SE Asia enters the 21st century

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): The Southeast Asian political landscape has changed significantly from events related to the unwinding of bipolar international relations since the end of the Cold War, the monetary crisis with its devastating effects on most of the countries' economies in the region and the problem of leadership changes which will have political significance for the region's political stability.

Concerning the political and strategic dimension, some of these changes could have been envisaged, in particular given the extensive involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. The scope and depth of these changes, however, could hardly be foreseen. Similarly, the monetary crisis, despite the warning signals detected but generally unheeded, shook the economic fundamentals of these countries. With no institutional safeguards to guarantee a smooth transition, leadership changes in the region took the world by surprise with the extent of its scope and its depth.

This article deals with the question of what lies ahead for Southeast Asia when it enters the twenty-first century. To be more precise, when we talk about Southeast Asia it actually means the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since most countries of the region are represented in that regional organization. Another point that should be mentioned from the outset is this article is more concerned about the security and strategic dimension of the problems caused by threats from outside the region facing these countries in the twenty-first century. Unresolved territorial disputes, divided countries and an uncertain balance of power are some of the factors which would have an impact on the future security in Southeast Asia.

What comes immediately to mind is whether ASEAN which is neither a collective security nor a collective defense organization can cope with the challenges without threatening the stability of the region. This problem became increasingly complex ever since the end of the Cold War when the power structure of the Asia-Pacific region was in a stage of transition, i.e. from a triangular structure towards that of a quadrangular or a multipolar structure.

The security structure of the Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century will be one of transition towards the formation of a four power structure, consisting of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The destiny of Southeast Asia will be decided by the challenger ASEAN. The organization will have to face such a structure where the region has strategic, economic, security and political significance for those major powers.

The future role China will play in this power structure has always been the focus of attention among ASEAN members. Historical experiences suggest that for ASEAN there must always remain a certain prudence about the possibility of a potential threat from China. The admission of Vietnam to ASEAN may increase threat perceptions within the regional organization. At present, however, ASEAN professes little sense of imminent danger from China, despite the fact that until now it adopts a hard position on maintaining territorial legitimacy. ASEAN regards nationalism as a source of legitimacy as was seen in the dispute over the Spratley Islands. ASEAN members accept the immensity of China as a fact of life. Growing ASEAN connections with China are accompanied by an evident willingness to explore the prospect for long-term relations with the country.

A fresh assessment of the international security environment which ASEAN has to face in the twenty-first century suggests that apart from major international schisms caused by conflicts between nation-states, there are also those which will not always be definable in geographic terms. These are, for example, increased conflicts within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or caste lines. Therefore, the threats facing ASEAN (Southeast Asia) in the next century are from within and without.

The changes associated with the end of the Cold War were so dramatic and profound that it is reasonable to question whether traditional assumptions regarding the nature of the global conflict will continue to prove reliable in the post-Cold War era. In particular, one could question whether conflicts between states will remain the principal form of international ones, or whether the boundaries between them will continue to constitute the world's major fault lines. The question was frequently raised in the context of an outbreak of ethnonationalist conflict, as in Bosnia and recently in Kosovo, and tribal and religious conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

On the other hand, some writers have argued that although the Cold War ended, territorial conflicts of earlier periods -- notably those produced by military competition among the major powers -- will be revived in the years ahead. Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley suggests that such competition will eventually reappear with Germany, Japan or China as a rising power, with military strength to contest America's global hegemony. He wrote in the International Security's summer 1993 issue: "Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why should the future be different from the past?"

Other writers such as Huntington of Harvard University has suggested that the principal schisms of the post-Cold War era are to be found along the peripheries of the world's great civilizations. He argued that the economic and ideological antagonisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be superseded in the twenty first by antagonism over culture and cultural identity. He wrote in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs: "Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations". He noted that although the boundaries between civilizations are not as precise as those between sovereign states, the loose frontiers will be the sight of a major conflict. He predicted that: "The clash of civilization will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future".

Other writers have argued that the world's future fault lines will fall not between the major states of civilizations, but between the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented societies and those states that refrain from democracy or have defied the world community in other ways. Such powers, like Iraq and North Korea, are said to harbor aggressive inclinations to support terrorism, and to seek the production of nuclear or chemical weapons. President Clinton's former national security adviser, Anthony Lake, wrote in the March-April 1994-edition of Foreign Affairs: "We must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family of nations but also to assault its basic values".

While these assessments of the international security environment differ in many of their particulars, they share a common belief that the battle lines of the future will fall along geographically defined boundaries with the contending powers displayed on opposite sides. This in turn, leads generally to the maintenance of sufficient military strength resulting in an arms race.

It is certainly understandable that these writers have proceeded from traditional assumptions regarding the nature of conflict when constructing models of future international relations, but it is not all apparent that such assessments will prove reliable. While a number of conflicts since the end of the Cold War appear to have followed one of the three models above, in Bosnia and Kosovo's case, the source cannot be fully explained as they cannot be confined within geographical boundaries or referred to as conflicts between particular civilizations.

Threats from within ASEAN in the next century will most likely be destabilizing conditions in these member-states, as in deteriorating economic situations or drastic political change. When a member finds itself in such a situation, it will affect the whole region. In light of this, the problem remains on the agenda of closed-door deliberations in ASEAN meetings but still adheres to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member. ASEAN does not violate any fundamentals, i.e. avoids open discussions on domestic problems of a member as it would cause structural tension.

ASEAN members realize that once a country which faces domestic problems is accepted, the only way of dealing with the problems is in the quiet Asian way. The moment the issue is open to public debate allows for a potential confrontation which would be institutionally destructive for ASEAN. The policy of non- interference is being strictly observed in the East Timor issue and the trial of former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

The writer is Director, Center for Social and Cultural Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.