Security first

Security first

U.S. senator Tom Harkin is not alone in calling on the United
Nations to send a peacekeeping force to East Timor to ensure
security during and after the Aug. 30 ballot. At the end of his
visit to the territory on Saturday, the Iowa Democrat said he
would bring up the proposal with U.S. President Bill Clinton and
the United Nations on his return to the U.S.

But Harkin's recommendation might as well be a voice in the
wilderness as far as the Indonesian government is concerned. For
Jakarta, a UN peacekeeping force in East Timor is not in the
cards, and never has been. The agreement Indonesia signed with
Portugal and the United Nations in May stipulates that
responsibility for the security in the run up, during and
immediately after the ballot rests with the Indonesian
government. The United Nations will send civilian police officers
to assist and monitor the organization of security in the area.
The security task of Indonesia, in this case the Indonesian
Military (TNI), includes disarming the hostile sides in East
Timor.

While Harkin's proposal for a UN peacekeeping force departs
from stipulations of the May agreement, it reflects the
international community's growing concern, if not frustration, at
Indonesia's inability to secure peace and order, which all agree
is a prerequisite for a truly free and fair ballot in the
province. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has already postponed
the ballot date twice, chiefly because of concerns about the
security situation. The United States and Australia have publicly
criticized the Indonesian government for its failure to contain
violence committed by both proindependence and pro-Indonesia
camps. In short, the international community is not impressed.

The United Nations Mission on East Timor (UNAMET) looks set to
go ahead with the ballot on Monday despite the deteriorating
security situation. This contradicts its own principle that there
can be no real ballot in a hostile setting. UNAMET, and the
Indonesian government, are prepared to take the risks entailed in
holding a ballot in such an environment.

Reports and comments from East Timor this past week suggest
that tension is rising and will further escalate, rather than
abate, before the ballot. The UN and the Indonesian government
have even begun preparing for the various scenarios that could
emerge after the ballot. A recommendation to beef up the UN
civilian police force only confirms that they both fear, or
anticipate, the worst.

To be fair to Jakarta, nobody said that managing security in
East Timor would be easy. Animosity between the proindependence
and pro-Indonesia camps runs deep, dating back to the 1975 civil
war which broke out in the wake of the hasty departure of the
Portuguese colonial administration. Indonesian military
intervention in that civil war changed the picture entirely,
turning it into a war between Indonesian forces and the
proindependence camp.

A UN peacekeeping force, as suggested by Harkin, would have
trouble securing the support of the two sides in order to conduct
its task. But TNI faces an almost insurmountable challenge: How
to win the trust and confidence of the proindependence camp to
propel its members to surrender their weapons. It is hard to
imagine Falintil, the armed wing of the proindependence Fretilin
faction, handing over its weapons to the very force it fought
bitterly against in the past 24 years.

Instead of disarming the sides, we have heard reports of
elements in TNI arming the pro-Indonesia militias, which in turn
are blamed for committing some of the recent acts of violence and
terrorization. TNI also has been accused of taking sides, or of
being indifferent to the atrocities committed by pro-Indonesia
camps. Although TNI has issued denials, the allegations have
chipped away at the military's credibility as it attempts to
carry out its tasks in East Timor.

With less than a week before balloting, the idea of disarming
the warring camps appears to have been dropped, or put aside, as
UNAMET and the Indonesian government forge ahead with
preparations. Given that the hostile sides are still fully armed,
we are left with disturbing misgivings about what will follow the
vote. Will the loser, whichever side that may be, graciously
accept the result, or will it turn its weapons on the winner?
Since the Indonesian government insists on being fully in charge
of the security situation, it also will have to go it alone in
shouldering the responsibility if violence erupts after the
ballot.