Security in the Straits: threats and challenges

Security in the Straits: threats and challenges

Nugroho Wisnumurti
Jakarta

Over the last few years security threats in the Malacca and
Singapore straits have heightened. The prospect of terrorist
attacks and attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
in the waterways are real. These developments have raised serious
concerns, not only among the coastal states bordering the straits
(Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), but also the user states
such as Japan, China, South Korea, India and the United States.

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), at
least 50,000 ships sail through the Malacca strait every year,
transporting the oil needs of China and Japan (80 percent of both
Japan's and China's oil needs) and about 30 percent of the
world's trade goods. In fact, the strait is a passageway for a
third of the world's crude oil. Thus the Strait of Malacca, which
constitutes the second-busiest shipping lane in the world, has a
quite significant strategic value.

Last year, Adm. Thomas Fargo, head of the U.S. forces in the
Asia and Pacific in his testimony to the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee suggested that U.S.
troops assist in patrolling the Strait of Malacca to deter
terrorists who might target vessels in the strait, under the so-
termed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).

Indonesia and Malaysia immediately expressed their objections.
Deploying foreign forces to the strait, which is part of the
territorial sea and economic zone of the littoral states, would
infringe upon the sovereign rights of those states and would
internationalize the strait.

Another reason for opposing the deployment of foreign forces
is the fear of a backlash from radical elements in the littoral
states.

While Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stand against
the deployment of foreign forces in the Strait of Malacca to
combat piracy and terrorism, Singapore has shown some flexibility
on this issue

While among the states bordering the Malacca and Singapore
straits there have always been some differences of opinion, the
three littoral states have shared responsibility for the safety
of the strait and the protection and preservation of its marine
environment.

In order to help the littoral states, Japan, for example, as a
user state established the Malacca Strait Council, which provides
a revolving fund for combating marine pollution from ships in the
straits.

While the interest of the littoral states was initially driven
by the desire to ensure the safety of the straits and to protect
the environment it is undeniable that the straits constitute part
of an area that is a major security concern for the coastal
states, as evident in various ASEAN security agreements such as
the 1971 Treaty on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in
Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN), 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone (SEANWFZ), 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the
recently adopted ASEAN Security Community as a part of the Bali
Concord II.

There is no doubt that the straits have strategic value for
the major powers that have stakes in the region. The United
States is a major player in the region, which has interest in
maintaining its dominance and influence.

China is acknowledged as the rising power in the region --
economically, politically and militarily. China is flexing its
military muscle as well as its ability to deploy "soft power" to
challenge the dominance of the U.S. and to check the growing
influence of its rival rising power, India. China recently even
conducted war games with Russia in the Yellow Sea codenamed
"Peace Mission 2005".

Thus it is logical that China opposes the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the U.S. Furthermore,
China with its incredible economic growth is in serious need of
oil from the Middle East passing through the straits. It is,
therefore, clear that in this power game, the security of the
straits is of paramount importance to China.

Japan, struggling to regain the status of the economic
locomotive of Asia and to raise its political profile in the
region and in the global arena, has the interest of preventing
the flow of needed oil through being disrupted.

India as another rising power and an acknowledged nuclear
power is also aspiring for dominance in the region, flexing its
military muscle and sending its naval fleet to make port visits
in the region, including to Jakarta harbour recently.

These developments can only be construed as a part of the
changing strategic environment in the region, which has to be
taken into account by the littoral states. It is essential that
in addressing the security threats in the straits, the littoral
states should avoid being dragged into the power games of outside
powers.

What the littoral states need is for the major players in the
region to be working for the establishment of a new power
equilibrium. It is necessary that further efforts for sustainable
and effective cooperation be made, inter alia:

* Upholding the principles contained in the Joint Ministerial
Statement on the straits of Malacca and Singapore issued by the
foreign ministers of the three littoral states on Aug. 2.

* Establishing a permanent joint mechanism composed of naval
officers at working level from the three littoral states based in
one of the littoral states that has the best access to the
straits. This mechanism would serve as a center for monitoring
and reporting, the exchange of information and the sharing of
intelligence, and for a quick-response command.

* More effective coordinated patrols by the navies and other
enforcement agencies of the littoral states, with an arrangement
that allows "hot pursuit" into the territorial sea of another
littoral state.

* Drawing up clear guidelines or "rules of engagement" and
other procedures necessary for effective law enforcement
operations;

* Investigating and taking action against perpetrators of
piracy/sea robbers at its source, i.e. at villages or other sites
where they launch their action from, or where they hide, and
isolating them from the local elements supporting them.

* Ensure the effective implementation of air patrol over the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore dubbed "The Eyes in the Sky"
(EiS) adopted recently by the Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore organized by the three littoral States,
Thailand and IMO (International Maritime Organization).

* Oppose the use of a private armed escort to protect ships
passing through the straits.

* User States should provide financial assistance, and for
that purpose establish a system of burden-sharing by, for
example, establishing a revolving fund such as the existing one
established by Japan;

* The three littoral states should promote cooperation with
and seek assistance from the IMO and other appropriate
international organizations.

* User states should provide assistance by providing the
necessary equipment, training for capacity-building, exchange of
information and sharing of intelligence.

The writer was formerly Indonesian ambassador/permanent
representative to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva.
He is currently a senior fellow of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). The article is an abbreviated
version of an essay due to appear in the forthcoming issue of the
Duta Journal, published by the Indonesian Council on World
Affairs.