Shelving the issue of sovereignty in the Ambalat dispute

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

Indonesia and Malaysia have reportedly decided to resolve their overlapping claims to Ambalat by peaceful means. There are a number of reasons why the decision to utilize diplomatic channels can be regarded as a positive step. The first relates to the fact that the two countries are "senior" members of ASEAN.

The image and future of ASEAN would be at stake if Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur refused to rely on regional norms to resolve interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia. In this regard, the emphasis placed by both the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ASEAN Security Community on peaceful conflict resolution could be utilized as an entry point for diplomatic negotiation. Both Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in diplomatic circles, need to be aware that they have spent a lot of diplomatic energy on producing these two official documents.

The question that needs to be answered by Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur now is what is ASEAN for if official documents released by the regional organization after holding a series of meetings cannot bind and regulate the behavior of its member countries?

Second, the disputed area, geographically speaking, does not have strategic significance in military terms. It cannot be used as a military foothold. The dispute over Ambalat is basically a dispute over maritime delimitation. The scramble for this maritime territory seems to have mainly stemmed from economic motives, namely, the exploitation of the abundant oil and gas resources in the area surrounding Amabalat.

Conceptually, there is always a lot of leeway for disputing parties to enter negotiations in conflicts over natural resources in maritime territory compared to conflicts over the ownership of islands. Moreover, stability is vital for oil companies to successfully run their businesses. Due to the need for huge capital investment and sophisticated technology, oil companies from developed countries are bound to avoid investing in volatile areas. There is a clear, tangible incentive, accordingly, both for Malaysia and Indonesia to deescalate the conflict over Ambalat with a view to attracting oil companies to exploit the resources in the area.

Third, the conflict over Ambalat is bilateral in nature. There would be a lot of problems should Ambalat be disputed by more than two countries. As can be seen in the case of the territorial conflict over the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the multilateral nature of the dispute, where more than six countries are involved, is a major constraint on reaching a collective agreement. As such, there is a good opportunity for Indonesia and Malaysia to reach agreement on how to formulate the steps and concrete measures necessary for peaceful conflict resolution in the future.

Fourth, the dispute over Ambalat has nothing to do with the identity of the two countries. Though the dispute could be categorized as conflict over territorial sovereignty, the identity of Malaysia and Indonesia as sovereign nations will not be put in jeopardy if both countries are prepared to soften their positions during the negotiations.

This is certainly different from the case of Kashmir, which is disputed by India and Pakistan. While the origin of the dispute over Kashmir at the very beginning was closely associated with the birth of two countries, the dispute over Ambalat is absolutely free from this existential question. Therefore, both the central governments in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have wider latitude for adopting innovative measures to resolve the dispute peacefully.

The fifth reason relates to risks possibly posed by "spoilers". The failure to evolve peaceful dialog could provide extra regional powers with an opportunity to manipulate the issue for their own regional political interests. Similarly, there is also the possibility that the resistance displayed by a number of political groups at the domestic level, the so-called "hawks", is motivated by narrow political agendas.

Hence, evolving dialog through negotiation offers two strategic benefits for the governments in the two countries. It can be used to avoid the internationalization of the issue and prevent the "hawks" from taking advantage of it.

Based on the above, practical solutions seem to be available to the two countries to solve the dispute amicably. One of the solutions that could be considered would be to transform Ambalat from a zone of hostility to a zone of functional cooperation through which joint development could be arranged, for instance, by launching joint exploitation programs for the resources in the disputed area. However, before arriving at this solution, the two countries will be required to shelve the issue of sovereignty in their talks and negotiations.

In this regard, shelving the issue of sovereignty does not necessarily mean that both countries should nullify their claims to the disputed area. It simply means that they agree not to raise the issue during talks and negotiations.

The reason for this is actually very simple. Sovereignty is a very sensitive issue and most people in the two countries still consider sovereignty to be an indivisible commodity and, therefore, not up for negotiation. If sovereignty continues to be stressed, then it is most likely that the talks and negotiations will go nowhere.

The writer is executive director of the Center for East Asian Cooperation Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia.