SE Asian nuclear treaty faces last hurdles

SE Asian nuclear treaty faces last hurdles

This is the second of two articles on the Southeast Asia
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty.

By Agus Tarmidzi

GENEVA (JP): In contrast to the treaties of Rarotonga and
Tlatelolco, the treaty for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone has identified the continental shelves and the EEZ as
parts of the area of coverage. The area of coverage of the SEA-
NWFZ is unprecedented. Arguing that accepting this legal concept
would imply the recognition of the sovereign rights of the states
party to the treaty over these areas, the nuclear-weapons states
demanded appropriate adjustment to the article.

The most delicate questions, however, relate to the contents
of Article 2 of the protocol. From legal perspectives, the
provision of this article will severely limit the abilities of
all nuclear-weapons states to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons upon which their security and military doctrines are
still based (nuclear deterrence). Article 2 of the protocol
contains Negative Security Assurances (NSA) that, if fully
implemented, will have at least two legal consequences which are
detrimental to the interests of the nuclear-weapons states.

First, it will deny the rights of any particular nuclear-
weapons state to attack another state which is to the protocol
which might happen to be also a nuclear-weapons state. This is
considered to be totally against the military strategy of a
nuclear-weapons state to strike back if attacked by another
state, using nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the provision of Article 2 of the protocol will
also prevent the nuclear-weapons states from launching an attack
using nuclear weapons from the SEA-NWFZ against the states which
are not party to the protocol outside of the region. This, again,
is in full contradiction with the security doctrines and the
global posture of these states, especially the United States.

Paragraph 62 (b) of the SSOD-I final document indeed
requests all nuclear-weapons states to refrain from the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons against the states of the zone.
But to date, there have been no legal regimes to prevent the
nuclear-weapons states from using the nuclear weapon-free zones
to launch nuclear strikes. Even China, perhaps the most open-
minded nuclear-weapons state, has only committed itself to an
unilateral declaration, stating that it will not use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear-weapons-free zone and
its the states which are party to the protocol. On the same
issue, the other nuclear-weapons states refused to commit
themselves, let alone agree to the restrictions as envisaged in
Article 2 of the protocol of the treaty.

At the multilateral level, as we all may recall, the
negotiations on a NSA regime in the Conference on Disarmament have
also encountered unsurmountable difficulties for decades. And the
efforts of non-nuclear-weapon states to induce political support
from the nuclear-weapons states to conclude a legally-binding NSA
during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference were
similarly strongly resisted. It is, therefore, understandable
that one of the documents resulting from the conference,
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament", failed to reflect in a crystal-clear manner the
commitments of the nuclear-weapons states to negotiate the NSA
legal regime.

Intensive consultations and negotiations are called for in
order to circumvent these fundamental difficulties. It will
certainly take time and perseverance to be successful. The
Southeast Asian countries are well known for their determination
and patience. Above all, time will hopefully help bridge the
differences between the countries in the region and the nuclear-
weapons states. We are firmly convinced that these last hurdles
will finally be overcome. The entry into force of the treaty will
not only be in the interests of the states which are party to the
treaty but it will also serve the security interests of all
states, for it will strengthen further the commitments of the
states in the region to non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament. This, in turn, will also contribute to the
preservation and promotion of international peace and security to
which we all aspire.

The countries in the region will not squander this precious
opportunity to accomplish a task so vital and crucial to the
common security of mankind. This treaty is indeed an absolute
precondition to any workable structure of regional peace and
stability. As such, it would form a basis -- together with the
similar treaties in Latin America, the Pacific and Africa -- for
our hope that the next century will not repeat the savagery of
the one we are leaving behind, and that the anticipated
prosperity of the next generations will not be marred by the
terror wrought by these weapons of mass destruction.

Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi is the Indonesian Permanent
Representative to the UN Office in Geneva and Head of the
Indonesian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.