Russia goes West

Dmitry Danilov Head of Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences RIA Novosti Moscow

The call-in broadcast of President Vladimir Putin with the Russian public late last year showed that the people don't question the U-turn made by the Russian foreign policy after Sept. 11. Only 1.6 percent of questions put to the president were concerned with foreign policy, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and compatriots.

Maybe the main result of Putin's "new policy" is that Russian society no longer sees relations with the West as the problem of "us and them." It confirmed the absence of alternative to the policy of Russia's integration into Europe. From this viewpoint, Russia was prepared for the Sept. 11 challenge, which offered a chance to considerably strengthen the vector of collaboration that was built into the foundation of Russia's European policy.

But the Western policy of the 1990s, which was spearheaded at consolidating Western institutes and limited the potential of Russia-Europe cooperation ("Greater Europe without Russia"), has largely exhausted itself. It fulfilled its key task, as the process of the creation of a greater Europe on the basis of Western institutes has acquired the necessary dynamics and became irreversible.

Russia and the West have made major steps towards each other. The agreement to elaborate a new format of Russia-NATO relations ("NATO-20") points to a fundamental change in the sides' attitude to cooperation. The NATO-20 formula is significant in that it offers the possibility of cooperation on the basis of equality but does not limit the partners' freedom in decision-making.

Europe will surely gain from stronger NATO-Russia relations. Above all because this will change the nature of Russia-West relationship and remove barriers to the development of Russia- Europe partnership. It was becoming clear prior to Sept. 11 that further progress in the collaboration between Russia and the EU in the sphere of security and defense policy was actually impossible without a fundamental improvement of Russia's relations with the U.S. and NATO.

On the other hand, the U.S. interest in accelerating the progress of Russia-NATO cooperation is not that simple. The Sept. 11 tragedy showed that the U.S. disregarded NATO's desire to demonstrate its great worth in that situation and preferred to rely on a set of bilateral relations. In other words, the role of NATO in the U.S. policy has objectively diminished. The U.S. may prefer bilateral channels of collaboration with Russia rather than NATO for the fulfillment of specific political tasks in the future, too.

Of special significance in this situation is the possibility of further enlargement of NATO, with the decision to be made at the autumn summit of the bloc in Prague. Vladimir Putin confirmed the Russian stand on the issue but made a vital addition: Despite Russia's disagreement with the policy of NATO enlargement, this should not have a destructive effect on its relations with NATO.

In fact, the only correct and constructive decision has been made: To struggle not against the enlargement but for Russia's interests. And these interests are concerned with the development of partner relations with the West in general and NATO in particular.

If a new format of NATO-Russia relations is created by May of this year in accordance with the agreement to this effect and if "the second wave" of bloc enlargement is kept relatively limited, then Russia's reaction will not be so outspoken. In its turn, Russia's restraint on the matter would become a serious argument for the West in favor of carrying on the line for developing partner relations with Russia.

It is vital in this connection to determine the future nature of such relations. The discussion of the potential Russia's NATO membership (or limited membership) should be raised to the political level.

However, if Russia demands the adoption of this new logic of relations based on the principle of equal partnership, it should draw serious lessons from the Sept. 11 tragedy. Its policy of seeing the post-Soviet space not as a zone of its vital interests but as its personal backyard where the West must not be allowed to tread should be overhauled.

Russia's giving up the concept of "red lines" when formulating the European foundations of its policy would remove major barriers to the development of partner relations with the West and improve Russia's image and standing in the post-Soviet space.

There are several serious arguments in favor of reviewing Russia's policy in the CIS in the context of Russia-West partnership that are not directly connected with the Sept. 11 events. We must above all admit that the common Russia-oriented CIS space does not exist. Russia is no longer the only priority on the scale of strategic bearings of many CIS members.

Consequently, integration prospects in the CIS depend not on Russia's ability to keep partners orbiting around it but on its development into a financially and economically strong integration center wielding great influence on the regional and European scale. This task, which is connected with a deep socio- economic transformation of Russia, can be fulfilled only through Russia's gradual integration into Europe.

It is no less important that this has become a serious lesson for Russia, too. The use of the thesis about the common threat of terrorism and extremism as an argument for substantiating Russia's actions in Chechnya is being replaced by the understanding that Russia cannot stand up against this challenge single-handed but needs effective Western assistance.

And this concerns not only the southeastern periphery of the CIS. In other words, for the first time since they overcame their military-political confrontation, Russia can expect the West to renounce its policy of keeping Russia outside the nascent Greater Europe. At the same time, Russia is abandoning the principle of deterring Western influence, which is completely incompatible with the strategy of Russia's integration into Europe. It is vital for these changes in the policy of Russia and the West to be reciprocal and lasting, sealed in new mechanisms of equal partnership.