Security in the Straits: The threats and challenges

Nugroho Wisnumurti, Jakarta

Over the last few years security threats in the Malacca and Singapore straits have heightened. The prospect of terrorist attacks and attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the waterways are real. These developments have raised serious concerns, not only among the coastal states bordering the straits (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), but also the user states such as Japan, China, South Korea, India and the United States.

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), at least 50,000 ships sail through the Malacca strait every year, transporting the oil needs of China and Japan (80 percent of both Japan's and China's oil needs) and about 30 percent of the world's trade goods. In fact, the strait is a passageway for a third of the world's crude oil. Thus the Strait of Malacca, which constitutes the second-busiest shipping lane in the world, has a quite significant strategic value.

Last year, Adm. Thomas Fargo, head of the U.S. forces in the Asia and Pacific in his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee suggested that U.S. troops assist in patrolling the Strait of Malacca to deter terrorists who might target vessels in the strait, under the so- termed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI).

Indonesia and Malaysia immediately expressed their objections. Deploying foreign forces to the strait, which is part of the territorial sea and economic zone of the littoral states, would infringe upon the sovereign rights of those states and would internationalize the strait.

Another reason for opposing the deployment of foreign forces is the fear of a backlash from radical elements in the littoral states.

While Indonesia and Malaysia have taken a firm stand against the deployment of foreign forces in the Strait of Malacca to combat piracy and terrorism, Singapore has shown some flexibility on this issue

While among the states bordering the Malacca and Singapore straits there have always been some differences of opinion, the three littoral states have shared responsibility for the safety of the strait and the protection and preservation of its marine environment.

In order to help the littoral states, Japan, for example, as a user state established the Malacca Strait Council, which provides a revolving fund for combating marine pollution from ships in the straits.

While the interest of the littoral states was initially driven by the desire to ensure the safety of the straits and to protect the environment it is undeniable that the straits constitute part of an area that is a major security concern for the coastal states, as evident in various ASEAN security agreements such as the 1971 Treaty on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN), 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the recently adopted ASEAN Security Community as a part of the Bali Concord II.

There is no doubt that the straits have strategic value for the major powers that have stakes in the region. The United States is a major player in the region, which has interest in maintaining its dominance and influence.

China is acknowledged as the rising power in the region -- economically, politically and militarily. China is flexing its military muscle as well as its ability to deploy "soft power" to challenge the dominance of the U.S. and to check the growing influence of its rival rising power, India. China recently even conducted war games with Russia in the Yellow Sea codenamed "Peace Mission 2005".

Thus it is logical that China opposes the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the U.S. Furthermore, China with its incredible economic growth is in serious need of oil from the Middle East passing through the straits. It is, therefore, clear that in this power game, the security of the straits is of paramount importance to China.

Japan, struggling to regain the status of the economic locomotive of Asia and to raise its political profile in the region and in the global arena, has the interest of preventing the flow of needed oil through being disrupted.

India as another rising power and an acknowledged nuclear power is also aspiring for dominance in the region, flexing its military muscle and sending its naval fleet to make port visits in the region, including to Jakarta harbour recently.

These developments can only be construed as a part of the changing strategic environment in the region, which has to be taken into account by the littoral states. It is essential that in addressing the security threats in the straits, the littoral states should avoid being dragged into the power games of outside powers.

What the littoral states need is for the major players in the region to be working for the establishment of a new power equilibrium. It is necessary that further efforts for sustainable and effective cooperation be made, inter alia:

* Upholding the principles contained in the Joint Ministerial Statement on the straits of Malacca and Singapore issued by the foreign ministers of the three littoral states on Aug. 2.

* Establishing a permanent joint mechanism composed of naval officers at working level from the three littoral states based in one of the littoral states that has the best access to the straits. This mechanism would serve as a center for monitoring and reporting, the exchange of information and the sharing of intelligence, and for a quick-response command.

* More effective coordinated patrols by the navies and other enforcement agencies of the littoral states, with an arrangement that allows "hot pursuit" into the territorial sea of another littoral state.

* Drawing up clear guidelines or "rules of engagement" and other procedures necessary for effective law enforcement operations;

* Investigating and taking action against perpetrators of piracy/sea robbers at its source, i.e. at villages or other sites where they launch their action from, or where they hide, and isolating them from the local elements supporting them.

* Ensure the effective implementation of air patrol over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore dubbed "The Eyes in the Sky" (EiS) adopted recently by the Jakarta Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore organized by the three littoral States, Thailand and IMO (International Maritime Organization).

* Oppose the use of a private armed escort to protect ships passing through the straits.

* User States should provide financial assistance, and for that purpose establish a system of burden-sharing by, for example, establishing a revolving fund such as the existing one established by Japan;

* The three littoral states should promote cooperation with and seek assistance from the IMO and other appropriate international organizations.

* User states should provide assistance by providing the necessary equipment, training for capacity-building, exchange of information and sharing of intelligence.

The writer was formerly Indonesian ambassador/permanent representative to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva. He is currently a senior fellow of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The article is an abbreviated version of an essay due to appear in the forthcoming issue of the Duta Journal, published by the Indonesian Council on World Affairs.