SE Asia's age of Thaksin

SE Asia's age of Thaksin

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Project Syndicate

The retirements from frontline politics of Singapore's Lee
Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad have deprived Southeast
Asia of its senior leaders. Can Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra fill the regional leadership vacuum?

A series of bold foreign-policy strokes -- the Asia
Cooperation Dialogue, the Economic Cooperation Strategy for the
development of mainland Southeast Asia, and America's designation
of Thailand as a "major non-NATO ally" -- turned the
international spotlight on Thaksin during his first term.
Violence in Thailand's predominantly Muslim south seemed to dent
his ambitions last year, but his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party's
landslide victory last February gave his bid for regional
leadership a new lease on life.

With the TRT capturing over 75 percent of the seats in the
lower house of parliament, Thaksin is now politically invincible
at home. Indeed, he has become the first elected Thai leader to
finish a four-year term, be re-elected, and preside over a one-
party government. Thaksin's dominance of Thai politics is
unprecedented, and his resilient popularity in the face of a
fickle electorate is unparalleled.

Apart from his complete control of domestic politics, Thaksin
commands other prerequisites of regional leadership. Already
eyeing a third term, he can count on political longevity on the
order of Mahathir's 22-year rule. Notwithstanding the one-party
system that the TRT is cultivating, Thaksin is armed with
democratic legitimacy in a global arena bent on democracy
promotion, and he speaks English decently enough to articulate
his views and vision to a global audience.

He even has his own development strategy, dubbed
"Thaksinomics," a self-styled approach that blends neo-liberal
export-led growth with grassroots-based domestic demand. The Thai
economy emerged out of its post-1997 crisis doldrums under
Thaksin's watch, and is now firmly positioned on a 6 percent
annual growth trajectory. While it relies on profligate subsidies
and cash handouts, Thaksinomics also banks on structural reforms
to propel economic growth.

The strategy's most promising prospects include the promotion
of industrial upgrading, niche industries, and competitiveness-
boosting cluster projects that aim to make Thailand a global and
regional hub for food, fashion, tourism, automobiles, and
healthcare. A vibrant economy -- GDP growth is second only to
China's in Asia -- is indispensable for regional leadership.

Of the policies that will determine his future role in the
region, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue and Economic Cooperation
Strategy stand out. Based on the concept of "Asia for Asians,"
the nascent ACD's membership straddles the Asian landmass from
the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East, with Thailand at the
geographic center. Although its future directions are uncertain,
this 26-member forum trumps Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN
Plus Three, which includes China, Japan, and South Korea.

The region-wide crisis in 1997, weak progress on free trade,
and the region's security vulnerabilities have made Thaksin aware
of ASEAN's limitations. As Indonesia's size makes it a natural
leader of ASEAN, the ACD lends Thaksin a broader platform that
stresses Thailand's geographical advantages. It allows him to
trumpet Thailand's strategic objectives and the region's major
issues, sometimes in confrontation with the interests and the
demands of the West. Within the ACD framework, Thaksin launched
the $1 billion "Asia Bond" last year in an effort to match Asia's
financial capital with its financing requirements.

In a smaller sphere of operations, the ECS envisages economic
development in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Under
Thaksin, Thailand graduated from aid recipient and became a donor
country for the first time, having turned away development
assistance from countries like Japan. A Thai fund of 10 billion
baht was established to provide outright aid and soft loans to
the ECS members. Like the ACD, the ECS shifts Thai foreign policy
priorities to the Southeast Asian mainland, highlighting
Thailand's role and Thaksin's canny leadership.

Two major obstacles stand in Thaksin's way. The raging
violence in southern Thailand over the past 15 months has made
him look bad, as his myriad strategies and tactics have failed
repeatedly. Nor have his bluster and ill temper improved matters.
Thaksin initially dismissed the violent attacks as the work of
bandits. Only late last year did he admit that southern Muslim
separatism was the cause.

Signs of a symbiotic relationship between local separatists
and regional terrorists have emerged. If the attacks widen beyond
the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, and
Narathiwat, Thaksin's regional leadership chances will be dimmed.

Thaksin knows this. Since his sweeping re-election, he has
been surprisingly modest and magnanimous. He has appointed Anand
Panyarachun, a former Thai prime minister who recently headed a
United Nations reform panel, to select and direct a blue-ribbon
national commission to seek reconciliation with the southern
separatists.

In addition, Thaksin will have to do something about Myanmar
if the international community is to accept his wider role. To
many, Thai-Myanmar relations are too cozy. Critics accuse Thaksin
of conflicts of interest, as his family-owned telecommunications
conglomerate holds sizeable investments in Myanmar.

It is now largely up to Thaksin himself. If he is enlightened
enough to make amends with disaffected southerners and move
beyond his vested interests in Myanmar, he retains a good shot at
becoming Asia's next spokesman.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a Professor of Political Science at
Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, is currently a Visiting
Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in
Singapore.