SE Asia's age of Thaksin

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Project Syndicate

The retirements from frontline politics of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad have deprived Southeast Asia of its senior leaders. Can Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra fill the regional leadership vacuum?

A series of bold foreign-policy strokes -- the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, the Economic Cooperation Strategy for the development of mainland Southeast Asia, and America's designation of Thailand as a "major non-NATO ally" -- turned the international spotlight on Thaksin during his first term. Violence in Thailand's predominantly Muslim south seemed to dent his ambitions last year, but his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party's landslide victory last February gave his bid for regional leadership a new lease on life.

With the TRT capturing over 75 percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament, Thaksin is now politically invincible at home. Indeed, he has become the first elected Thai leader to finish a four-year term, be re-elected, and preside over a one- party government. Thaksin's dominance of Thai politics is unprecedented, and his resilient popularity in the face of a fickle electorate is unparalleled.

Apart from his complete control of domestic politics, Thaksin commands other prerequisites of regional leadership. Already eyeing a third term, he can count on political longevity on the order of Mahathir's 22-year rule. Notwithstanding the one-party system that the TRT is cultivating, Thaksin is armed with democratic legitimacy in a global arena bent on democracy promotion, and he speaks English decently enough to articulate his views and vision to a global audience.

He even has his own development strategy, dubbed "Thaksinomics," a self-styled approach that blends neo-liberal export-led growth with grassroots-based domestic demand. The Thai economy emerged out of its post-1997 crisis doldrums under Thaksin's watch, and is now firmly positioned on a 6 percent annual growth trajectory. While it relies on profligate subsidies and cash handouts, Thaksinomics also banks on structural reforms to propel economic growth.

The strategy's most promising prospects include the promotion of industrial upgrading, niche industries, and competitiveness- boosting cluster projects that aim to make Thailand a global and regional hub for food, fashion, tourism, automobiles, and healthcare. A vibrant economy -- GDP growth is second only to China's in Asia -- is indispensable for regional leadership.

Of the policies that will determine his future role in the region, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue and Economic Cooperation Strategy stand out. Based on the concept of "Asia for Asians," the nascent ACD's membership straddles the Asian landmass from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East, with Thailand at the geographic center. Although its future directions are uncertain, this 26-member forum trumps Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and ASEAN Plus Three, which includes China, Japan, and South Korea.

The region-wide crisis in 1997, weak progress on free trade, and the region's security vulnerabilities have made Thaksin aware of ASEAN's limitations. As Indonesia's size makes it a natural leader of ASEAN, the ACD lends Thaksin a broader platform that stresses Thailand's geographical advantages. It allows him to trumpet Thailand's strategic objectives and the region's major issues, sometimes in confrontation with the interests and the demands of the West. Within the ACD framework, Thaksin launched the $1 billion "Asia Bond" last year in an effort to match Asia's financial capital with its financing requirements.

In a smaller sphere of operations, the ECS envisages economic development in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Under Thaksin, Thailand graduated from aid recipient and became a donor country for the first time, having turned away development assistance from countries like Japan. A Thai fund of 10 billion baht was established to provide outright aid and soft loans to the ECS members. Like the ACD, the ECS shifts Thai foreign policy priorities to the Southeast Asian mainland, highlighting Thailand's role and Thaksin's canny leadership.

Two major obstacles stand in Thaksin's way. The raging violence in southern Thailand over the past 15 months has made him look bad, as his myriad strategies and tactics have failed repeatedly. Nor have his bluster and ill temper improved matters. Thaksin initially dismissed the violent attacks as the work of bandits. Only late last year did he admit that southern Muslim separatism was the cause.

Signs of a symbiotic relationship between local separatists and regional terrorists have emerged. If the attacks widen beyond the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, Thaksin's regional leadership chances will be dimmed.

Thaksin knows this. Since his sweeping re-election, he has been surprisingly modest and magnanimous. He has appointed Anand Panyarachun, a former Thai prime minister who recently headed a United Nations reform panel, to select and direct a blue-ribbon national commission to seek reconciliation with the southern separatists.

In addition, Thaksin will have to do something about Myanmar if the international community is to accept his wider role. To many, Thai-Myanmar relations are too cozy. Critics accuse Thaksin of conflicts of interest, as his family-owned telecommunications conglomerate holds sizeable investments in Myanmar.

It is now largely up to Thaksin himself. If he is enlightened enough to make amends with disaffected southerners and move beyond his vested interests in Myanmar, he retains a good shot at becoming Asia's next spokesman.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a Professor of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.