Scenarios for democratization

Scenarios for democratization

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
by Mohammad A.S. Hikam, a senior research associate of the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), at a European Union-
Indonesia Dialog organized by the International Dialogs
Foundation (IDF) and the European Institute for Asian Studies
(EIAS) in Brussels on Feb. 23 to Feb. 24.

BRUSSELS: The gradual process of democratization will be
stronger after the coming general election on June 7 if there is
a change from the current Golkar-supported government to a
reform-oriented regime.

In so doing, proreform groups should be able to obtain
majority seats in the House of Representatives (DPR), which can
be used as bargaining power during the general session of the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

This will not be an easy endeavor, since under the existing
political constellation, Golkar is conceivably maintaining its
influence.

It seems reasonable to expect that the 200 seats designated
for regional representatives and groups representatives would be
in favor of Golkar. In addition, there is no guarantee that the
military, with its 38 seats, will not back Golkar in MPR
sessions, given the similarities of political interests in the
past. It is therefore safe to say that to win the majority
support, Golkar only needs approximately 31 percent of the votes,
while reformist parties should win more than 51 percent in order
to be able to form a new government.

The nagging question is whether Golkar would be capable of
obtaining such votes and whether the main reformist parties --
PDI Perjuangan, PKB and the National Mandate Party (PAN) -- could
garner more than 51 percent of votes in the next election.

As mentioned before, Golkar has experienced a serious
political setback and it seems that a quick recovery is rather
remote. Therefore, if the election is conducted fairly and
freely, then it is highly impossible for Golkar to return as a
single majority winner. Nor can it expect to muster enough votes
to form a new government without support from the military and
other parties.

Therefore, there is open speculation that it would adopt money
politics and old patron-client networks, which are by and large
still effective as an instrument for mobilization, particularly
in rural areas. In addition, the military's involvement on behalf
of Golkar cannot be discounted, especially when the electoral
monitoring system is weak.

The other side of the coin is that the power of reformist
parties is still insufficient to challenge Golkar without
establishing a strong coalition. For PDI Perjuangan, for example,
despite its strong support in rural areas evidenced by the
mushrooming of its command posts, it is not clear that it can be
directly translated into ballot box results in favor of the
party. To date, the overwhelming support to the party basically
still depends on Megawati's personality and the charisma of her
father, the late president Sukarno, in addition to the prevalent
antiestablishment mood. As a consequence, PDI Perjuangan still
needs to expand its basis of support to include the urban middle-
class society who are more pragmatic in its political
orientation. This means that Megawati and her team have to create
a sound platform in which economic recovery will be its priority
in the context of gradual democratization.

PKB, whose support relies heavily on Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
members, still has to come up with more adequate mobilization
strategies to expand its voters, including improving its human
resources at the elite level. This could be decisive because NU
will become the target of several parties' political maneuvering
for the election. To be sure, such Islamic parties as the United
Development Party (PPP), the United Believers Awakening Party
(PKU) and the Nahdlatul Ummat Party (PNU), whose main bases of
support are also NU, will be competing with PKB both on Java and
the other islands.

But even Golkar will definitely target NU voters, especially
in the predominantly Muslim areas of Java. Golkar can and will
employ its networks of the kyai (traditional Islamic scholars)
and pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools) for such a
purpose which, prior to the demise of the New Order regime, was
quite effective.

It is too early, therefore, to predict that NU voters will
overwhelmingly support PKB outside NU and even from Muslim voters
who have potential. This is partly the reason why PKB has chosen
NU chairman Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid as its presidential
candidate in the coming election.

Amien Rais' PAN is still struggling to be internally united.
The danger of factionalism is by no means nonexistent despite the
efforts to portray the party as a modern, nonsectarian political
organization. As a matter of fact, there is tension within its
elite between those who tend to use Islam and those who are more
secular in orientation. At the grassroots level, the image that
PAN is dominated by the members of Muslim organization
Muhammadiyah remains strong which could hinder its capacity to
accommodate a large segment of social groups.

On top of that, PAN is still heavily dependent on Amien's
popularity. Amien, for the time being, is still portrayed as the
most outspoken leader of the reformist groups. This means that
PAN still has to work for expanding its base of support at the
grass-roots level if it wants to be a more autonomous and a less
figure-oriented party.

Other political parties such as PPP, the Crescent Star Party
(PBB) and the Justice Party are, theoretically, not going to
become big parties after the election. The exception is probably
PPP, which could have strong support in areas outside Java, such
as South Kalimantan, Jambi and Aceh. However, it seems difficult
for the party to compete with PKB and PDI Perjuangan.

Based on the above political mapping, one can pinpoint the
possible presidential candidates in the election. Golkar is
likely to support incumbent President Habibie as its presidential
candidate. However, there is an open possibility that Adi Sasono,
minister of cooperatives, medium and small enterprises, as well
as Akbar Tandjung, the chairman of Golkar and minister/state
secretary, could also become Golkar's alternatives. Outside
Golkar, Megawati, Gus Dur and Amien are the presidential hopefuls
from PDI Perjuangan, PKB and PAN respectively. The vice
presidential candidates are Gen. Wiranto and Yogyakarta Governor
Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, who seem to have strong support from
Golkar and PKB respectively. There is still no vice presidential
nomination from both PDI Perjuangan and PAN.

For Golkar, in order to go smoothly with the scenario, it is
possible that it would forge alliances with Islamic coalition
parties and the military. The former will have no difficulty in
supporting Habibie, who has been known as being close with the
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). The latter
can be expected to support Habibie if only because of its being
pragmatic.

However, it is not entirely impossible that the military
faction will carefully analyze the development of those competing
parties. What is clear is that political support from the
military is still required by any party to enable it to form the
new government after the election.