties
influencing the process should include, for example, other
relevant ministries, parliament, interest groups and the mass
media. Nevertheless, the degree of influence and the role of each
player varies depending on the political structure and dynamics
within any individual country.

Since the New Order, the decision-making process was heavily
dominated by Soeharto and his military supporters. To present an
acceptable international image to the outside world, the regime
always assigned a civilian foreign minister to lead Indonesia's
diplomacy and its participation on the international stage.

While the military's involvement was inevitable, its influence
was further expanded along with the adoption of the inward and
outward looking security approach and the implementation of the
concept of dwi fungsi, the military's role in security and public
affairs.

The achievement of domestic stability and economic development
enabled Soeharto to assert his supremacy in domestic politics. As
his confidence grew, he turned his attention to foreign policy
and became more personally involved in policy-making.

Eventually, he seemed to enjoy discussing foreign policy, and
frequently traveled abroad. It became a common practice after
1990 that the then state minister Moerdiono acted as Soeharto's
mouthpiece on foreign policy. Consequently, the degree of the
military's influence was reduced as a result of Soeharto's direct
involvement in the decision-making process.

Despite maintaining the principle of a free and active foreign
policy, President Abdurrahman Wahid appears to have abandoned the
security approach outlook in his foreign policy. Accordingly, the
role of the military will be further reduced. However, it might
be argued that the military should retain its authority,
particularly when it comes to the issue of security and defense.
Indeed, it is the military that has the coercive power of the
state and directly controls its armed forces.

Indeed, the appointment of Alwi Shihab as Indonesian foreign
minister is an indication of Abdurrahman's considerable attention
to foreign policy. It also means that he will directly be
involved in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, Abdurrahman's personal outlook, perception,
experience, general orientation, values, and idealism will
characterize the orientation and direction of Indonesian foreign
policy. Nevertheless, the revival of political parties also
creates the opportunity for them to influence the output of
foreign policy. Thus, the parliament should be able to get rid of
its image as simply a rubberstamp.

The posts of chief-of-mission -- more widely known as
ambassador -- originating from a diplomatic career background
have been occupied by a significant number of high-level military
officers. This was a reward for those who were loyal to
Soeharto's leadership but who could not be accommodated within
the military establishment.

Their appointments were also intended to ease domestic
frictions created by those who were not in agreement with
Soeharto's policy. Thus, it was very common for such people to be
dubbed as didubeskan or "appointed to be ambassador." In some
cases, a similar practice was also applied to people from outside
the military establishment.

In the past, senior military officials have occupied many
ambassadorship postings, particularly in countries that were
considered to be of strategic importance. However, in response to
the dynamics of domestic and international politics in the 1990s,
there was a new tendency for Soeharto to appoint career and non-
career civilian ambassadors to embassies in, for example,
Canberra, The Hague, Tokyo, and Washington, which had long been
considered to be the military's automatic allotment.

Therefore, the plan to reduce the number of non-career
ambassadorship posts is not a new idea. Instead, the process has
been accelerated while the target has clearly been set.

However, the plan to appoint a civilian career ambassador to
head the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur appears to have far-
reaching implications. Under the New Order, most of Indonesia's
chiefs of mission in the capitals of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) came from the military establishment.

This indicated the importance of these countries to the
military leadership. According to political expert Dewi Fortuna
Anwar, this was the reflection of the politico-strategic
importance of these countries to the dominance of the military
leadership, particularly as the seventh military region in terms
of security importance. Therefore, the abandonment of the
security approach by the current government generally appears to
weaken the rationale for the appointment of an ambassador from
the military establishment.

However, the question of whether an ambassador should be a
career diplomat or should come from the military establishment or
any other quarter ought not to be over-exaggerated. The
implementation of a professional merit system that is based on,
among other things, quality, skills and the ability to meet
increasing demand is much more important.

Although appointing ambassadorships is one of the president's
prerogatives, recent amendments to the 1945 Constitution that
make it mandatory for the president to consult the House of
Representatives when appointing Indonesian ambassadors should be
seen as one way of selecting good, capable and competent
ambassadors.

Finally, the plan to reduce the number of non-career
ambassadors should not be regarded merely as a shaking-up of the
military's role in foreign policy. It is more significant and
fundamental than that: it is restoring the military to its
primary role -- which is security and defense -- and is in line
with the coming of a new reality in Indonesia.

The writer is a staff member of the Indonesian Foreign
Ministry, and is pursuing a Doctorate Program at the Department
of Politics, Durham University, United Kingdom. The views
expressed here are personal.