Shelving corruption cases

Shelving corruption cases

The confirmation of the Attorney General's Office (AGO) --
that it had decided to drop corruption cases against former
president Soeharto's daughter Siti "Tutut" Hardiyanti Rukmana,
former timber baron Prajogo Pangestu and tollroad developer Djoko
Ramiadji -- served only to strengthen the public perception of
the government as acutely lacking the determination to crack down
on graft.

The AGO decision was quietly made in June, but it was only
revealed to the public on Thursday in a statement that, instead
of providing the public with accountability, raised more
questions regarding the technical competence and integrity of
public prosecutors.

Compare this to the great fanfare and drama in which the three
corruption suspects were summoned for investigations at the AGO.
The manner in which the public prosecutors initially handled the
graft cases was so convincing that the public had really believed
that the government was determined to dig deeply and expose the
roots of corruption, which was one of the underlying causes of
the 1997 economic crisis.

But then, this controversial decision is only a small episode
within the bizarre profile of law enforcement in the country --
where corruption has long been perceived as endemic, systemic and
deeply institutionalized -- involving the whole system of the
government, notably the judiciary, public prosecutors and the
police.

Just witness the very small number of people so far jailed
after being found guilty of corruption, even though the public
and international corruption watchdogs have always ranked the
government among the most corrupt in the world, along with those
of countries such as Angola and Nigeria.

In fact, most high-profile graft suspects or defendants -- who
generated weeks of headline stories during their initial
investigations -- eventually either escaped justice on
technicalities or got only very light sentences.

The AGO argument that the corruption charge against Prajogo, a
crony of Soeharto -- related to his exploitation of hundreds of
thousands hectares of forests in South Sumatra -- was not valid
because he had caused no loss to the state, was an insult to the
public's sense of justice. After all, Prajogo's acquisition of
his vast forest concession had in the first place caused
controversy, let alone his questionable use of a huge amount of
government reforestation funds.

Likewise, the AGO's inability to establish legal evidence of
corruption in Tutut's fuel pipeline project in Central Java and
in Djoko's tollroad project in Jakarta only validated the public
perception that justice is indeed discriminatory.

True, the laws on corruption and business transactions are
sometimes ambiguous, containing many loopholes that can either be
exploited by high-caliber lawyers, or make it extremely difficult
for public prosecutors to prove their cases beyond any reasonable
doubt. Judges too often are not able to comprehend the complexity
of business and financial transactions.

Even in many developed countries with well established justice
systems, getting convictions for economic crimes often turns out
to be much more difficult than putting bank robbers or drug
dealers in jail.

Nevertheless, when most big corruption cases, involving
businesspeople or senior officials with powerful backing, fail to
reach court or are eventually thrown out of court due to a lack
of legal evidence, as has taken place in the country, there must
be many things fundamentally wrong within the legal system.

There is, however, another fundamental shortcoming, that has
made the government's drive against corruption seemingly hopeless
and a miserably lost cause. That is the absence of credible
leadership.

The experience of most other countries -- with success stories
in fighting graft -- show that to be effective, an anti-
corruption campaign requires the strongly-committed leadership of
the government. Even better, if the commitment comes from the
highest levels of the state.

But, in Indonesia, the public perception of institutionalized
corruption undermines the credibility of the national leadership.
Consequently, a moral hazard has been created as most big white-
collar crimes seem to be worth the risk, generating a vicious
circle in which an anti-graft strategy is hard to launch.