Russian-Ukranian ties still edgy
LONDON: More than five years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, relations between its two most important republics, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, remain strained. In January 1997, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma warned of a 'systematic deterioration' in relations between Moscow and Kiev after renewed disputes over the Black Sea Fleet and rising economic tensions. The postponement of a visit by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in October 1996 to sign a deal on the Fleet, and a highly critical vote in the Russian Duma the same month, underlined the continuing rift between the two countries. Furthermore, these differences occur in the context of NATO enlargement, a prospect towards which Kiev is far more accommodating than Moscow.
The collapse of high-level deals between Russia and Ukraine is nothing new. Previous bilateral negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet and the December 1991 Minsk Agreement establishing a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for example, ended in failure. In fact, there has yet to be a solid and lasting bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine on any major issue. The only exceptions have occurred when third parties have become involved: Washington brokered the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine in January 1994; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) renegotiated Kiev's US$2.5 billion energy debt in March 1995.
The transition to normal bilateral relations was never expected to be easy. Both Moscow and Kiev operate under serious internal constraints. Russian President Boris Yeltsin's illness has placed an additional burden on policy-making in Moscow. Both governments also have very different views on the future of their relationship. Russia hopes that the two countries will eventually return to 'a fraternal Slavic compromise', an integrated relationship far closer than normal state-to-state ties. Consequently, Moscow does not want to resolve outstanding issues in a way that would normalize relations and make integrated ties less likely. In contrast, Ukraine wants unambiguous state-to- state cooperation, but is too weak and internally divided to impose such a relationship on Russia. Failure to resolve these differences, however, may well create further divisions between the two countries.
Despite their many unresolved problems, there has been almost continuous dialogue since 1991. Russian and Ukrainian presidents have held numerous summits and working meetings, including President Kuchma's two unscheduled visits to Moscow on Sept. 28 and Oct. 24, 1996. There is regular contact between the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine, and their respective foreign, finance and defense ministries. Expert groups have also worked hard to resolve the outstanding disputes. Nevertheless, four key problems remain.
First, the issue of long-term basing arrangements for the Black Sea Fleet has resulted in negotiations being deadlocked for years. On June 23, 1992, Moscow and Kiev agreed on an equal division of the ships and other assets. However, at a summit in Massandra on Sept. 3, 1993, they formally agreed that Ukraine would sell Russia a portion of its share of the Fleet to reduce its energy debt. The two states have been dividing the assets in this way ever since. Kiev is expected to retain 16-20 percent of the Fleet and sell Russia 30-34 percent.
No final agreement on dividing the assets exists precisely because the key issue of where the fleets will be based, and the terms governing the lease for Russian ships, are still under negotiation. Russia insists that Kiev grant it exclusive rights to base its share of the Fleet at Sevastopol in the Crimea, a demand reinforced by a 334 to 1 vote in the Duma in October 1996. Ukraine refuses to accept an outcome that would transform part of its territory into a de facto Russian city. Although no formal link exists between the Black Sea Fleet and the broader problem of Crimea's ties to Kiev, the two are intertwined. To Crimea's majority Russian population, the Fleet is economically vital and an important connection with Russia. Nevertheless, neither Russia nor Ukraine is adequately financing or maintaining the Fleet.
Russian defense policy calls for a radically reduced navy to be concentrated in the Pacific and Northern Fleets. While President Yeltsin has explicitly denied that plans exist to radically reduce or phase out the Black Sea Fleet, there is not enough money available to maintain four fleets and even the Pacific and Northern Fleets' strategic assets are seriously neglected. If the Black Sea Fleet deteriorates further, some of its personnel could become more active in the Crimean peninsula's politics. This would have destabilizing consequences for both Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian relationship.
The second key point of contention is the growing economic friction between the two countries. In part this stems from Russia's decision in October 1996 to impose a 20 percent sales tax on Ukrainian goods and strict quotas on its sugar. This policy has brought the two nations to the brink of a trade war. Although they are each other's largest trading partner, Ukraine would be more vulnerable in a trade war. Kiev is almost totally dependent on Russian oil and natural gas.
Moscow claims that its actions are a legal response to Kiev's policy of 'dumping' its cheaper products onto, and winning a substantial share of, the Russian market. Ukraine argues that the tax is part of growing economic intimidation by Moscow - that is likely to increase, as other more direct forms of coercion are shown to be ineffective. These allegedly include: open political and financial support for Russian-oriented political movements in Ukraine; increased intelligence activities; and various forms of military pressure. Given the current state of relations, and the domestic interests at stake, Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to resolve this question on their own.
Third, further CIS integration also deeply divides the two states. Russia has made de facto regional assimilation the centerpiece of its foreign policy. It sees the issue as crucial to its national interests and as the basis for its re-emergence as a global power. Ukraine, however, has always been apprehensive about Russian-sponsored integration. Kiev's policy towards the CIS thus focuses on the primacy of sovereignty and practical economic cooperation.
Ukraine also refuses to participate in CIS security mechanisms, leaving the weakest successor states to negotiate with Russia. Ukraine's strategy is increasingly supported by Uzbekistan, Georgia and other states that want practical cooperation, rather than subordination to a Moscow-run CIS system.
Fourth, Russia and Ukraine have differing polices towards NATO expansion. Russia has explicitly made known its concerns about Alliance enlargement. While initially Ukraine also feared that expansion might complicate both its internal situation and the external security environment, it has since endorsed enlargement. In June 1996, President Kuchma described NATO as the only 'real guarantor of security' in Europe, and expressed his support for Poland's bid to join the Alliance. Ukrainian officials are aware of the benefits Warsaw will derive from NATO membership, but they want to uphold the principle of sovereignty in domestic decision- making.
Kiev has proposed constraints on the stationing of military and nuclear forces in any new NATO member-states, and urged the Alliance to achieve a swift accommodation with Russia. As relations with Moscow deteriorate, Ukraine has greatly expanded its ties with NATO and the European Union (EU). While negotiations between Russia and NATO over a charter and joint council are likely to be protracted, those between NATO and Ukraine will probably be amicably concluded at an early date.
These four issues are only the most serious points of contention, but there are other potential trouble spots on the Russian-Ukrainian agenda. A Friendship Treaty between the two countries was initialed in Moscow on Feb. 8, 1995, but not signed, and probably cannot be ratified by the Russian Duma as it presently stands. The Treaty requires a number of important Russian concessions. These include the first legally binding recognition of Ukrainian territory not linked to CIS membership, and the postponement of any consideration of dual citizenship.
In addition, progress on border demarcation between Russia and Ukraine, especially in the Sea of Azov, has been delayed. However, Ukrainian official sources have threatened to carry it out unilaterally. Ukraine will also need to renegotiate its 1995 debt resettlement package with Moscow in 1998. Consequently, the two states will find no shortage of unresolved issues to address for some time to come.
Internal and international constraints make a more assertive Russian policy towards Ukraine unlikely. However, widening divisions between the two countries over major issues are likely to foster disengagement and misunderstanding. Both states would now find it difficult to gain domestic support for a broad-based settlement.
The current bilateral framework is growing weaker, thus making it more vulnerable to mistakes and miscalculations. A crisis in Crimea, for example, would have tragic consequences if the legal status of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol or Crimea itself remained unresolved in Moscow. Given the European-wide significance of a breakdown in Russian-Ukrainian relations, it is dangerous for the West to ignore these divisions and hope for a bilateral resolution to the problems.