RI's views on verifying disarmament

RI's views on verifying disarmament

By Agus Tarmidzi and Imron Cotan

GENEVA (JP): The United Nations Headquarters' conference last
week was vital in determining the course of the international
community in its constant endeavors to contain the proliferation
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass-destruction in the
future.

From Nov. 26 to Dec. 6, the states parties to the Biological
Weapons convention which regulate the development, production and
stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and their destruction
reviewed the implementation of the convention for the last five
years.

The conference was held after some important developments in
the field of non-proliferation have taken place, such as the
imminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons convention
(CWC) and the signing of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). The provision of these two legal instruments will
certainly serve as the guiding principles in all disarmament
negotiations, especially those affecting weapons of mass-
destruction, such as biological weapons.

Words of caution, however, need to be flagged for they might
or might not fit to function as such. As one may recall, the CWC
comprehensively ban all chemical weapons, including their use,
while the CTBT has, unfortunately, failed to address the issue of
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, which has certainly
helped shape the nature of their verification regimes.

It is therefore fair to remind the states parties to the
convention to take these facts into consideration when they
further consider the elements of the verification regime of the
convention, as requested by its special conference held in 1994.

Touching upon this very important issue, it is advisable to
outline the position Indonesia has long been advocating on the
verification regime of the convention.

First, Indonesia is of the view that the provision contained
therein should not hinder the use or research and development of
biological/toxin agents for peaceful purposes or the need to
develop bio-technology to improve the well-being of its
population.

Secondly, the verification regime should be reliable and
trustworthy as to enable it to fully deter non-compliance and
appropriately protect sensitive information not relevant to the
implementation of the convention.

Thirdly, as a matter of principle, the verification regime
should not make it difficult for the states parties to engage in
technical cooperation among themselves or denying developing
countries access to technology and equipment and biological/toxin
agents to suit their developmental requirements and needs, as
required by the Convention.

This is particularly important, since Indonesia's National
Development Guidelines clearly determined that it should develop
agriculture-based industries in order to further improve the
well-being of its people

Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled upon
is the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection
should be based. During the course of deliberations in the Adhoc
Group which was set up by the special Conference in 1994 in order
to study the possibility of establishing a verification regime,
some developed countries proposed that "unusual outbreak of
disease" could be a triggering factor for launching such an
inspection.

To avoid any misunderstandings, however, there is a need to
stress that Indonesia has nothing against the use of such a
criteria for launching an on-site inspection. It should, however,
be borne in mind that the developing countries, including
Indonesia, do not have as yet adequate measures and
infrastructures pertaining to health and sanitary conditions.

Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case in
point, reminding the international community of such the
vulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.

Therefore, these developing countries see a need to conduct an
in-depth analysis based on scientific data and parameters set by
the competent international authority, such as the World Health
Organization, to firstly determine whether or not a case of an
unusual outbreak of disease is indeed proven as a natural-rooted
calamity before hastily resorting to on-site inspection measures.

Indonesia is, naturally, sensitive to the opinions which have
been expressed regarding the need to conduct an on-site
inspection in the speediest possible manner in order to avoid
data-tampering by the suspected state or suspected violator. A
balance between these two elements therefore needs to be struck.
but taking into account that the international community is
dealing with living biological/toxin agents which can quickly
multiply themselves, a data-tampering or a cover-up operation
is hardly conceivable.

Another matter of concern to the developing countries is the
question of determining the deadline for the completion of the
verification system of the convention. Some developed countries
have already stated that they wish to see the states parties
complete the verification protocol in 1998.

While fully sharing their concern that the absence of a
verification regime would render the Convention ineffective and,
have, encourage ill-motivated States parties to break their
obligations, Indonesia sees a danger in imposing an artificial
deadline. Recent developments that the Conference on Disarmament
have gone through teach us a very valuable lesson during which
India disassociated itself with the conclusion of the CTBT,
another important non-proliferation regime.

A pre-determined deadline, particularly one which has not been
agreed to by all participating states, would only prevent us from
achieving the universality of the verification regime in the
future. Indonesia would certainly be more than happy to complete
the existing work as some delegations wish. However, careful
consideration is really warranted in this case in order not to
commit the same mistake.

It is indeed encouraging to note that some countries, such as
France and South Africa, have used this conference to divulge the
withdrawals of their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
thereby revoke their rights to use biological/toxin weapons as
retaliatory measure.

As one may recall, Indonesia has been a state party to the
1925 Geneva Protocol since 1971 and has lodged no reservations
whatsoever to its provisions. It is against this backdrop that
Indonesia welcomes the statement by the European Union countries
and other states associated thereto which called on those states
which have not done so to also promptly withdraw all their
reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Only then will the international community be able to
definitely fill in the lacuna of the Biological Weapons
Convention which in its present form fails to ban outright the
use of these inhuman weapons.

The world has indeed undergone fundamental and radical changes
requiring it to adapt to the new realities of the post-Cold War
era. In such a world, biological and toxin weapons have no place
and should be considered a thing of the past. The Gulf War has
taught the international community a priceless lesson. If the
states parties to the convention are to save their future
generations, they shall not fail to prevent it from rekindling.

Agus Tarmidzi is Indonesia's Permanent Representative to the
United Nations Office and Other International Organizations.
Imron Cotan is an expert on international peace and security,
including multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Both are
stationed in Geneva.

Window A: Another important issue which needs to be fully dwelled
upon is the criteria on which a request for an on-site inspection
should be based.

Window B: Recent unusual outbreak of disease in India is a case
in point, reminding the international community of such the
vulnerability of the developing countries to such a case.