Security first
U.S. senator Tom Harkin is not alone in calling on the United Nations to send a peacekeeping force to East Timor to ensure security during and after the Aug. 30 ballot. At the end of his visit to the territory on Saturday, the Iowa Democrat said he would bring up the proposal with U.S. President Bill Clinton and the United Nations on his return to the U.S.
But Harkin's recommendation might as well be a voice in the wilderness as far as the Indonesian government is concerned. For Jakarta, a UN peacekeeping force in East Timor is not in the cards, and never has been. The agreement Indonesia signed with Portugal and the United Nations in May stipulates that responsibility for the security in the run up, during and immediately after the ballot rests with the Indonesian government. The United Nations will send civilian police officers to assist and monitor the organization of security in the area. The security task of Indonesia, in this case the Indonesian Military (TNI), includes disarming the hostile sides in East Timor.
While Harkin's proposal for a UN peacekeeping force departs from stipulations of the May agreement, it reflects the international community's growing concern, if not frustration, at Indonesia's inability to secure peace and order, which all agree is a prerequisite for a truly free and fair ballot in the province. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has already postponed the ballot date twice, chiefly because of concerns about the security situation. The United States and Australia have publicly criticized the Indonesian government for its failure to contain violence committed by both proindependence and pro-Indonesia camps. In short, the international community is not impressed.
The United Nations Mission on East Timor (UNAMET) looks set to go ahead with the ballot on Monday despite the deteriorating security situation. This contradicts its own principle that there can be no real ballot in a hostile setting. UNAMET, and the Indonesian government, are prepared to take the risks entailed in holding a ballot in such an environment.
Reports and comments from East Timor this past week suggest that tension is rising and will further escalate, rather than abate, before the ballot. The UN and the Indonesian government have even begun preparing for the various scenarios that could emerge after the ballot. A recommendation to beef up the UN civilian police force only confirms that they both fear, or anticipate, the worst.
To be fair to Jakarta, nobody said that managing security in East Timor would be easy. Animosity between the proindependence and pro-Indonesia camps runs deep, dating back to the 1975 civil war which broke out in the wake of the hasty departure of the Portuguese colonial administration. Indonesian military intervention in that civil war changed the picture entirely, turning it into a war between Indonesian forces and the proindependence camp.
A UN peacekeeping force, as suggested by Harkin, would have trouble securing the support of the two sides in order to conduct its task. But TNI faces an almost insurmountable challenge: How to win the trust and confidence of the proindependence camp to propel its members to surrender their weapons. It is hard to imagine Falintil, the armed wing of the proindependence Fretilin faction, handing over its weapons to the very force it fought bitterly against in the past 24 years.
Instead of disarming the sides, we have heard reports of elements in TNI arming the pro-Indonesia militias, which in turn are blamed for committing some of the recent acts of violence and terrorization. TNI also has been accused of taking sides, or of being indifferent to the atrocities committed by pro-Indonesia camps. Although TNI has issued denials, the allegations have chipped away at the military's credibility as it attempts to carry out its tasks in East Timor.
With less than a week before balloting, the idea of disarming the warring camps appears to have been dropped, or put aside, as UNAMET and the Indonesian government forge ahead with preparations. Given that the hostile sides are still fully armed, we are left with disturbing misgivings about what will follow the vote. Will the loser, whichever side that may be, graciously accept the result, or will it turn its weapons on the winner? Since the Indonesian government insists on being fully in charge of the security situation, it also will have to go it alone in shouldering the responsibility if violence erupts after the ballot.