Shelving the issue of sovereignty in the Ambalat dispute

Shelving the issue of sovereignty in the Ambalat dispute

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

Indonesia and Malaysia have reportedly decided to resolve
their overlapping claims to Ambalat by peaceful means. There are
a number of reasons why the decision to utilize diplomatic
channels can be regarded as a positive step. The first relates to
the fact that the two countries are "senior" members of ASEAN.

The image and future of ASEAN would be at stake if Jakarta and
Kuala Lumpur refused to rely on regional norms to resolve
interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia. In this regard, the
emphasis placed by both the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and
the ASEAN Security Community on peaceful conflict resolution
could be utilized as an entry point for diplomatic negotiation.
Both Indonesia and Malaysia, particularly in diplomatic circles,
need to be aware that they have spent a lot of diplomatic energy
on producing these two official documents.

The question that needs to be answered by Jakarta and Kuala
Lumpur now is what is ASEAN for if official documents released by
the regional organization after holding a series of meetings
cannot bind and regulate the behavior of its member countries?

Second, the disputed area, geographically speaking, does not
have strategic significance in military terms. It cannot be used
as a military foothold. The dispute over Ambalat is basically a
dispute over maritime delimitation. The scramble for this
maritime territory seems to have mainly stemmed from economic
motives, namely, the exploitation of the abundant oil and gas
resources in the area surrounding Amabalat.

Conceptually, there is always a lot of leeway for disputing
parties to enter negotiations in conflicts over natural resources
in maritime territory compared to conflicts over the ownership of
islands. Moreover, stability is vital for oil companies to
successfully run their businesses. Due to the need for huge
capital investment and sophisticated technology, oil companies from
developed countries are bound to avoid investing in volatile
areas. There is a clear, tangible incentive, accordingly, both for
Malaysia and Indonesia to deescalate the conflict over Ambalat
with a view to attracting oil companies to exploit the resources
in the area.

Third, the conflict over Ambalat is bilateral in nature. There
would be a lot of problems should Ambalat be disputed by more
than two countries. As can be seen in the case of the territorial
conflict over the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the
multilateral nature of the dispute, where more than six countries
are involved, is a major constraint on reaching a collective
agreement. As such, there is a good opportunity for Indonesia and
Malaysia to reach agreement on how to formulate the steps and
concrete measures necessary for peaceful conflict resolution in
the future.

Fourth, the dispute over Ambalat has nothing to do with the
identity of the two countries. Though the dispute could be
categorized as conflict over territorial sovereignty, the
identity of Malaysia and Indonesia as sovereign nations will not
be put in jeopardy if both countries are prepared to soften their
positions during the negotiations.

This is certainly different from the case of Kashmir, which is
disputed by India and Pakistan. While the origin of the dispute
over Kashmir at the very beginning was closely associated
with the birth of two countries, the dispute over Ambalat is
absolutely free from this existential question. Therefore, both
the central governments in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have wider
latitude for adopting innovative measures to resolve the dispute
peacefully.

The fifth reason relates to risks possibly posed by
"spoilers". The failure to evolve peaceful dialog could provide
extra regional powers with an opportunity to manipulate the issue
for their own regional political interests. Similarly, there is
also the possibility that the resistance displayed by a number of
political groups at the domestic level, the so-called "hawks", is
motivated by narrow political agendas.

Hence, evolving dialog through negotiation offers two
strategic benefits for the governments in the two countries. It
can be used to avoid the internationalization of the issue and
prevent the "hawks" from taking advantage of it.

Based on the above, practical solutions seem to be available
to the two countries to solve the dispute amicably. One of the
solutions that could be considered would be to transform Ambalat
from a zone of hostility to a zone of functional cooperation
through which joint development could be arranged, for instance,
by launching joint exploitation programs for the resources in the
disputed area. However, before arriving at this solution, the two
countries will be required to shelve the issue of sovereignty in
their talks and negotiations.

In this regard, shelving the issue of sovereignty does not
necessarily mean that both countries should nullify their
claims to the disputed area. It simply means that they
agree not to raise the issue during talks and negotiations.

The reason for this is actually very simple. Sovereignty is a
very sensitive issue and most people in the two countries still
consider sovereignty to be an indivisible commodity and,
therefore, not up for negotiation. If sovereignty continues to be
stressed, then it is most likely that the talks and negotiations
will go nowhere.

The writer is executive director of the Center for East Asian
Cooperation Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
University of Indonesia.