SE Asian nuclear treaty faces last hurdles

This is the second of two articles on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone treaty.

By Agus Tarmidzi

GENEVA (JP): In contrast to the treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco, the treaty for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone has identified the continental shelves and the EEZ as parts of the area of coverage. The area of coverage of the SEA- NWFZ is unprecedented. Arguing that accepting this legal concept would imply the recognition of the sovereign rights of the states party to the treaty over these areas, the nuclear-weapons states demanded appropriate adjustment to the article.

The most delicate questions, however, relate to the contents of Article 2 of the protocol. From legal perspectives, the provision of this article will severely limit the abilities of all nuclear-weapons states to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons upon which their security and military doctrines are still based (nuclear deterrence). Article 2 of the protocol contains Negative Security Assurances (NSA) that, if fully implemented, will have at least two legal consequences which are detrimental to the interests of the nuclear-weapons states.

First, it will deny the rights of any particular nuclear- weapons state to attack another state which is to the protocol which might happen to be also a nuclear-weapons state. This is considered to be totally against the military strategy of a nuclear-weapons state to strike back if attacked by another state, using nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the provision of Article 2 of the protocol will also prevent the nuclear-weapons states from launching an attack using nuclear weapons from the SEA-NWFZ against the states which are not party to the protocol outside of the region. This, again, is in full contradiction with the security doctrines and the global posture of these states, especially the United States.

Paragraph 62 (b) of the SSOD-I final document indeed requests all nuclear-weapons states to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the states of the zone. But to date, there have been no legal regimes to prevent the nuclear-weapons states from using the nuclear weapon-free zones to launch nuclear strikes. Even China, perhaps the most open- minded nuclear-weapons state, has only committed itself to an unilateral declaration, stating that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a nuclear-weapons-free zone and its the states which are party to the protocol. On the same issue, the other nuclear-weapons states refused to commit themselves, let alone agree to the restrictions as envisaged in Article 2 of the protocol of the treaty.

At the multilateral level, as we all may recall, the negotiations on a NSA regime in the Conference on Disarmament have also encountered unsurmountable difficulties for decades. And the efforts of non-nuclear-weapon states to induce political support from the nuclear-weapons states to conclude a legally-binding NSA during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference were similarly strongly resisted. It is, therefore, understandable that one of the documents resulting from the conference, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", failed to reflect in a crystal-clear manner the commitments of the nuclear-weapons states to negotiate the NSA legal regime.

Intensive consultations and negotiations are called for in order to circumvent these fundamental difficulties. It will certainly take time and perseverance to be successful. The Southeast Asian countries are well known for their determination and patience. Above all, time will hopefully help bridge the differences between the countries in the region and the nuclear- weapons states. We are firmly convinced that these last hurdles will finally be overcome. The entry into force of the treaty will not only be in the interests of the states which are party to the treaty but it will also serve the security interests of all states, for it will strengthen further the commitments of the states in the region to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This, in turn, will also contribute to the preservation and promotion of international peace and security to which we all aspire.

The countries in the region will not squander this precious opportunity to accomplish a task so vital and crucial to the common security of mankind. This treaty is indeed an absolute precondition to any workable structure of regional peace and stability. As such, it would form a basis -- together with the similar treaties in Latin America, the Pacific and Africa -- for our hope that the next century will not repeat the savagery of the one we are leaving behind, and that the anticipated prosperity of the next generations will not be marred by the terror wrought by these weapons of mass destruction.

Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi is the Indonesian Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva and Head of the Indonesian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.