Thu, 26 Aug 2004

Setting the record straight on Papua not just perception

Andri Hadi, Jakarta

On Aug. 10, 2004, The Jakarta Post published an article by John Saltford responding to mine (The Jakarta Post, July 30) on the issue of Papua. Without any intention to generate a polemic, I feel compelled to take issue with some of the arguments contained in his article in order to set the record straight about Papua.

Saltford's article involved facts, opinions as well as interpretations molded in such a manner seemingly intended to support the idea of an independent Papua. This is not surprising since Saltford has long been well-known as a scholar holding such a stand.

It is pertinent to note that what is now known as modern Indonesia was formed based on the principle of usi possidentis, i.e. covering all territories that used to fall under the control of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), extending from Sabang (northern tip of Aceh) to Merauke (southeastern corner of Papua).

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, which is based on a certain ethnicity, Indonesia's nationalism has been characterized as a civic nationalism (Leifer, 2002), which is inclusive of all ethnic groups existing in the NEI territories.

Under such a condition, cultural identity has never been regarded as a strong factor in Indonesia's nationalism in the sense that Indonesians shall never claim territories such as Malaysia (peninsular and eastern) or Brunei, simply because they were clearly not a part of the NEI territories, although the populations of these territories share Malay cultural identity and belong to common Malay stock.

It is also pertinent to note that special autonomy has been unfolding since 2001. Saltford was not factually accurate when he stated that the autonomy policy is "still unimplemented". Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy is being implemented and progress has been noted, including the allocation of more generous funds for Papuan development that originated from exploration of Papua's natural and other resources.

Saltford's interpretation concerning the expansion of the Papuan territory into three provinces is bias. In fact, the Law on Territorial Extension is currently under review by the Constitutional Court.

Even if such a law (to split the territory into three) is finally adopted in full, its implementation aims merely to promote effective and efficient development in the region. In terms of territorial size, Papua is almost as large as Papua New Guinea (around 460,000 square kilometers), which currently has 27 administrative provinces.

Thus, for a territory such as Papua, which is in fact far larger than England (around 243,000 square kilometers), it is groundless to be allergic to any idea of administrative extension. Many Papuans even believe that Papua could ideally be administered by the establishment of six, instead of three, distinct administrative provinces for promoting more equity in the progress of development.

It seems that the issue of "one man, one vote" is central. Yet, the New York agreement does not mention any such method. Neither UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 contain explicit provisions concerning methods required to implement self-determination.

Moreover, paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 states that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

As evidence, after the adoption of resolutions 1514 and 1541 more than 50 new states in Asia and Africa gained their political independence without resorting to the "one man, one vote" method.

Furthermore, the claim that Papua was listed in the United Nations as non-self governing territory is quite misleading. It is true that the Dutch in 1946 put Papua on the non-self governing territory list, but this was only part of the colonial strategy to deny the restoration by Indonesia of the full extent of its legitimate territories based on the principle of usi possidentis.

Basically, this Dutch strategy went unchallenged in the UN because Indonesia was not yet a member state of the world body in 1946. And, for this reason, the government of Indonesia since its admission as a UN member state in 1950 strongly rejected the falsely constructed status of Papua as a non-self governing territory.

It is very important to look at the issue of Papua from a comprehensive historical perspective. Since 1945, the definition of Indonesia has emphasized the completeness of the national territory that should comprise all the territories of the NEI, including Papua.

Thus, from this point of view, the word "annexation" is wrong because what happened was actually "the restoration" of the NEI territories (modern Indonesia) including Papua, which then remained under the Dutch colonial yoke.

Thus, when the real question is basically a fulfillment of an irredentist claim long denied by the colonial power, and while "one man, one vote" is practically not the core issue at hand, the argument of "selecting 1,022 Papuans out of nearly 800,000" (for the Act of Free Choice in 1969) is no longer relevant because such an effort was pursued simply to accommodate difficult circumstances in Papua at the time, both relating to the human and social conditions as well as to the geographical situation and its inherent technical problems.

For Indonesia, restoration of Papua is final and irrevocable because it is a historical fact that has been endorsed by the UN.

We, however, recognize that there are perceived grievances challenging the Papuans that require serious and honest attention. Accordingly, we believe that the enhancement of the implementation of Special Autonomy Law in Papua remains the best solution and represents a democratic response, which is most realistic for Papua.

The writer is the Director for Public Diplomacy and Head of the Working Group on Papua at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia