Shift in allocation of ambassador posts

By Desra Percaya

LONDON (JP): Foreign minister Alwi Shihab recently said that he would prefer non-career diplomats to occupy only between 5 and 15 percent of all ambassadorships abroad. While conceding the current allotment as unfair and likely to cause jealousy, he noted that about 33 percent of the 105 ambassadorial posts abroad are currently held by non-foreign ministry officials. What is the significance of Shihab's statement?

It would be interesting to examine the role of the military in foreign policy and its implications for the allocation of ambassadorial posts.

Traditionally, foreign policy-making is centered in the chief executive and his foreign minister. However, as P.M. Kamath argued, foreign policy-making is not an exclusive sphere of influence for traditional policy-makers.

In this regard, the military (read the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces) play an important part in the formulation of foreign policy. Other parties influencing the process should include, for example, other relevant ministries, parliament, interest groups and the mass media. Nevertheless, the degree of influence and the role of each player varies depending on the political structure and dynamics within any individual country.

Since the New Order, the decision-making process was heavily dominated by Soeharto and his military supporters. To present an acceptable international image to the outside world, the regime always assigned a civilian foreign minister to lead Indonesia's diplomacy and its participation on the international stage.

While the military's involvement was inevitable, its influence was further expanded along with the adoption of the inward and outward looking security approach and the implementation of the concept of dwi fungsi, the military's role in security and public affairs.

The achievement of domestic stability and economic development enabled Soeharto to assert his supremacy in domestic politics. As his confidence grew, he turned his attention to foreign policy and became more personally involved in policy-making.

Eventually, he seemed to enjoy discussing foreign policy, and frequently traveled abroad. It became a common practice after 1990 that the then state minister Moerdiono acted as Soeharto's mouthpiece on foreign policy. Consequently, the degree of the military's influence was reduced as a result of Soeharto's direct involvement in the decision-making process.

Despite maintaining the principle of a free and active foreign policy, President Abdurrahman Wahid appears to have abandoned the security approach outlook in his foreign policy. Accordingly, the role of the military will be further reduced. However, it might be argued that the military should retain its authority, particularly when it comes to the issue of security and defense. Indeed, it is the military that has the coercive power of the state and directly controls its armed forces.

Indeed, the appointment of Alwi Shihab as Indonesian foreign minister is an indication of Abdurrahman's considerable attention to foreign policy. It also means that he will directly be involved in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, Abdurrahman's personal outlook, perception, experience, general orientation, values, and idealism will characterize the orientation and direction of Indonesian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the revival of political parties also creates the opportunity for them to influence the output of foreign policy. Thus, the parliament should be able to get rid of its image as simply a rubberstamp.

The posts of chief-of-mission -- more widely known as ambassador -- originating from a diplomatic career background have been occupied by a significant number of high-level military officers. This was a reward for those who were loyal to Soeharto's leadership but who could not be accommodated within the military establishment.

Their appointments were also intended to ease domestic frictions created by those who were not in agreement with Soeharto's policy. Thus, it was very common for such people to be dubbed as didubeskan or "appointed to be ambassador." In some cases, a similar practice was also applied to people from outside the military establishment.

In the past, senior military officials have occupied many ambassadorship postings, particularly in countries that were considered to be of strategic importance. However, in response to the dynamics of domestic and international politics in the 1990s, there was a new tendency for Soeharto to appoint career and non- career civilian ambassadors to embassies in, for example, Canberra, The Hague, Tokyo, and Washington, which had long been considered to be the military's automatic allotment.

Therefore, the plan to reduce the number of non-career ambassadorship posts is not a new idea. Instead, the process has been accelerated while the target has clearly been set.

However, the plan to appoint a civilian career ambassador to head the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur appears to have far- reaching implications. Under the New Order, most of Indonesia's chiefs of mission in the capitals of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) came from the military establishment.

This indicated the importance of these countries to the military leadership. According to political expert Dewi Fortuna Anwar, this was the reflection of the politico-strategic importance of these countries to the dominance of the military leadership, particularly as the seventh military region in terms of security importance. Therefore, the abandonment of the security approach by the current government generally appears to weaken the rationale for the appointment of an ambassador from the military establishment.

However, the question of whether an ambassador should be a career diplomat or should come from the military establishment or any other quarter ought not to be over-exaggerated. The implementation of a professional merit system that is based on, among other things, quality, skills and the ability to meet increasing demand is much more important.

Although appointing ambassadorships is one of the president's prerogatives, recent amendments to the 1945 Constitution that make it mandatory for the president to consult the House of Representatives when appointing Indonesian ambassadors should be seen as one way of selecting good, capable and competent ambassadors.

Finally, the plan to reduce the number of non-career ambassadors should not be regarded merely as a shaking-up of the military's role in foreign policy. It is more significant and fundamental than that: it is restoring the military to its primary role -- which is security and defense -- and is in line with the coming of a new reality in Indonesia.

The writer is a staff member of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, and is pursuing a Doctorate Program at the Department of Politics, Durham University, United Kingdom. The views expressed here are personal.