RI's views on verifying disarmament

By Agus Tarmidzi and Imron Cotan

GENEVA (JP): The United Nations Headquarters' conference last week was vital in determining the course of the international community in its constant endeavors to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass-destruction in the future.

From Nov. 26 to Dec. 6, the states parties to the Biological Weapons convention which regulate the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and their destruction reviewed the implementation of the convention for the last five years.

The conference was held after some important developments in the field of non-proliferation have taken place, such as the imminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons convention (CWC) and the signing of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The provision of these two legal instruments will certainly serve as the guiding principles in all disarmament negotiations, especially those affecting weapons of mass- destruction, such as biological weapons.

Words of caution, however, need to be flagged for they might or might not fit to function as such. As one may recall, the CWC comprehensively ban all chemical weapons, including their use, while the CTBT has, unfortunately, failed to address the issue of qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which has certainly helped shape the nature of their verification regimes.

It is therefore fair to remind the states parties to the convention to take these facts into consideration when they further consider the elements of the verification regime of the convention, as requested by its special conference held in 1994.

Touching upon this very important issue, it is advisable to outline the position Indonesia has long been advocating on the verification regime of the convention.

First, Indonesia is of the view that the provision contained therein should not hinder the use or research and development of biological/toxin agents for peaceful purposes or the need to develop bio-technology to improve the well-being of its population.

Secondly, the verification regime should be reliable and trustworthy as to enable it to fully deter non-compliance and appropriately protect sensitive information not relevant to the implementation of the convention.

Thirdly, as a matter of principle, the verification regime should not make it difficult for the states parties to engage in technical cooperation among themselves or denying developing countries access to technology and equipment and biological/toxin agents to suit their developmental requirements and needs, as required by the Convention.

This is particularly important, since Indonesia's National Development Guidelines clearly determined that it should develop agriculture-based industries in order to further improve the well-being of its people

Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled upon is the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection should be based. During the course of deliberations in the Adhoc Group which was set up by the special Conference in 1994 in order to study the possibility of establishing a verification regime, some developed countries proposed that "unusual outbreak of disease" could be a triggering factor for launching such an inspection.

To avoid any misunderstandings, however, there is a need to stress that Indonesia has nothing against the use of such a criteria for launching an on-site inspection. It should, however, be borne in mind that the developing countries, including Indonesia, do not have as yet adequate measures and infrastructures pertaining to health and sanitary conditions.

Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case in point, reminding the international community of such the vulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.

Therefore, these developing countries see a need to conduct an in-depth analysis based on scientific data and parameters set by the competent international authority, such as the World Health Organization, to firstly determine whether or not a case of an unusual outbreak of disease is indeed proven as a natural-rooted calamity before hastily resorting to on-site inspection measures.

Indonesia is, naturally, sensitive to the opinions which have been expressed regarding the need to conduct an on-site inspection in the speediest possible manner in order to avoid data-tampering by the suspected state or suspected violator. A balance between these two elements therefore needs to be struck. but taking into account that the international community is dealing with living biological/toxin agents which can quickly multiply themselves, a data-tampering or a cover-up operation is hardly conceivable.

Another matter of concern to the developing countries is the question of determining the deadline for the completion of the verification system of the convention. Some developed countries have already stated that they wish to see the states parties complete the verification protocol in 1998.

While fully sharing their concern that the absence of a verification regime would render the Convention ineffective and, have, encourage ill-motivated States parties to break their obligations, Indonesia sees a danger in imposing an artificial deadline. Recent developments that the Conference on Disarmament have gone through teach us a very valuable lesson during which India disassociated itself with the conclusion of the CTBT, another important non-proliferation regime.

A pre-determined deadline, particularly one which has not been agreed to by all participating states, would only prevent us from achieving the universality of the verification regime in the future. Indonesia would certainly be more than happy to complete the existing work as some delegations wish. However, careful consideration is really warranted in this case in order not to commit the same mistake.

It is indeed encouraging to note that some countries, such as France and South Africa, have used this conference to divulge the withdrawals of their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and thereby revoke their rights to use biological/toxin weapons as retaliatory measure.

As one may recall, Indonesia has been a state party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol since 1971 and has lodged no reservations whatsoever to its provisions. It is against this backdrop that Indonesia welcomes the statement by the European Union countries and other states associated thereto which called on those states which have not done so to also promptly withdraw all their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Only then will the international community be able to definitely fill in the lacuna of the Biological Weapons Convention which in its present form fails to ban outright the use of these inhuman weapons.

The world has indeed undergone fundamental and radical changes requiring it to adapt to the new realities of the post-Cold War era. In such a world, biological and toxin weapons have no place and should be considered a thing of the past. The Gulf War has taught the international community a priceless lesson. If the states parties to the convention are to save their future generations, they shall not fail to prevent it from rekindling.

Agus Tarmidzi is Indonesia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations. Imron Cotan is an expert on international peace and security, including multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Both are stationed in Geneva.

Window A: Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled upon is the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection should be based.

Window B: Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case in point, reminding the international community of such the vulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.