Russia's global intentions visible in ASEAN Forum

Russia's global intentions visible in ASEAN Forum

Dmitry Kosyrev
RIA Novosti
Moscow

The path traversed by Russian diplomacy from Phnom Penh to
Jakarta, that is, from last year's ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to
the upcoming ARF on security in early July, is barely noticeable
to the uniformed but it is remarkable.

Based on the way relations have been developing between Moscow
and the 10 ASEAN countries, it is possible to imagine the future
role Russia wants to and will play in the world as well as how
successful Russia will be at winning new markets and preparing
for its future role in world economics and politics.

Without closely examining Russia's foreign policy in Asia it
is difficult to understand the role Russia plays in the world and
to what extent it is an independent political phenomenon, or as
some say, a civilization. Unless Russia's interests and actions
in Asia are understood, senseless questions about why it does not
plan to join the European Union or NATO, or some other
organizations, will continue to arise.

In this context, the region Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov will visit for several days while attending the ARF is
very interesting. The point is that during the past few decades
the Soviet Union's and then Russia's relations with South Asia
(primarily with India) and East Asia (primarily with China)
formed and then changed.

But the region south of China and east of India -- Southeast
Asia -- is a special case, as it is a diplomatically virgin land
for Russia. It is a region with practically no traces of the
Soviet era and therefore, for the new Russia only potential
opportunities lie ahead.

In the 1990s, while attempting to realize these opportunities,
Moscow tried to cooperate with the region in various areas
associated with the oil and natural gas industries mainly because
of the region's geographic remoteness. Russia offered arms, space
services and other technologies.

With the exception of arms, little progress has been made in
that direction, but a few unexpected areas of cooperation have
emerged recently. In these areas, Southeast Asia sees not only
Russia's potential but also real success and progress.

After the forum, ASEAN conducts talks with the foreign
ministers of the countries that are the association's partners in
dialogue. All of the partner countries -- the United States,
China, and others -- are important in the Pacific region.

During talks about partnership with ASEAN, Lavrov may be
expected to mention the unexpected boom of Russian tourism in the
region and the Southeast Asian students being educated in Russia.
The successes are obvious. Though prospects of cooperation in
energy are not clear, so far. Russia is viewed as a needed
partner, but for the time being things have not gone further than
talks.

At the 2002 forum in Brunei it was estimated that trade with
ASEAN countries amounted to US$1 billion, and last year in Phnom
Penh this issue was not raised at all.

However, it is precisely at these forums, where specific
policies are made, that an interesting phenomenon is becoming
increasingly noticeable -- Russia's political influence in
regional policy is growing disproportionately to its economic
influence. In Jakarta, Russia is expected to sign the 1976 Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which is the
ideological foundation of ASEAN. Russia signing the treaty does
not mean that it is joining the association; it only means that
Moscow shares the political principles proclaimed in the treaty.

ASEAN has many partners with whom the trade level has long
since exceeded $100 billion a year, but, so far, only China and
India have reached this level of political closeness with ASEAN.
It can be expected that in the near future Russia and ASEAN will
have annual meetings not on a ministerial level, but on a
presidential level. ASEAN holds similar meetings with India, for
instance, which enjoys the same influence in the region as Russia
but also has problems with commodity circulation.

So, what is this closeness based on? Let us look at the
program for the upcoming ministerial forum, which normally
focuses on security issues. The first item is terrorism,
specifically the signing of a document on transportation security
and combating terrorism. Russia and the Philippines are the
authors of this non-declarative yet very specific document. In
2003, Russia and the Philippines formulated security proposals
for the forum, the United States and Malaysia did this task the
year before.

The second document at the forum concerns the nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and here, too, Russia did a
good deal of editing. The amendments specify that combating WMD
proliferation should be in keeping with international law and UN
resolutions.

Moscow shares ASEAN's political philosophy. Incidentally, a
similar philosophy was at the basis of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, a Central Asian organization whose members include
four Central Asian countries and Russia and China (ARF
participants).

The SCO is not only an organizational copy of ASEAN, it is
currently establishing ties with ASEAN. The organization is also
Moscow's contribution to the system of relations in Asian
politics, a contribution which ASEAN countries appreciate. All of
Russia's diplomatic actions in Asia, reveal the policy Russia
intends to pursue Asia, a policy that will ultimately yield
economic fruit.