RI needs diplomatic strength in dealing with Malaysia

RI needs diplomatic strength in dealing with Malaysia

Wahyu Susilo, Jakarta

The diplomatic tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia have
been escalating over a border dispute concerning the oil in the
Ambalat block. It started nearly two weeks ago when Malaysia's
state oil company Petronas claimed that the oil field in the
Sulawesi Sea was its exploitation area, and proceeded to sell a
concession to the multinational company, Shell.

The unilateral decision by the state company promptly received
a strong reaction from the Indonesian government, which also
claimed that Ambalat was an inseparable part of the unitary state
of the Republic of Indonesia. The oil dispute became a full-
fledged crisis after warships and fighter jets were deployed to
the area by both countries. The ships are apparently still there
on high alert.

As a background, Malaysia's bold claim on Ambalat was not only
based on historical considerations, but also on Malaysia's
analysis of the performance of Indonesian diplomacy, which has
always "lost" to Malaysia. In previous weeks, Malaysia noticed
its "victory" in the diplomacy of migrant worker deportation,
though it had been cornered by the case of Damansara Damai, which
revealed Malaysian companies' wage payment arrears and deliberate
recruitment of migrant workers without documents.

In the beginning, Indonesia aggressively declared that there
was "something serious about the issue of migrant workers without
documents in Malaysia" and even planned to hire 10 renowned
lawyers in Malaysia to sue the companies in order to make them
bankrupt. But the Malaysian government was not deterred and stuck
to its guns, believing that, "migrant workers without papers is a
crime so they have no right to sue". Finally, Indonesia backed
down -- with an anticlimax at the summit meeting between
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Premier Abdullah Badawi on
Feb. 14, 2005.

When the Indonesian public expected the meeting to improve the
fate of migrant workers without documents (particularly on the
issue of unpaid wages), the result was the reverse. Instead of
urging Malaysian firms to pay the wages overdue, the Indonesian
government left its settlement fully to Malaysia and agreed to
allow the stern actions against Indonesian illegal workers. The
Indonesian "agreement" legitimized the Malaysian operation.
Indonesia's "defeat" was apparent with the cancellation of the
Indonesian government's lawsuit against the Malaysian firms.

This failure in Indonesian diplomacy encouraged Malaysia to
launch its political maneuver by claiming the Ambalat offshore
area as its territory. The move will again force Indonesia to
solve the Ambalat border crisis through the mechanism of
diplomacy. Indonesia will definitely avoid settling the dispute
through the international court because of the trauma of its loss
in the 2002 Sipadan-Ligitan case in this tribunal.

I predict that by inviting Indonesia to bilateral diplomatic
talks, there will certainly be room for negotiation on the
control over Ambalat. Should Indonesia be trapped in a fait
accompli, it would mean that Ambalat will indeed be recognized
legally as Malaysia's oil field.

The Indonesian government should conduct a profound evaluation
of its performance of foreign diplomacy. Admittedly, Indonesia
has so far been ensnared in the myth of the "common ethnic
family" policy with Malaysia, so that the pattern of diplomacy
tends to avoid the approach of bargaining and be more oriented to
the politics of harmony.

By the model that gives prominence to the politics of harmony,
the interests of migrant workers demanding their rights and
protection were brushed aside for the sake of harmony in
bilateral relations. So, if in this process of the Ambalat
diplomacy, Indonesia still applies the politics of harmony, the
outcome will again harm Indonesian interests. In a territorial
dispute, our diplomacy should be totally maximized by pooling all
political resources.

Observing the main issues in the Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral
crisis (migrant workers and territorial dispute), Indonesia
should strengthen its political bargaining position in its
diplomacy by analyzing the interdependence between Malaysia's
economy and the labor market. On Saturday, March 5, a Malaysian
delegation under Interior Minister Azmi Khalid visited Jakarta to
meet with Indonesian Minister of Manpower and Transmigration
Fahmi Idris for a discussion on the quick return of the migrant
workers who left Malaysia during the amnesty period.

According to Azmi Khalid, companies in Malaysia are facing a
labor shortage due to the scarcity of low-wage migrant workers,
and Malaysia expects the fulfillment of its industrial demand
within two months (for around 300,000 migrant workers).

Therefore, this reality should serve as a political bargaining
chip. The Indonesian government should not always comply with
Malaysia's requests. Indonesia's bargaining position will rise if
the government says, for instance: "Indonesia is prepared to
speed up the return of 300,000 migrant workers to Malaysia, if
within a month the Malaysian government is ready to force
Malaysian firms to pay wages still overdue."

The government can add more demands including the arrest and
punishment of Malaysian employees who deliberately recruited
migrant workers without papers, make sure that the migrant raid
proceeds peacefully without rights violation, and withdraw the
unilateral claim on Ambalat."

The writer is a labor policy analyst in Migrant CARE --
Indonesian Association for Sovereign Migrant Workers.