Same mistakes being made in Aceh and Papua

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio Nederlands, Amsterdam

On Dec. 1 and Dec. 4, the pro-independence movements in Irian Jaya (Papua) and Aceh will celebrate their respective "independence day", possibly with some dismay, given earlier reports that Jakarta would send 50 army and police units to the regions -- which was denied.

A prospect of a just solution for the two regions seems to have moved further away as intensified military operations have replaced dialog. Peaceful dialog for Aceh has been abandoned since the military campaign, Kolakops, commenced with the presidential decree last April. Talks with the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council were halted even earlier as several of its leaders, including the late Theys H. Elluay, were arrested last year.

Two years ago, when the majority of Acehnese demanded a referendum, the Free Aceh Movement, GAM, went public on Dec.4 to celebrate its "independence" day amid the heady days of post- Soeharto reform. Many locals, traumatized by the repression during the 1990s, warned -- correctly as it turns out -- that things could change drastically.

Only the military felt frustrated with the post-Soeharto reform. As GAM capitalized on the demand to curb human rights violations, one district commander blamed the "indecisiveness of the new civilian leaders in Jakarta" and rights activists.

"We need a comprehensive operation (to defeat the rebels) instead of half-hearted measures," said Col. Syarifuddin Tippe. In a sense, he may be right as then president Abdurrahman Wahid's policy of dialog and humanitarian pauses failed to produce a tangible result, except the continuing war.

A year later, as the military top brass restored its standing, the president, under strong pressure, issued the April decree. The Army started a military campaign, putting Syarifudin's ideas into practice, but laid political responsibility with the civilian leaders in Jakarta.

Yet this has resulted in an outcome that has turned out for the worse. First, GAM has been put on the defensive, both militarily (at least in Pidie regency) and politically, as GAM retreated from the public arena, lost its grip in government agencies and its negotiators were arrested, killed or went in hiding.

However, as the Army and GAM resorted to fierce battles, some military elements secured local resources, aggravating the crisis around the Exxon oil plant and elsewhere. Hence, soldiers sent by Jakarta were accused -- so the local saying goes -- of "arriving with M-16 (rifles), but returning home with 16-M (millions of rupiah)".

Second, with GAM's retreat from some areas, the trend of refugees fleeing Aceh has significantly increased to some 40,000 people. GAM, too, was guilty of human rights violations, including intimidation of the local press. But reports clearly indicate that the new trend was the result of actions carried out by the newly formed pro-Army militias in South and Southeast Aceh -- the so-called Galaksi region.

Third, the number of casualties have dramatically increased and expanded among civilians, taking its toll among legislators, intellectuals and human rights activists. At least 1,400 people have been killed since April. The Army may have won the battles, but the war could be at the expense of the remaining trust of the Acehnese to the republic.

With the euphoria gone in Aceh, as well as in Irian Jaya, the military has returned to the old security approach. The Papuan pro-independence movement may lack a tough army like GAM, but it has built a stronger legitimacy at home than GAM has done in Aceh. Despite Irian Jaya's complex topography and geopolitical ethnic map, the Papuan Presidium has succeeded in informing the public of its cause -- "down to the village level," admits a government document.

Indeed the unifying pan-Irian Jaya Congress in May 2000, the first of its kind in history, which supported a peaceful strategy toward independence, has been crucial.

It was this congress that changed Jakarta's policy toward Irian Jaya. As then president Abdurrahman's gesture of reconciliation was attacked, he had to retract his promises to attend the congress and to allow the Morning Star flag to represent Papua.

"You should understand, I was put under pressure from all sides," said the late Theys Eluay, recalling Abdurrahman's words spoken to him, last year.

In November last year, the Jayapura weekly Tifa Papua published a memorandum signed by Ermaya Suradinata, then home affairs director general of national unity. The document, which resulted from the meeting his ministry held with the military and intelligence community (Bakin, Bais, Kostrad and Kopassus) on June 8, 2000, suggested that Jakarta should anticipate the actions of rebel groups in Irian Jaya.

Abdurrahman's honeymoon with Irian Jaya, thus, ended as thousands of Kostrad (elite forces) and mobile brigade soldiers were dropped in Jayapura to intimidate the celebration of Dec. 1, 2000 anniversary of Papua's "Declaration of Independence". This approach was seen as contradictory to Jakarta's reformist claims.

Whether or not the Kopassus units were involved in the assassination of Theys Eluay, the Irianese perception that they were the killers, is politically crucial. In addition, the recent revelations of two retired United Nations top officials -- one being former undersecretary Gen. Chakravarthy Narasimhan -- that the 1969 plebiscite in West Irian was "a sham," could strengthen the Irianese perception of the "illegitimacy" of Jakarta's rule.

No one would wish to see Aceh and Irian Jaya become Indonesia's war-torn Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland. Yet unless Jakarta brings its generals, who were responsible for atrocities in Aceh and Irian Jaya to justice and firmly controls its soldiers, few would hope for new talks and reconciliation. The language of violence may succeed only at the expense of the relationship of the two peoples with the republic. Human rights, unfortunately, are not always compatible with the nation's desires.