Same mistakes being made in Aceh and Papua

Same mistakes being made in Aceh and Papua

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio Nederlands, Amsterdam

On Dec. 1 and Dec. 4, the pro-independence movements in Irian
Jaya (Papua) and Aceh will celebrate their respective
"independence day", possibly with some dismay, given earlier
reports that Jakarta would send 50 army and police units to the
regions -- which was denied.

A prospect of a just solution for the two regions seems to
have moved further away as intensified military operations have
replaced dialog. Peaceful dialog for Aceh has been abandoned
since the military campaign, Kolakops, commenced with the
presidential decree last April. Talks with the pro-independence
Papuan Presidium Council were halted even earlier as several of
its leaders, including the late Theys H. Elluay, were arrested
last year.

Two years ago, when the majority of Acehnese demanded a
referendum, the Free Aceh Movement, GAM, went public on Dec.4 to
celebrate its "independence" day amid the heady days of post-
Soeharto reform. Many locals, traumatized by the repression
during the 1990s, warned -- correctly as it turns out -- that
things could change drastically.

Only the military felt frustrated with the post-Soeharto
reform. As GAM capitalized on the demand to curb human rights
violations, one district commander blamed the "indecisiveness of
the new civilian leaders in Jakarta" and rights activists.

"We need a comprehensive operation (to defeat the rebels)
instead of half-hearted measures," said Col. Syarifuddin Tippe.
In a sense, he may be right as then president Abdurrahman Wahid's
policy of dialog and humanitarian pauses failed to produce a
tangible result, except the continuing war.

A year later, as the military top brass restored its standing,
the president, under strong pressure, issued the April decree.
The Army started a military campaign, putting Syarifudin's ideas
into practice, but laid political responsibility with the
civilian leaders in Jakarta.

Yet this has resulted in an outcome that has turned out for
the worse. First, GAM has been put on the defensive, both
militarily (at least in Pidie regency) and politically, as GAM
retreated from the public arena, lost its grip in government
agencies and its negotiators were arrested, killed or went in
hiding.

However, as the Army and GAM resorted to fierce battles, some
military elements secured local resources, aggravating the crisis
around the Exxon oil plant and elsewhere. Hence, soldiers sent by
Jakarta were accused -- so the local saying goes -- of "arriving
with M-16 (rifles), but returning home with 16-M (millions of
rupiah)".

Second, with GAM's retreat from some areas, the trend of
refugees fleeing Aceh has significantly increased to some 40,000
people. GAM, too, was guilty of human rights violations,
including intimidation of the local press. But reports clearly
indicate that the new trend was the result of actions carried out
by the newly formed pro-Army militias in South and Southeast Aceh
-- the so-called Galaksi region.

Third, the number of casualties have dramatically increased
and expanded among civilians, taking its toll among legislators,
intellectuals and human rights activists. At least 1,400 people
have been killed since April. The Army may have won the battles,
but the war could be at the expense of the remaining trust of the
Acehnese to the republic.

With the euphoria gone in Aceh, as well as in Irian Jaya, the
military has returned to the old security approach. The Papuan
pro-independence movement may lack a tough army like GAM, but it
has built a stronger legitimacy at home than GAM has done in
Aceh. Despite Irian Jaya's complex topography and geopolitical
ethnic map, the Papuan Presidium has succeeded in informing the
public of its cause -- "down to the village level," admits a
government document.

Indeed the unifying pan-Irian Jaya Congress in May 2000, the
first of its kind in history, which supported a peaceful strategy
toward independence, has been crucial.

It was this congress that changed Jakarta's policy toward
Irian Jaya. As then president Abdurrahman's gesture of
reconciliation was attacked, he had to retract his promises to
attend the congress and to allow the Morning Star flag to
represent Papua.

"You should understand, I was put under pressure from all
sides," said the late Theys Eluay, recalling Abdurrahman's words
spoken to him, last year.

In November last year, the Jayapura weekly Tifa Papua
published a memorandum signed by Ermaya Suradinata, then home
affairs director general of national unity. The document, which
resulted from the meeting his ministry held with the military and
intelligence community (Bakin, Bais, Kostrad and Kopassus) on
June 8, 2000, suggested that Jakarta should anticipate the
actions of rebel groups in Irian Jaya.

Abdurrahman's honeymoon with Irian Jaya, thus, ended as
thousands of Kostrad (elite forces) and mobile brigade soldiers
were dropped in Jayapura to intimidate the celebration of Dec. 1,
2000 anniversary of Papua's "Declaration of Independence". This
approach was seen as contradictory to Jakarta's reformist claims.

Whether or not the Kopassus units were involved in the
assassination of Theys Eluay, the Irianese perception that they
were the killers, is politically crucial. In addition, the recent
revelations of two retired United Nations top officials -- one
being former undersecretary Gen. Chakravarthy Narasimhan -- that
the 1969 plebiscite in West Irian was "a sham," could strengthen
the Irianese perception of the "illegitimacy" of Jakarta's rule.

No one would wish to see Aceh and Irian Jaya become
Indonesia's war-torn Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland. Yet unless
Jakarta brings its generals, who were responsible for atrocities
in Aceh and Irian Jaya to justice and firmly controls its
soldiers, few would hope for new talks and reconciliation. The
language of violence may succeed only at the expense of the
relationship of the two peoples with the republic. Human rights,
unfortunately, are not always compatible with the nation's
desires.