Roots of conflict and peace agendas in Papua

Roots of conflict and peace agendas in Papua

Muridan S. Widjojo
Jakarta

The meeting between Vice President Jusuf Kalla, flanked by
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs
Widodo AS, Minister of Home Affairs Mohammad Ma'ruf and
Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and the
official leaders of the province of Papua on Nov. 24, followed by
the talks with the leaders of West Irian Jaya province the next
day, resulted in a positive consensus.

The conflict over the election of local leaders in West Irian
Jaya will be settled based on Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy
and Government Regulation No. 54/2004 on the Papuan People's
Assembly (MRP). This implies that the process of creating a legal
umbrella for West Irian Jaya will start with a white paper
drafted by the governor of Papua, which will then be studied by
the Papuan provincial council and brought to the MRP for
approval. Subsequently, it will be forwarded to the central
government via the minister of home Affairs.

This process is expected to last a month. According to the
consensus, the central government will issue a regulation in lieu
of law to provide legal protection for West Irian Jaya. If
Jakarta firmly adheres to the accord, the door will likely be
open for a comprehensive resolution of the root causes of the
Papuan conflict.

However, it is worth noting that the agreement was reached
only after the provincial council and MRP had rejected the
unilateral plan by the Ministry of Home Affairs to hold local
elections in West Irian Jaya, and threatened to reject the
government initiated special autonomy and demand a referendum.
This threat reflected the pinnacle of disappointment and anger
among Papuan people and provincial leaders at the government's
arbitrary policies and disregard for the Special Autonomy Law.

The success of Vice President Jusuf Kalla in breaking the
political deadlock in Papua is in fact only superficial. The
conflict over the elections in West Irian Jaya is just a small
symptom of a much bigger problem.

Throughout 2005, the central government and provincial
administration found themselves at loggerheads over a number of
issues. The most significant consequence of this was a high level
of Papuan dissatisfaction with the application of special
autonomy, as manifested in the demonstration by 15,000 people
organized by the Papuan Tribal Council in August.

Their reasons are obvious.

First, socioeconomic development in the region is making
little significant progress. The public health service is seen as
inadequate, and the HIV/AIDS question is not being properly
handled. The education sector remains plagued by a lack of
facilities and teachers. Widespread poverty amid Papua's natural
riches is still the order of the day.

Second, little progress has been made on the human rights and
state violence questions. To mention but a few cases, the legal
process in respect of grave rights violations in Wamena and
Wasior has stalled in the Attorney General's Office. A 2004
military operation in Puncak Jaya (2004) that resulted in serious
rights abuses has not even been officially reported yet. Worse
still, the first permanent Human Rights Tribunal (2005) has
failed to punish rights violators in Abepura (2000). The victims
in the case were taken aback by a defense attorney's statement
that the accused should be considered "heroes" and the injured
parties "separatists".

Third, the demand for "setting the historical record straight"
in Papua and hopes for reconciliation have not been responded to
wisely.

The Papuans' demands for freedom are connected with the
historical issue. This problem will hamper Papua-Jakarta
reconciliation and the effort to build healthier political ties.
The people of Papua will continue to question their political
history in various local, national and international forums.

The Vice President, and even the President himself, have
emphasized the need to settle the problems of West Irian Jaya and
Papua by taking account of the aspirations of the Papuan people
and provincial leaders. Whatever course of action is decided upon
in resolving the West Irian Jaya issue, Jakarta must avoid
unilateral action. The Papuan side, particularly state leaders in
the provincial council and MRP, and the governor, should be fully
involved.

The West Irian Jaya problem looks likely to be long drawn out
and will not be settled within one month as targeted by Vice
President Jusuf Kalla. Differing views will arise between the
governor of Papua and the MRP, with the governor accepting the
splitting of Papua into five provinces and the MRP tending to
reject this. This is not to mention the possible introduction of
another agenda by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta, which
is apparently set on pushing through the local election plan.

If the West Irian Jaya issue can be properly resolved, the
central government and Papuan leadership will be able to prepare
three peace agendas to get to the root of the conflict in Papua.

First, Papua's development can be accelerated based on a new
special autonomy paradigm that prioritizes the empowerment of
indigenous Papuans in the social economy, health and education
sectors. Conflicts over natural resources should be resolved
based on the principles of justice and benefit to local
communities.

Spending on the Papuan bureaucracy should be reduced and
priority given to community development spending. Parallel to
this, corruption cases, such as that involving the Jayawijaya
regent, should be brought to trial.

Second, human rights should be upheld while at the same time
putting an end to the impunity enjoyed by the military and
police. As a start, the Abepura case should be appeared. The
files on the Wamena and Wasior cases should also be improved and
delivered to the court for trial without delay. The entire legal
process and control over prosecutors and judges should be
tightened to prevent outside intervention on behalf of
defendants.

Third, the question of "straightening out Papuan history", the
territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and
reconciliation should be addressed by opening a dialog between
Jakarta and Papua. This should be aimed at reaching a compromise
between the "nationalist" and "separatist" poles.

In this regard, all the important elements of Papuan society
should be represented, covering the grassroots like the Papuan
Tribal Council, the Presidium of Papuan Councils and Churches and
official leaders in Papua. The President should appoint a
committee made up of members knowledgeable about Papuan affairs
and experienced in negotiating. President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono has promised that the Aceh peace deal will be a model
for Papua.

In the context of the internationalization of Papua, the
government should realize that the best diplomacy would be improved
Jakarta-Papua relations based upon concrete action in line with
the three agendas described above.

There are two principal views in international circles on
Papua.

Some NGOs and Indonesian experts believe that Papua could
become a second Timor Leste. Other NGOs and Indonesian
specialists disagree with this view because, first, Papua has
been recognized as part of Indonesia by the United Nations since
1969 and, second, there has been explicit confirmation by
influential nations like the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands and
Britain that Indonesia has sovereignty over Papua.

The second group tends to believe that special autonomy is
more logical and realistic for Papua.

Nonetheless, all the optimism could dissipate if, first,
rights violations are ignored and the security forces continue to
enjoy impunity; second, Indonesian troops, perhaps also police
personnel, go out of control and commit new rights infringements;
and, third, a unilateral policy on Papua continues to be imposed
by the Ministry of Home Affairs, thus increasing antipathy on the
part of both informal and formal Papuan leaders.

All this would give more reason to the international community
to question the 1969 decision on integration and encourage a
referendum in Papua. If this were to happens, a Jakarta-Papua
political stalemate would be inevitable. Political violence would
increase and disintegration would become part of the agenda.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, and a PhD candidate in history at
University of Leiden in the Netherlands.