Russia's global intentions visible in ASEAN Forum

Dmitry Kosyrev RIA Novosti Moscow

The path traversed by Russian diplomacy from Phnom Penh to Jakarta, that is, from last year's ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to the upcoming ARF on security in early July, is barely noticeable to the uniformed but it is remarkable.

Based on the way relations have been developing between Moscow and the 10 ASEAN countries, it is possible to imagine the future role Russia wants to and will play in the world as well as how successful Russia will be at winning new markets and preparing for its future role in world economics and politics.

Without closely examining Russia's foreign policy in Asia it is difficult to understand the role Russia plays in the world and to what extent it is an independent political phenomenon, or as some say, a civilization. Unless Russia's interests and actions in Asia are understood, senseless questions about why it does not plan to join the European Union or NATO, or some other organizations, will continue to arise.

In this context, the region Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will visit for several days while attending the ARF is very interesting. The point is that during the past few decades the Soviet Union's and then Russia's relations with South Asia (primarily with India) and East Asia (primarily with China) formed and then changed.

But the region south of China and east of India -- Southeast Asia -- is a special case, as it is a diplomatically virgin land for Russia. It is a region with practically no traces of the Soviet era and therefore, for the new Russia only potential opportunities lie ahead.

In the 1990s, while attempting to realize these opportunities, Moscow tried to cooperate with the region in various areas associated with the oil and natural gas industries mainly because of the region's geographic remoteness. Russia offered arms, space services and other technologies.

With the exception of arms, little progress has been made in that direction, but a few unexpected areas of cooperation have emerged recently. In these areas, Southeast Asia sees not only Russia's potential but also real success and progress.

After the forum, ASEAN conducts talks with the foreign ministers of the countries that are the association's partners in dialogue. All of the partner countries -- the United States, China, and others -- are important in the Pacific region.

During talks about partnership with ASEAN, Lavrov may be expected to mention the unexpected boom of Russian tourism in the region and the Southeast Asian students being educated in Russia. The successes are obvious. Though prospects of cooperation in energy are not clear, so far. Russia is viewed as a needed partner, but for the time being things have not gone further than talks.

At the 2002 forum in Brunei it was estimated that trade with ASEAN countries amounted to US$1 billion, and last year in Phnom Penh this issue was not raised at all.

However, it is precisely at these forums, where specific policies are made, that an interesting phenomenon is becoming increasingly noticeable -- Russia's political influence in regional policy is growing disproportionately to its economic influence. In Jakarta, Russia is expected to sign the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which is the ideological foundation of ASEAN. Russia signing the treaty does not mean that it is joining the association; it only means that Moscow shares the political principles proclaimed in the treaty.

ASEAN has many partners with whom the trade level has long since exceeded $100 billion a year, but, so far, only China and India have reached this level of political closeness with ASEAN. It can be expected that in the near future Russia and ASEAN will have annual meetings not on a ministerial level, but on a presidential level. ASEAN holds similar meetings with India, for instance, which enjoys the same influence in the region as Russia but also has problems with commodity circulation.

So, what is this closeness based on? Let us look at the program for the upcoming ministerial forum, which normally focuses on security issues. The first item is terrorism, specifically the signing of a document on transportation security and combating terrorism. Russia and the Philippines are the authors of this non-declarative yet very specific document. In 2003, Russia and the Philippines formulated security proposals for the forum, the United States and Malaysia did this task the year before.

The second document at the forum concerns the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and here, too, Russia did a good deal of editing. The amendments specify that combating WMD proliferation should be in keeping with international law and UN resolutions.

Moscow shares ASEAN's political philosophy. Incidentally, a similar philosophy was at the basis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Central Asian organization whose members include four Central Asian countries and Russia and China (ARF participants).

The SCO is not only an organizational copy of ASEAN, it is currently establishing ties with ASEAN. The organization is also Moscow's contribution to the system of relations in Asian politics, a contribution which ASEAN countries appreciate. All of Russia's diplomatic actions in Asia, reveal the policy Russia intends to pursue Asia, a policy that will ultimately yield economic fruit.