Security in the Malacca Straits: Who is responsible?

Nugroho Wisnumurti Former Director General for Political Affairs Ministry Foreign Affairs Jakarta

It has been reported in the media that the United States plans to implement its Regional Maritime Security Initiative, under which the country intends to deploy marines and special-operation forces on high speed vessels along the Malacca Straits to flush out terrorists. The details of this initiative are at this stage unclear. However, foreign ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa has issued a statement on the official position of Indonesia in its opposition to the U.S. plan.

Fighting terrorism through regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, or on any part of the globe for that matter, is something to be applauded. However, fighting terrorism in the Malacca and Singapore Straits by allowing the use of military force by any country other than the coastal states (Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore) is another matter.

Over the years, the coastal States have shown great interest in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. On Nov. 16, 1971, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore issued a joint communique reaffirming the responsibility of the coastal states in the Straits, including in the safety of navigating the straits.

On Feb. 24, 1977, Adam Malik, who was at that time foreign minister of Indonesia, together with foreign ministers Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen of Malaysia and Rajaratnam of Singapore signed an agreement reaffirming the 1971 joint statement and their determination "to further promote the existing tripartite cooperation on enhancing the safety of navigation and promoting close cooperation and coordination on antipollution policies and measures in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore".

While the interest of the coastal states was initially driven by the desire to ensure the safety of navigation and to protect the marine environment in the straits, it is undeniable that the straits constitute part of an area where the coastal states have a major security concern. This is evident in various ASEAN security instruments such as the 1971 Treaty on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN), 1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the recently adopted ASEAN Security Community as a part of the Bali Concord II.

Aside from the security aspects, it is essential also to look at the legal aspects relating to the straits. The waters in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, under international law, constitute part of the territorial waters of the coastal states, over which they have sovereignty. This sovereignty is subject only to the regime of transit passage as stipulated by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, a convention which through state practice has become customary international law. For these reasons, any activities or maneuvers in the straits by foreign vessels, which are not exercising the right of transit passage -- whether they are for civilian or military purposes -- are subject to the consent of the respective coastal States.

The territorial waters of a country are basically the extension of its land territory. Thus, security in the territorial waters, or in this case, the Malacca and Singapore Straits, is the responsibility of the respective coastal states. And if Indonesia, under its laws and regulations and its foreign policy does not permit the deployment of foreign forces in its territory, even if the aim is to fight terrorism, the deployment of foreign marines and special-operation forces in the straits would not be consistent with international law and could harm the national interests of Indonesia.

There are also political considerations which deserve serious attention, namely the possible impact of the U.S. plan on one of the basic principles of the Indonesian foreign policy, the policy of non-alignment. As a non-aligned country, the deployment of foreign forces in our territory, including in our territorial waters, will run counter to this cardinal principle.

Being that as it may, the U.S. plan, under its Regional Maritime Security Initiative -- however well-intentioned that plan might be -- would not serve the best interests of the countries concerned in fostering regional cooperation to fight terrorism. There should be other ways to reach the same objectives. It is also desirable that the countries concerned should be consulted before any effort to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia is made public.

The writer was also former ambassador to the United Nations in New York and in Geneva