Thu, 24 Nov 2005

Risks in Thailand's Myanmar policy

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network/Bangkok

Thailand's unyielding support of the Burmese junta is fast making the country a laughing-stock throughout the world. Bangkok has become the strongest and most vocal backer of the Burmese regime. Alas! Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is now more Burmese than the Burmese.

The recent inaugural strategic Thai-U.S. dialogue in Bangkok showed that Myanmar has emerged as a sharp thorn in the side of this critically important bilateral relationship. (More than Thai and American officials will admit, the warmth and intimacy that the nations used to enjoy is no longer there. There was no press report on the dialogue except one short report by this paper, highlighting the countries' differences over Myanmar.)

Thaksin's Myanmar policy is creating an ugly situation. This point is not being repeated enough. In fact, it is not so much about Thailand's support of Myanmar, which is not unique or dissimilar to other countries in the region, but rather the manner in which Thaksin and his Cabinet members have pursued their Myanmar policy. Over the past five years, this policy has been the subject of much ridicule.

The government has often been asked questions that zero in on Thailand's ulterior motives in defending Myanmar's intransigence at all costs.

Worse still, Thaksin and the Foreign Ministry have repeatedly acted as a mouthpiece for the junta's leaders, as if they were their only authorized spokespersons.

What puzzles the Bangkok-based diplomatic community the most has been the Thai attitude towards the current effort to put Myanmar on the UN Security Council's agenda. Thailand was the first country to make clear that it would not support such a move. The Foreign Ministry later denied this, saying that it strongly supports UN efforts on Myanmar such as the role of the UN special envoy to Myanmar.

The confusion has made things worse. How can Thailand support UN efforts but refuse to back the council's debate on Myanmar? Other Asean countries probably share similar Thai views but they are discreet about it. In short, they simply keep their mouths shut. Nobody knows what benefits Thailand will derive for being such a strong pro-Myanmar advocate, other than efforts to sustain core interests associated with Thaksin and his business empire.

Of course, Thailand can always argue that it has to keep the diplomatic channel open with the Rangoon regime. It also hopes, in vain, that the lifeless "Bangkok process" can be resuscitated and that perhaps concerned parties in Myanmar can again meet in the Thai capital.

In the next few weeks, Thailand will get a black eye as the campaign among the Security Council's members reaches its crescendo. Why? The answer is simple enough.

Thailand has completely failed to gauge and understand the shifting of international sentiment on Myanmar, especially within the UN circuit and in the U.S. Congress. The report commissioned by former Czech president Vaclav Havel and South African Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu on Myanmar has been praised and given strong support. The report urges the council to discuss the situation in Myanmar. The chance that this will happen is good.

At the moment, nine votes are needed to include Myanmar on the council's agenda. Seven of the council's 15-members have already agreed to sponsor the effort. Apart from the permanent five, the non-permanent members are the newly elected Congo, Qatar, Slovakia, Ghana and Peru, which will join Argentina, Denmark, Greece, Japan and Tanzania.

For years, China and Russia have successfully blocked efforts to get the topic on the council's agenda. However, this time around a strong signal has been sent that Beijing will not stand in the way. In Busan, South Korea, last week, U.S. President George Bush highlighted Myanmar in his meeting with Asean leaders. He also discussed the issue during a bilateral meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. That was significant, because Malaysia is the current chair of Asean and its views on Myanmar are closer to Washington's than Bangkok's.

Bush's tough positions on Myanmar were partly in response to the Congress' mounting pressure on breaking the impasse on Myanmar. The rapidly increasing negative sentiment for the Thaksin government in Congress is closely linked to the growing anti-Myanmar movement.

Soon the council will discuss the situation in Myanmar. Interestingly, this topic is among very few issues that receive substantial bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. In the long run, such solidarity will negatively affect ongoing negotiations on a Thailand-U.S. free-trade agreement. Quite a few American lawmakers have been commenting that concluding a Thailand-U.S. free-trade agreement, considering the present policies of Thailand, would be tantamount to also agreeing to a Myanmar-U.S. free-trade agreement. Myanmar has taken the council's moves seriously. If the reports in the state-controlled Burmese media are any indication, the junta is quite shaken by the growing solidarity among UN council members.

Last month, The Myanmar Times quoted Burmese Information Minister Brig. Gen. Kyaw Hsan as saying that the move was part of a conspiracy by Western countries to destabilize Myanmar. On Nov. 9, The New Light of Myanmar called on the people of the world to unite and ward off what it said was an invasion of Myanmar that the U.S. was planning. The sudden relocation of many ministries from Rangoon to Pyinmana showed how seriously the junta leaders believe the conspiracy theory.

But in the end, the axe will have to fall on Thailand for its sinful policy towards Myanmar.