Seeking a stance on Bush's 'Nixon streak'

Seeking a stance on Bush's 'Nixon streak'

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. has given
President Bush a sense of purpose, mission and leadership.

This follows a decade of uncertainty in U.S. policies and lost
opportunities after the cold war has been won and the U.S. has
become the world's only superpower.

Bush's rhetoric, perhaps out of need, has become much more
forceful in a time of crisis. He now receives approval ratings of
more than 80 percent among the American public.

But what will be the future policies of the Bush
administration in relation to terrorism and other threats, such
as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

What did Bush really mean when he referred to Iraq, Iran and
North Korea as an "axis of evil"?

And what is he intending to achieve and what will the
consequences of this be for his allies and friends?

First, one needs to recognize that President Bush has a "Nixon
streak." One cannot tell beforehand whether he is willing -- or
unwilling -- to do something dramatic, such as launching attacks
on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Also unclear whether he will go it alone if he feels that
those weapons are a threat to the U.S.

It appears clear that Bush intends to send a warning to the
three countries, especially Iraq. Regarding Iraq, it appears that
Bush is prepared to go much further than giving a warning.

His campaign against the "axis of evil" may have been inspired
by former president Ronald Reagan, who called the Soviet Union an
"evil empire." That started a debate among the Soviet leadership,
between the "ideologues" and the "pragmatists," on how to react
to American provocation. It is unclear whether the same internal
divisions exist now in the three countries, and whether a same
internal debate could be aroused there.

The Bush administration has warmed relations with Iran due to
its support at the beginning of the anti-terrorist war in
Afghanistan. But the White House grew disappointed at their
continued support for terrorism in the Middle East, and with
regard to the smuggled weapons into Israel.

It is also believed that Iran has allowed supporters of al-
Qaeda and the Taliban to flee through Iran. The efforts of Iran
for acquiring weapons of mass destruction are viewed as a
dangerous development for the near future.

On the North Korean regime, it was considered a personal
conviction on the president's part, and was accepted more and
more to be a warning.

There is hope for some change when the President visits South
Korea, China and Japan in mid-February.

The Bush administration certainly has a problem with lumping
North Korea in the same league with Iraq and Iran, because it
considered Pyongyang as having fulfilled its obligations in
controlling its weapons of mass destruction.

The real questions for U.S. allies and friends are about how
to react and balance Bush's unilateral moves in the war against
terrorism.

Most allies are not convinced of the need to put the three
countries together in the same category, as each nation has its
own unique aspects which must be considered before launching any
kind of military action.

And, by putting them together, the Bush administration will
endanger the very coalitions that the U.S. has so successfully
established for the recent fighting in Afghanistan.

These international coalitions have also played a vital role
in preventing other attacks against U.S. interests and citizens
elsewhere through a series of crackdowns on al-Qaeda cells.

There are people in the administration who really believe that
groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime will lose much of their
momentum if the U.S. does not show resolve to help them soon.

But they do recognize that Iraq would be more difficult to
subdue than Afghanistan.

Whether the Bush team is really willing to face down the
mullahs of Iran is another question; on North Korea, they seem
more willing to listen to their allies -- namely South Korea and
Japan -- who will face the brunt of any action, and China, which
has been helpful in drawing North Korea out its isolation.

Allies and friends must look to the Bush administration to
influence them on these questions instead of protesting its ideas
and policies. And as more friendly governments do their jobs in
the anti-terrorist flight, the more influence they will have on
the U.S. -- though not immediately, or in every aspect.

There are other centers of terrorism in the eyes of this
administration to worry about, namely Yemen and Somalia and, of
course, also Southeast Asia. In this region, there is already a
group of U.S. military advisors in the fight against Abu Sayyaf
in the Southern Philippines since they were linked to the al-
Qaeda network, and still support them.

But the U.S. must be careful not to make the MILF, a Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (a bigger threat to the Philippine
government, with whom they are now negotiating a political
settlement) a target and, hence, a bigger danger to the
Philippine government.

Other cooperation in Southeast Asia has come mainly from
intelligence exchanges and police crackdowns and investigations
in Malaysia and Singapore.

The weakest place is considered to be Indonesia, mainly
because of the multiple crises from a weak central government
which cannot get its act together in many ways.

There is no intention from the Bush administration to get the
Pentagon involved here, as Indonesia has always been reluctant to
cooperate militarily.

The U.S. is also limited in cooperating with the Indonesian
military (TNI) due to its human rights violations.

Further, the U.S. has recognized that the TNI has also their
own limitations in their role and leadership in a democratic
Indonesia. So any future cooperation with the TNI will take time
and real preparation. In the meantime, cooperation in
intelligence and police work can take place in a limited way.

Despite all the rhetoric of unilateralism in the Bush
administration, the record shows that, if necessary, it is
willing to be pragmatic and multilateral in its policies.

To that end, it is also willing to create a number of
coalitions in the fight against terrorism.

This willingness was not expected at the beginning. For
instance, the U.S. is willing to participate in maintaining peace
in Afghanistan, since the main war has been over, despite an
earlier pronouncement against it.

The U.S. is accepting the application of the Geneva Convention
on the Taliban prisoners after much criticism of its allies, and
also because of interest. Some change is expected in relation to
its policies towards North Korea in the coming visit of President
Bush in the region due to pressure from allies and friends.

Coalitions with Muslim countries have been established and
cooperation with Muslim groups and elite's have been quite
encouraging.

Only in the Israeli-Palestine conflict is a more active and
balanced U.S. policy expected because the problem is not only
Arafat but also Ariel Sharon; both sides have been instrumental
in getting themselves into their current mess.

And only listening to Sharon is not going to be helpful for
U.S. interests in the Middle East, particularly in respect of
Arab and Muslim support against terrorism.

In the end, the U.S. can only succeed if it builds a series of
coalitions to oppose terrorism.

As President Bush rightly said, fighting terrorism and other
threats can only be done if it is a long term effort in an all-
encompassing struggle, and not only via the military.

For that to be successful, a coalitions are indeed a must;
and the Bush administration understands this.