RI-S'pore ties: Opportunity lost

RI-S'pore ties: Opportunity lost

AM Hendropriyono, Jakarta

It was not that long ago, so the story goes, that a former
Indonesian president pointed to a small star on a map of
Southeast Asia. "That's Singapore," he sniffed with disdain. It's
smaller than the island in the middle of Lake Toba".

A decent interval has passed since those caustic comments, and
Indonesia-Singapore ties have rebounded strongly in many areas.
Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the war on terrorism.
From my perspective as head of the State Intelligence Agency,
Singapore's cooperation on this front can only be described as
excellent. As one of our close partners in what promises to be a
prolonged campaign, Singapore has responded positively to all
intelligence requests made by Indonesia. This is a two-way
street: Indonesia, in turn, has done its best to fulfill
Singapore's intelligence needs.

On a more symbolic level, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong was one
of the first foreign leaders to visit Indonesia after the October
2002 Bali bombings. While in Jakarta, he went out of his way to
emphasize the sense of security he felt -- welcome comments not
without influence among foreign businessmen and tourists.

Just as important have been the gains in bilateral economic
ties. Out of all proportion to its size, Singapore has been the
fourth-largest investor in Indonesia for five years running.
Tourism in both directions is vibrant, with about a million
Singaporeans visiting Indonesia last year.

On Batam and Bintan Islands, close cooperation extends back a
decade; this stands to grow more deeply following implementation
of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, with Indonesian
exports, as a result, able to enter the U.S. market without
paying duty through the Integrated Sourcing Initiative.

But despite all this, there is a lingering impression among
many Singaporean leaders that the current administration of
Megawati Soekarnoputri is often obstructive at best, and hostile
at worst. This impression is not without justification. In
particular, recent examples of economic friction have been all
too common.

Worse, one usually comes away with the feeling that much of
this friction is due to a lack of willingness by some Indonesian
officials to tackle hard reforms at home. Example: Rather than
reigning in administrative corruption around Riau to correct
customs shortfalls, one senior official recently pinned blame
solely on alleged Singaporean smugglers.

Another point of contention is maritime security along the
Malacca Strait. There is no understating the importance of this
checkpoint. Some 800 kilometers long, it hosts about 5,000 ships
a year. This includes some 72 percent of the supertankers and
heavy vessels moving between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Obviously, were traffic to be seriously impeded along the
strait, the negative impact rippling across the economies of East
Asia would be enormous. This is, unfortunately, an all too real
possibility. For one thing, piracy is on the increase. According
to the International Maritime Bureau, there were 16 piratical
attacks along the strait in 2002; that number rose to 28 during
2003.

Furthermore, there is the threat of maritime terrorism. Senior
Jamaah Islamiyah terrorists now in detention have admitted that
attacks on Malacca shipping traffic have been contemplated in the
recent past. Should a supertanker along the strait be sabotaged,
especially near territorial waters, the economic and ecological
fallout would be enormous.

But despite such threats, security along the strait has been
sorely lacking. This is partly for jurisdictional reasons: Three
countries have territorial waters extending into the strait,
complicating naval coordination. Part, too, is due to a lack of
resources: Attrition since the 1997 economic crisis has hit
regional navies rather hard, none more so than that of Indonesia.

Looking at the shortfall in maritime patrols along the length
of the strait, Singapore earlier this year raised the possibility
of inviting a third party to guarantee maritime security. This
would have been done through the U.S. Regional Maritime Security
Initiative, part of the Proliferation Security Initiative meant
to combat global terrorism. To support the scheme, Singapore
officially dedicated naval facilities at its Changi Naval Base in
May; these were built to the specifications of U.S. warships.

Reacting to the concerns raised by Singapore, Indonesia and
Malaysia have attempted to shore up security measures by the
three littoral states. A meeting of the Indonesia-Malaysia Joint
Commission in May, for example, resulted in pledges to enhance
bilateral naval cooperation. Malaysia, in particular, announced
it would establish a coast guard over the coming year.

Most recently, in July, the Indonesian, Malaysian and
Singaporean navies agreed to commence joint patrols along the
strait. They also agreed to establish a naval hotline and to use
common radio frequencies to ease communications.

While these are all positive developments, the attitude of
some Indonesian diplomats toward Singapore was found wanting.
Rather than discretely voicing questions over Singaporean
cooperation in the Regional Maritime Security Initiative,
criticism of Singapore was very public and shrill. More suitable,
perhaps, would have been a measured response that welcomed
cooperation from any country wishing to help safeguard the
strait, provided that there was agreement from the littoral
states. This might include, for example, intelligence-sharing,
the provision of weaponry and training exercises.

The attitude taken by some Indonesian authorities toward the
Malacca initiative has only fueled the impression of hostility
toward Singapore, despite the fact that, generally, the Megawati
administration has been trying hard to foster bilateral goodwill.
With the new administration having taken office in Singapore,
perhaps the time is right for a fresh, more mature start.

Already, there have been calls for the establishment of a
hotline between leaders of both nations to quickly resolve issues
before they become a matter of public debate. Such a step, among
others, could well result in the enhancement of cordial ties that
are so obviously in the mutual interests of both Singapore and
Jakarta.

The writer is director of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN).