Rum-Royen agreement
Rum-Royen agreement
May 7, 1999 marks the 50th anniversary of a great event in the
history of Indonesian diplomacy, the Rum-Van Royen Agreement. So
far, the peculiar fact discernible is that three episodes are
well appraised, judging from monographs on them. These are the
Linggarjati Agreement (March 25, 1947), the Renville Agreement
(Jan. 17 to Jan 19, 1948) and the Round Table Conference (RTC)
Agreement of The Hague (Aug. 23 to Nov.2, 1949). However, the
historic importance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is commonly
ignored.
Officially the agreement is called the "Van Royen-Rum
Statements" after a suggestion the U.S. member in the United
Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), emanating in the closing
ceremony on May 7, 1949.
When the Rum-Van Royen Agreement is scrupulously examined, it
is revealed that an exceptional feature characterizing its
historic value is missing in the Linggarjati and Renville
Agreements.
The instrument cannot be called "agreement", for the fact that
in the eyes of the Dutch government the authority proper of the
Indonesian government did not exist. The objective of the Dutch
second military action against Yogyakarta on Dec. 19, 1948 was
exactly to crush the republic. The emergency government of the
republic under Syafruddin Prawiranegara, with a mandate from
president Sukarno and vice president Mohammad Hatta, was not
recognized by the Dutch.
At that time, the members of the Cabinet, along with president
Sukarno and vice president Hatta, were held captive on Bangka
(president Sukarno had been transferred to Bangka from Prapat on
Lake Toba, North Sumatra.
However, although the title adopts the term "Statements", the
intent of creating a mutual binding obligation is evident from
the word "agreed" in the text. This denotes the nature of
agreement.
The other outstanding feature is that the president and the
vice president, as captives on Bangka, missed the governing
authority of the republic. Thus they gave only "personal
assurances" that they favored the agreement, and this sufficed as
credentials provided to Rum, as head of the Indonesian
delegation. Notably, this was recognized by the Dutch.
The Rum Statement sets out only three points, whereas the Van
Royen Statement seven points, but the gist is that on the
republican side the cessation of guerrilla warfare was pledged
and on the Dutch side the return of the republican government and
its reinstatement in the residency of Yogyakarta were agreed to.
The withdrawal of the Dutch forces from Yogyakarta was
completed on June 30, 1949, and on July 6 president Sukarno, vice
president Hatta and the ministers by UNCI plane returned to
Yogyakarta.
The historical significance of the Rum-Van Royen Agreement
lies in the fact that in effect it paved the way toward speeding
up the convening and realization of the objectives of the RTC. It
was the fruit of the RTC agreements that on Dec. 27, 1949, the
Netherlands transferred sovereignty over Indonesia (except West
Irian) to a then federal state, the United States of Indonesia.
Now, when all is said of the official account, one may revert
to the unofficial aspect of the story. One is reminded that the
negotiations, involving official talks from April 14 to April 21,
followed by 16 days of unofficial discussions, and the
culminating announcement of the Rum-Van Royen Statements took
place at Hotel des Indes. But now the historic building exists no
more. It was demolished some time in the 1970s.
A monument in the history of Indonesian diplomacy disappeared.
It's a great pity.
S. SUHAEDI
Jakarta