SE Asia enters the 21st century

SE Asia enters the 21st century

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): The Southeast Asian political landscape has
changed significantly from events related to the unwinding of
bipolar international relations since the end of the Cold War,
the monetary crisis with its devastating effects on most of the
countries' economies in the region and the problem of leadership
changes which will have political significance for the region's
political stability.

Concerning the political and strategic dimension, some of
these changes could have been envisaged, in particular given the
extensive involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. The
scope and depth of these changes, however, could hardly be
foreseen. Similarly, the monetary crisis, despite the warning
signals detected but generally unheeded, shook the economic
fundamentals of these countries. With no institutional safeguards
to guarantee a smooth transition, leadership changes in the
region took the world by surprise with the extent of its scope
and its depth.

This article deals with the question of what lies ahead for
Southeast Asia when it enters the twenty-first century. To be
more precise, when we talk about Southeast Asia it actually means
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since most
countries of the region are represented in that regional
organization. Another point that should be mentioned from the
outset is this article is more concerned about the security and
strategic dimension of the problems caused by threats from
outside the region facing these countries in the twenty-first
century. Unresolved territorial disputes, divided countries and
an uncertain balance of power are some of the factors which would
have an impact on the future security in Southeast Asia.

What comes immediately to mind is whether ASEAN which is
neither a collective security nor a collective defense
organization can cope with the challenges without threatening the
stability of the region. This problem became increasingly complex
ever since the end of the Cold War when the power structure of
the Asia-Pacific region was in a stage of transition, i.e. from a
triangular structure towards that of a quadrangular or a
multipolar structure.

The security structure of the Asia-Pacific region in the
twenty-first century will be one of transition towards the
formation of a four power structure, consisting of the United
States, China, Russia and Japan. The destiny of Southeast Asia
will be decided by the challenger ASEAN. The organization will
have to face such a structure where the region has strategic,
economic, security and political significance for those major
powers.

The future role China will play in this power structure has
always been the focus of attention among ASEAN members.
Historical experiences suggest that for ASEAN there must always
remain a certain prudence about the possibility of a potential
threat from China. The admission of Vietnam to ASEAN may increase
threat perceptions within the regional organization. At present,
however, ASEAN professes little sense of imminent danger from
China, despite the fact that until now it adopts a hard position
on maintaining territorial legitimacy. ASEAN regards nationalism
as a source of legitimacy as was seen in the dispute over the
Spratley Islands. ASEAN members accept the immensity of China as
a fact of life. Growing ASEAN connections with China are
accompanied by an evident willingness to explore the prospect for
long-term relations with the country.

A fresh assessment of the international security environment
which ASEAN has to face in the twenty-first century suggests that
apart from major international schisms caused by conflicts
between nation-states, there are also those which will not always
be definable in geographic terms. These are, for example,
increased conflicts within states, societies, and civilizations
along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or caste lines.
Therefore, the threats facing ASEAN (Southeast Asia) in the next
century are from within and without.

The changes associated with the end of the Cold War were so
dramatic and profound that it is reasonable to question whether
traditional assumptions regarding the nature of the global
conflict will continue to prove reliable in the post-Cold War
era. In particular, one could question whether conflicts between
states will remain the principal form of international ones, or
whether the boundaries between them will continue to constitute
the world's major fault lines. The question was frequently raised
in the context of an outbreak of ethnonationalist conflict, as in
Bosnia and recently in Kosovo, and tribal and religious conflicts
in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

On the other hand, some writers have argued that although the
Cold War ended, territorial conflicts of earlier periods --
notably those produced by military competition among the major
powers -- will be revived in the years ahead. Kenneth Waltz of
the University of California at Berkeley suggests that such
competition will eventually reappear with Germany, Japan or China
as a rising power, with military strength to contest America's
global hegemony. He wrote in the International Security's summer
1993 issue: "Countries have always competed for wealth and
security, and the competition has often led to conflict. Why
should the future be different from the past?"

Other writers such as Huntington of Harvard University has
suggested that the principal schisms of the post-Cold War era are
to be found along the peripheries of the world's great
civilizations. He argued that the economic and ideological
antagonisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be
superseded in the twenty first by antagonism over culture and
cultural identity. He wrote in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign
Affairs: "Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in
world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics
will occur between nations and groups of different
civilizations". He noted that although the boundaries between
civilizations are not as precise as those between sovereign
states, the loose frontiers will be the sight of a major
conflict. He predicted that: "The clash of civilization will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations
will be the battle lines of the future".

Other writers have argued that the world's future fault lines
will fall not between the major states of civilizations, but
between the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented
societies and those states that refrain from democracy or have
defied the world community in other ways. Such powers, like Iraq
and North Korea, are said to harbor aggressive inclinations to
support terrorism, and to seek the production of nuclear or
chemical weapons. President Clinton's former national security
adviser, Anthony Lake, wrote in the March-April 1994-edition of
Foreign Affairs: "We must face the reality of recalcitrant and
outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family
of nations but also to assault its basic values".

While these assessments of the international security
environment differ in many of their particulars, they share a
common belief that the battle lines of the future will fall along
geographically defined boundaries with the contending powers
displayed on opposite sides. This in turn, leads generally to the
maintenance of sufficient military strength resulting in an arms
race.

It is certainly understandable that these writers have
proceeded from traditional assumptions regarding the nature of
conflict when constructing models of future international
relations, but it is not all apparent that such assessments will
prove reliable. While a number of conflicts since the end of the
Cold War appear to have followed one of the three models above,
in Bosnia and Kosovo's case, the source cannot be fully explained
as they cannot be confined within geographical boundaries or
referred to as conflicts between particular civilizations.

Threats from within ASEAN in the next century will most likely
be destabilizing conditions in these member-states, as in
deteriorating economic situations or drastic political change.
When a member finds itself in such a situation, it will affect
the whole region. In light of this, the problem remains on the
agenda of closed-door deliberations in ASEAN meetings but still
adheres to the principle of non-interference in the domestic
affairs of a member. ASEAN does not violate any fundamentals,
i.e. avoids open discussions on domestic problems of a member as
it would cause structural tension.

ASEAN members realize that once a country which faces domestic
problems is accepted, the only way of dealing with the problems
is in the quiet Asian way. The moment the issue is open to public
debate allows for a potential confrontation which would be
institutionally destructive for ASEAN. The policy of non-
interference is being strictly observed in the East Timor issue
and the trial of former Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim.

The writer is Director, Center for Social and Cultural
Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.