Setting the record straight on Papua not just perception

Setting the record straight on Papua not just perception

Andri Hadi, Jakarta

On Aug. 10, 2004, The Jakarta Post published an article by John
Saltford responding to mine (The Jakarta Post, July 30) on the
issue of Papua. Without any intention to generate a polemic, I
feel compelled to take issue with some of the arguments contained
in his article in order to set the record straight about Papua.

Saltford's article involved facts, opinions as well as
interpretations molded in such a manner seemingly intended to
support the idea of an independent Papua. This is not surprising
since Saltford has long been well-known as a scholar holding such
a stand.

It is pertinent to note that what is now known as modern
Indonesia was formed based on the principle of usi possidentis,
i.e. covering all territories that used to fall under the control
of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), extending from Sabang
(northern tip of Aceh) to Merauke (southeastern corner of Papua).

In contrast to ethnic nationalism, which is based on a certain
ethnicity, Indonesia's nationalism has been characterized as a
civic nationalism (Leifer, 2002), which is inclusive of all
ethnic groups existing in the NEI territories.

Under such a condition, cultural identity has never been
regarded as a strong factor in Indonesia's nationalism in the
sense that Indonesians shall never claim territories such as
Malaysia (peninsular and eastern) or Brunei, simply because they
were clearly not a part of the NEI territories, although the
populations of these territories share Malay cultural identity
and belong to common Malay stock.

It is also pertinent to note that special autonomy has been
unfolding since 2001. Saltford was not factually accurate when he
stated that the autonomy policy is "still unimplemented". Law No.
21/2001 on Special Autonomy is being implemented and progress has
been noted, including the allocation of more generous funds for
Papuan development that originated from exploration of Papua's
natural and other resources.

Saltford's interpretation concerning the expansion of the
Papuan territory into three provinces is bias. In fact, the Law
on Territorial Extension is currently under review by the
Constitutional Court.

Even if such a law (to split the territory into three) is
finally adopted in full, its implementation aims merely to
promote effective and efficient development in the region. In
terms of territorial size, Papua is almost as large as Papua New
Guinea (around 460,000 square kilometers), which currently has 27
administrative provinces.

Thus, for a territory such as Papua, which is in fact far
larger than England (around 243,000 square kilometers), it is
groundless to be allergic to any idea of administrative
extension. Many Papuans even believe that Papua could ideally be
administered by the establishment of six, instead of three,
distinct administrative provinces for promoting more equity in
the progress of development.

It seems that the issue of "one man, one vote" is central.
Yet, the New York agreement does not mention any such method.
Neither UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 contain
explicit provisions concerning methods required to implement
self-determination.

Moreover, paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 states that any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.

As evidence, after the adoption of resolutions 1514 and 1541
more than 50 new states in Asia and Africa gained their political
independence without resorting to the "one man, one vote" method.

Furthermore, the claim that Papua was listed in the United
Nations as non-self governing territory is quite misleading. It
is true that the Dutch in 1946 put Papua on the non-self
governing territory list, but this was only part of the colonial
strategy to deny the restoration by Indonesia of the full extent
of its legitimate territories based on the principle of usi
possidentis.

Basically, this Dutch strategy went unchallenged in the UN
because Indonesia was not yet a member state of the world body in
1946. And, for this reason, the government of Indonesia since its
admission as a UN member state in 1950 strongly rejected the
falsely constructed status of Papua as a non-self governing
territory.

It is very important to look at the issue of Papua from a
comprehensive historical perspective. Since 1945, the definition
of Indonesia has emphasized the completeness of the national
territory that should comprise all the territories of the NEI,
including Papua.

Thus, from this point of view, the word "annexation" is wrong
because what happened was actually "the restoration" of the NEI
territories (modern Indonesia) including Papua, which then
remained under the Dutch colonial yoke.

Thus, when the real question is basically a fulfillment of an
irredentist claim long denied by the colonial power, and while
"one man, one vote" is practically not the core issue at hand,
the argument of "selecting 1,022 Papuans out of nearly 800,000"
(for the Act of Free Choice in 1969) is no longer relevant
because such an effort was pursued simply to accommodate
difficult circumstances in Papua at the time, both relating to
the human and social conditions as well as to the geographical
situation and its inherent technical problems.

For Indonesia, restoration of Papua is final and irrevocable
because it is a historical fact that has been endorsed by the UN.

We, however, recognize that there are perceived grievances
challenging the Papuans that require serious and honest
attention. Accordingly, we believe that the enhancement of the
implementation of Special Autonomy Law in Papua remains the best
solution and represents a democratic response, which is most
realistic for Papua.

The writer is the Director for Public Diplomacy and Head of
the Working Group on Papua at the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia