Seeking a stance on Bush's 'Nixon streak'

Jusuf Wanandi, Member, Board of Trustees Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. has given President Bush a sense of purpose, mission and leadership.

This follows a decade of uncertainty in U.S. policies and lost opportunities after the cold war has been won and the U.S. has become the world's only superpower.

Bush's rhetoric, perhaps out of need, has become much more forceful in a time of crisis. He now receives approval ratings of more than 80 percent among the American public.

But what will be the future policies of the Bush administration in relation to terrorism and other threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?

What did Bush really mean when he referred to Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil"?

And what is he intending to achieve and what will the consequences of this be for his allies and friends?

First, one needs to recognize that President Bush has a "Nixon streak." One cannot tell beforehand whether he is willing -- or unwilling -- to do something dramatic, such as launching attacks on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Also unclear whether he will go it alone if he feels that those weapons are a threat to the U.S.

It appears clear that Bush intends to send a warning to the three countries, especially Iraq. Regarding Iraq, it appears that Bush is prepared to go much further than giving a warning.

His campaign against the "axis of evil" may have been inspired by former president Ronald Reagan, who called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." That started a debate among the Soviet leadership, between the "ideologues" and the "pragmatists," on how to react to American provocation. It is unclear whether the same internal divisions exist now in the three countries, and whether a same internal debate could be aroused there.

The Bush administration has warmed relations with Iran due to its support at the beginning of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan. But the White House grew disappointed at their continued support for terrorism in the Middle East, and with regard to the smuggled weapons into Israel.

It is also believed that Iran has allowed supporters of al- Qaeda and the Taliban to flee through Iran. The efforts of Iran for acquiring weapons of mass destruction are viewed as a dangerous development for the near future.

On the North Korean regime, it was considered a personal conviction on the president's part, and was accepted more and more to be a warning.

There is hope for some change when the President visits South Korea, China and Japan in mid-February.

The Bush administration certainly has a problem with lumping North Korea in the same league with Iraq and Iran, because it considered Pyongyang as having fulfilled its obligations in controlling its weapons of mass destruction.

The real questions for U.S. allies and friends are about how to react and balance Bush's unilateral moves in the war against terrorism.

Most allies are not convinced of the need to put the three countries together in the same category, as each nation has its own unique aspects which must be considered before launching any kind of military action.

And, by putting them together, the Bush administration will endanger the very coalitions that the U.S. has so successfully established for the recent fighting in Afghanistan.

These international coalitions have also played a vital role in preventing other attacks against U.S. interests and citizens elsewhere through a series of crackdowns on al-Qaeda cells.

There are people in the administration who really believe that groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime will lose much of their momentum if the U.S. does not show resolve to help them soon.

But they do recognize that Iraq would be more difficult to subdue than Afghanistan.

Whether the Bush team is really willing to face down the mullahs of Iran is another question; on North Korea, they seem more willing to listen to their allies -- namely South Korea and Japan -- who will face the brunt of any action, and China, which has been helpful in drawing North Korea out its isolation.

Allies and friends must look to the Bush administration to influence them on these questions instead of protesting its ideas and policies. And as more friendly governments do their jobs in the anti-terrorist flight, the more influence they will have on the U.S. -- though not immediately, or in every aspect.

There are other centers of terrorism in the eyes of this administration to worry about, namely Yemen and Somalia and, of course, also Southeast Asia. In this region, there is already a group of U.S. military advisors in the fight against Abu Sayyaf in the Southern Philippines since they were linked to the al- Qaeda network, and still support them.

But the U.S. must be careful not to make the MILF, a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (a bigger threat to the Philippine government, with whom they are now negotiating a political settlement) a target and, hence, a bigger danger to the Philippine government.

Other cooperation in Southeast Asia has come mainly from intelligence exchanges and police crackdowns and investigations in Malaysia and Singapore.

The weakest place is considered to be Indonesia, mainly because of the multiple crises from a weak central government which cannot get its act together in many ways.

There is no intention from the Bush administration to get the Pentagon involved here, as Indonesia has always been reluctant to cooperate militarily.

The U.S. is also limited in cooperating with the Indonesian military (TNI) due to its human rights violations.

Further, the U.S. has recognized that the TNI has also their own limitations in their role and leadership in a democratic Indonesia. So any future cooperation with the TNI will take time and real preparation. In the meantime, cooperation in intelligence and police work can take place in a limited way.

Despite all the rhetoric of unilateralism in the Bush administration, the record shows that, if necessary, it is willing to be pragmatic and multilateral in its policies.

To that end, it is also willing to create a number of coalitions in the fight against terrorism.

This willingness was not expected at the beginning. For instance, the U.S. is willing to participate in maintaining peace in Afghanistan, since the main war has been over, despite an earlier pronouncement against it.

The U.S. is accepting the application of the Geneva Convention on the Taliban prisoners after much criticism of its allies, and also because of interest. Some change is expected in relation to its policies towards North Korea in the coming visit of President Bush in the region due to pressure from allies and friends.

Coalitions with Muslim countries have been established and cooperation with Muslim groups and elite's have been quite encouraging.

Only in the Israeli-Palestine conflict is a more active and balanced U.S. policy expected because the problem is not only Arafat but also Ariel Sharon; both sides have been instrumental in getting themselves into their current mess.

And only listening to Sharon is not going to be helpful for U.S. interests in the Middle East, particularly in respect of Arab and Muslim support against terrorism.

In the end, the U.S. can only succeed if it builds a series of coalitions to oppose terrorism.

As President Bush rightly said, fighting terrorism and other threats can only be done if it is a long term effort in an all- encompassing struggle, and not only via the military.

For that to be successful, a coalitions are indeed a must; and the Bush administration understands this.