Thu, 06 Jun 1996

SE Asia and the peace dividend

By Dewi Fortuna Anwar

The following article is based on a paper presented at the Defense Services Asia 1996 conference: "Changing Conception of Security in a Changing Pacific Asia" in Kuala Lumpur on April 25 and April 26, 1996. This is the first of two articles.

KUALA LUMPUR: The most important changes taking place in Southeast Asian security have occurred in the relations between ASEAN and the other countries of Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War and the settlement of the Cambodian conflict have brought peace to the Indochinese states and led to a complete rapprochement between these countries and ASEAN.

The two formerly antagonistic subregions have finally come together under the umbrella of ASEAN. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995. Laos and Cambodia, which have both acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, will likely to become full members of the association at its 1997 ministerial meeting. By that time Myanmar will be the only Southeast Asian country remaining outside the ASEAN fold. Even Myanmar, however, is beginning to show its interests in developing closer relations with ASEAN.

The expectation that all ten Southeast Asian countries will be united within one regional organization by the turn of the century, as originally envisaged by the founding fathers of ASEAN, will hopefully be realized. The way towards this has already been paved by the holding of the first ever Southeast Asian summit, albeit informally, which brought together all ten heads of state or government in Bangkok in December 1995. A second such meeting is planned to take place in Bogor later this year.

With Southeast Asian unification almost a reality, it means that major progress is also being made towards achieving ASEAN's long term political objectives. These are the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which is a component of ZOPFAN. For over two decades ZOPFAN seemed like an unrealistic and unattainable dream, given the sharp regional cleavages and the intrusive roles of outside powers which further exacerbated regional conflicts. Now this regional division is at an end, making it possible for all of the Southeast Asian countries to come to an agreement about the desirable regional order. In fact, the ten Southeast Asian countries have recently signed the Treaty on Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The challenge for Southeast Asia in general, and ASEAN in particular, is how to win international recognition and support for ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ.

Until the end of the Cold War, the security concerns of most Southeast Asian nations were confined to their immediate subregions. The urgency of the domestic and regional problems left policymakers in ASEAN with little time and energy to pay attention to the wider regional security issues. At the same time the bipolar structure of the Cold War, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, had also provided scant opportunities to the smaller and medium powers to play a meaningful role beyond their immediate environment.

Despite Southeast Asian being a primary theater of the Cold War, the regional government's became pawns in the competition among the great powers. Southeast Asia bore the brunt of two Cold Wars, namely the East-West conflict which resulted in the Vietnam War and the confrontation between China and the Soviet Union which was mainly responsible for the Cambodian conflict. Southeast Asia's strategic location had made it important enough for the great powers to attempt to bring it under their spheres of influence, or at least deny the region to their enemies. As a result, Southeast Asia was divided into two opposing camps, communist Indochina and non-communist ASEAN.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union effectively ended the Cold War and ended the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow. It also presented Southeast Asian countries with opportunities as well as challenges. The relaxation of tensions among the major powers greatly contributed to the settlement of regional conflicts in Southeast Asia. A growing sense of regional solidarity and cohesion will accompany the widening of ASEAN. Such a situation will clearly enhance regional resilience and make it hard for outside powers to interfere in Southeast Asian internal affairs or play one party off another.

The end of the Cold War has also provided an opportunity for ASEAN to play a more active role outside the region. Ideological confrontation has now been replaced by the common desire for economic prosperity, pushing countries towards closer cooperation with each other. While the overall reduction of global tensions have made cooperation easier among the former contending powers, the replacement of the rigid and therefore more predictable Cold War bipolar structure with a much more fluid system has also increased the need for security talks. Here ASEAN has been able to take a leading role.

Countries in Southeast Asia have always been very aware of the fact that their security is closely linked to the happenings outside their immediate region. Compared to all the other countries and groupings, ASEAN is clearly the most strategically placed to take the initiative in promoting a multilateral security dialog.

Firstly, ASEAN has already established a wide-ranging dialog partnerships with most of the key international actors through the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference. Secondly, ASEAN's positive role in helping to end the Cambodian conflict has also earned the association a pool of goodwill from the other regional members. Last but not least, ASEAN's initiative was also accepted by all of other regional powers because it is basically an innocuous association which poses no threat to any one. As such, ASEAN's leading role in promoting a multilateral security dialog is not immediately suspected of having an ulterior motive by the other parties.

The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum is clearly a major breakthrough in the quest for security in the Asia Pacific region. So far it is the only official forum in which security issues can be discussed in the wider Asia-Pacific multilateral setting. Although it is still at a very early stage, much hope is being pinned on the ARF as the primary vehicle for promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The main objectives of the ARF are to promote confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and, in the long term, to establish mechanisms for conflict resolutions.