Rum-Royen agreement

May 7, 1999 marks the 50th anniversary of a great event in the history of Indonesian diplomacy, the Rum-Van Royen Agreement. So far, the peculiar fact discernible is that three episodes are well appraised, judging from monographs on them. These are the Linggarjati Agreement (March 25, 1947), the Renville Agreement (Jan. 17 to Jan 19, 1948) and the Round Table Conference (RTC) Agreement of The Hague (Aug. 23 to Nov.2, 1949). However, the historic importance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is commonly ignored.

Officially the agreement is called the "Van Royen-Rum Statements" after a suggestion the U.S. member in the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), emanating in the closing ceremony on May 7, 1949.

When the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is scrupulously examined, it is revealed that an exceptional feature characterizing its historic value is missing in the Linggarjati and Renville Agreements.

The instrument cannot be called "agreement", for the fact that in the eyes of the Dutch government the authority proper of the Indonesian government did not exist. The objective of the Dutch second military action against Yogyakarta on Dec. 19, 1948 was exactly to crush the republic. The emergency government of the republic under Syafruddin Prawiranegara, with a mandate from president Sukarno and vice president Mohammad Hatta, was not recognized by the Dutch.

At that time, the members of the Cabinet, along with president Sukarno and vice president Hatta, were held captive on Bangka (president Sukarno had been transferred to Bangka from Prapat on Lake Toba, North Sumatra.

However, although the title adopts the term "Statements", the intent of creating a mutual binding obligation is evident from the word "agreed" in the text. This denotes the nature of agreement.

The other outstanding feature is that the president and the vice president, as captives on Bangka, missed the governing authority of the republic. Thus they gave only "personal assurances" that they favored the agreement, and this sufficed as credentials provided to Rum, as head of the Indonesian delegation. Notably, this was recognized by the Dutch.

The Rum Statement sets out only three points, whereas the Van Royen Statement seven points, but the gist is that on the republican side the cessation of guerrilla warfare was pledged and on the Dutch side the return of the republican government and its reinstatement in the residency of Yogyakarta were agreed to.

The withdrawal of the Dutch forces from Yogyakarta was completed on June 30, 1949, and on July 6 president Sukarno, vice president Hatta and the ministers by UNCI plane returned to Yogyakarta.

The historical significance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement lies in the fact that in effect it paved the way toward speeding up the convening and realization of the objectives of the RTC. It was the fruit of the RTC agreements that on Dec. 27, 1949, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty over Indonesia (except West Irian) to a then federal state, the United States of Indonesia.

Now, when all is said of the official account, one may revert to the unofficial aspect of the story. One is reminded that the negotiations, involving official talks from April 14 to April 21, followed by 16 days of unofficial discussions, and the culminating announcement of the Rum-Van Royen Statements took place at Hotel des Indes. But now the historic building exists no more. It was demolished some time in the 1970s.

A monument in the history of Indonesian diplomacy disappeared. It's a great pity.

S. SUHAEDI

Jakarta