Salafism and terrorism mostly do not mix

Muhamad Ali, Manoa, Hawaii

A recent report issued by the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Do Not Mix is long overdue, but we should welcome their important conclusions in light of the oversimplified representation of Islamic movements and within the context of the "war on terror".

Scholars have debated whether or not Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to the United States and its allies, and whether or not Islamic fundamentalist schools foster terrorism. The report provides some explanation as to whether or not Salafism per se is a threat to the West.

First of all, the ICG defines Salafism as a movement that seeks to return to what is seen by its adherents as the purest form of Islam -- the faith practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the two succeeding generations. They support the view that the further away from the time of the Prophet, the more impure Islam has become, and they reject innovation in religious matters, or bid'ah.

While the terms Salafism and Wahabism are sometimes used interchangeably, many Salafis see themselves as having taken purification of the faith one step further.

In addition, while the Wahabis look to the Hanbali school of law for guidance, the Salafis tend to reject all schools of law and look to the Koran and the Hadith directly and literally. The ICG lists several Salafi organizations and movements in Indonesia: the Indonesian Council of Islam Propagation (DDII), the Institute for Islamic Sciences and Arabic (LIPIA), the al- Sofwah Foundation, the at-Turath network and the al-Irsyad network.

According to the report, the strictest Salafis in Indonesia are religious, not political, activists. They eschew political or organizational allegiances because they divide the Muslim community and divert attention from study of the faith and propagation of Salafi principles. They reject oath-taking to a leader, which are central to the organizational structure of groups like the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).

Strict Salafis believe it is not permissible to revolt against a Muslim government, no matter how oppressive or unjust, and are also opposed to the JI and the Darul Islam movement because, in their view, these groups actively promote rebellion against the Indonesian state.

Salafis also tend to see the concept of jihad in defensive terms -- like in aiding Muslims under attack -- rather than waging war against symbolic targets that may include innocent civilians.

The ICG continues, suggesting that while some involved in terrorism in Indonesia, such as Ali Gufron, alias Muklas, a Bali bomber, claim to be Salafis, the radical fringe that Muklas represents -- sometimes called "Salafi jihadism" -- is not representative of the broader movement. The ICG concludes that Salafism in Indonesia is not the security threat it is sometimes portrayed as, partly because it is so inwardly focused on faith.

Therefore, the ICG argues, purist Salafis are a more potent barrier against jihadis like the JI than pluralist or moderate Muslims. If Salafi jihadis believe they are making bombs to destroy the enemies of Islam, strict Salafis may have more success in convincing them, using the same texts, that their interpretation is wrong.

Thus, the report suggests, it might be more productive to analyze the educational background and employment history of everyone in Indonesia now in custody for crimes connected to jihadist organizations. Using this information as a base, it would be useful to develop programs in a few geographic areas that include elements that JI and like-minded organizations offer.

ICG concludes that Salafism is not the source of the problem, and jihadism is far too complex for simple, silver-bullet solutions.

The report explains the phenomenon of Imam Samudra, the Bali bombing mastermind who recently published his autobiography, Aku Melawan Teroris (Me versus the terrorist). Samudra claims that he is a Salafi, but he always relies on fatwas, or religious edicts, issued by Saudi ulama in matters such as the veil, music and entertainment, and jihad.

He also subscribes to the Muftis -- scholars who issue the edicts -- who had fought in wars, and understands jihad partially as a holy war against "infidels", or kafir, who wage wars against Islam and Muslims. For Samudra, the infidels have existed since Mustafa Kamal Attaturk destroyed the Islamic caliphate.

The victorious enemy continues to the present, with the United States as commander, followed by Israel and its allies. The bloody wars in Palestine, Serbia-Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq have raised his spirit of jihad. "Blood is paid by blood, soul by soul, civilians by civilians," Samudra wrote.

Samudra's book will be read by thousands of Indonesians and foreigners, but his religious-political interpretation is very dangerous and will pose a threat to the peaceful and tolerant version of Islam.

Samudra's interpretation of Islam is strict, literal and partial. He selects only those verses that suit and fulfill his enduring hatred against the West. He has interpreted kafir as the enemy that should be destroyed. He simplifies the U.S. as the kafir that must be diminished, while denying the complexity of relationships that exist between the West and the Middle East.

Certainly, the U.S. and its allies need to change their policies in the region, but the limited interpretations by Samudra and other like-minded individuals about jihad as violence and terror is not in accordance with the messages contained within the Koran and the Hadith. Samudra also follows blindly edicts issued elsewhere and in radically different contexts.

Therefore, improving and deepening religious understanding among their followers is a very critical obligation of Salafis as well as moderate Islamic movements.

In addition, they must incorporate a thorough study of Middle Eastern history and world politics. The case of Samudra and his groups is revealing in that the misreading and misunderstanding of "others" can be very dangerous.

The ICG report has shed some light of the Salafis and jihadi groups in Indonesia, although more research is required into the educational background and employment history of those in custody, as it suggests. But with some understanding of the diversity and complexity of Islamic movements in Indonesia, it is hoped that national and foreign intelligence bureaus can be more specific, clear and precise in dealing with terrorism. Purely religious movements should not be confused with terrorist groups.

The writer is a lecturer at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta, and a graduate of Islamic History and Politics at Edinburgh University. He is now pursuing a Ph.D. in history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.