Russian-U.S. relations have generally good prospects

Alexei Arbatov Deputy Chairman State Duma Defense RIA Novosti Moscow

The policy of establishing all-round cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism and closer ties with the West as a whole, adopted by President Vladimir Putin after September 11, has not brought about for Russia reply moves by the U.S., as many analysts point out. Of course, the sharp turn in Russia's foreign policy was not made in expectation of similar moves by Washington. But the desire to become a full-fledged member of the civilized community, displayed by Russia once again, should have been supported by America. Nevertheless, one is becoming more and more convinced that this is not happening. Naturally, this results in growing criticism of Vladimir Putin's foreign policy. I do not think this situation is well realized in Washington. The U.S. administration does not understand that as a result of the pressure on the Russian president he may change his foreign policy or certain circles in Russia may attempt to replace him.

The Russian-U.S. summit in May gives Russia a chance to convey to U.S. President George Bush and his team sentiments of the political elite in Russia and explain to them that one should not take all the time -- one must also give something in return. This is not bargaining, it is a normal political compromise, a search for ways to coordinate national interests on the issue of strategic offensive armaments, which will be in the focus of attention, on ABM defense, NATO's expansion and U.S. military presence in countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which must be regulated by corresponding agreements on interaction and cooperation with Russia, because it also has troops and vital interests there. There are also many other problems that need to be discussed. These include Russia's foreign debts, steel exports, and WTO membership.

The need to reckon with Russian interests has been made stronger by the fact that after Sept. 11 Russia has again been generally recognized as a very important partner of the West.

As I have already said, the May summit will focus on strategic offensive arms cuts. Apparently, the parties will sign an agreement -- not a treaty but a framework agreement. Its implementation may require additional negotiations. One would like to hope that in this agreement the United States will take into account Russia's interests and expediency of arms control to a greater extent than it did six months ago or, the more so, a year ago when the U.S. administration said that the offensive armaments issue should no longer be discussed -- let every country decide itself what it would do with them.

Fears are now often expressed in Russia over U.S. plans to store, instead of to destroy, warheads removed from missiles, as they can be redeployed on carriers anytime. But people expressing these fears do not understand that even if warheads are destroyed, they can be replaced with new ones made secretly. If the production of weapon-grade plutonium and uranium is not prohibited and if the production of new warheads is not terminated (this is quite a different, unexplored field of disarmament), one should hardly regard the storage of warheads as dangerous and make a molehill into a mountain.

The parties can agree to ensure control in storage facilities to guarantee that warheads kept there are not secretly removed and redeployed on missiles. I think the United States will agree to this measure, especially as it is interested in such control as much as Russia -- not to prevent warhead redeployment but to prevent their thefts, resale and falling into terrorists' hands.

The main issue that Russia must decide for itself is how it should develop its strategic forces. The Americans do not mind Russia's leaving in service heavy missiles with a sufficient number of warheads for a long time yet. They do not mind, either, Russia's deploying multiple warheads on Topol-M missiles. So, if Russia extends the period of service for heavy missiles, increases the production of Topol-M missiles, and provides for the deployment of multiple warheads on them, if necessary, the issue of redeployment of U.S. warheads removed from carriers will not be so acute as Russia, too, can increase the number of warheads on its missiles in reply.

I think Russian-U.S. relations have very good prospects -- provided two serious conditions are met. The first one is that the United States must realize that it must take into account Russia's interests in a much greater degree to have it as a partner, and the operation in Afghanistan has shown how important this partnership is. The other condition for cementing ties between the two countries is the strengthening of positions of those circles in Russia that support the policy of rapprochement with the West. For President Putin's foreign policy to win broader support, he must also change his home policy, re- orienting it to the building of true, rather than controlled, democracy, to the implementation of socially oriented market reforms that would not be to the detriment of a majority of the population, to all those principles that were so well and consistently set out in the president's recent address to the Federal Assembly.