RI must take real steps toward reform

RI must take real steps toward reform

Pressure for political reform toppled Soeharto from the
presidency on May 21. Political scientist J. Soedjati Djiwandono
tracks how far we have traveled on the heralded road to reform
under B.J. Habibie.

JAKARTA (JP): Exactly three years ago, in anticipation of
1996, I ended my review in this column by stating, "we may be in
for a continuously declining political situation with a deepening
crisis of confidence..."

I am afraid the prospects for 1999 do not seem any better.

Many have referred to the period since the resignation of
Soeharto as an "era of reform". The reality, however, is that at
best we are just moving from the New Order toward reform. We have
reached only the door of reform, which is only slightly ajar.

Habibie added the word "reform" to the name of his essentially
transitional Cabinet (despite his adamant but pointless denials),
which is notably designated in Soeharto's style as a "Development
Cabinet". This small and seemingly insignificant step may be
construed by some as a foretaste of more progressive measures to
come.

That would be no more than self-deceit. The climate of reform,
characterized particularly by ample freedom of association and
the press, is not a gift bestowed by Habibie nor his creation. It
is a development he probably does not like but has to grudgingly
accept.

The development was the fruit of the reform movement
spearheaded by university students. The students, no doubt,
represent the majority of the people, whose courage to express
their views openly and whose awareness of the rotten political
system over more than three decades were awakened by the
deepening economic crisis.

The climate of reform, however, has continued to be
accompanied by uncertainty and confusion, increasing although
sporadic violence, and general lawlessness, with the breakdown of
law and order. These have resulted from the worsening crisis of
confidence, and thus of leadership.

Reform essentially forms part of democratization. As applied
to Indonesia, it is to be understood particularly in the sense
that sovereignty, robbed by the power of the state, is to be
returned to the people. The implication is then that chaos and
lawlessness, crisis of confidence, leadership and authority as a
result of a complete breakdown of the political system due to
decades of manipulation, can only be overcome through a fresh,
free and fair election.

That should be the focus of our attention, the main political
agenda of 1999. It should be our top priority. It should take
precedence over the rest of the problems, however urgent and
important they are, such as the continued investigation and legal
proceedings against Soeharto and his cronies for corrupt,
collusive and nepotistic practices, the issue of the Armed
Forces' (ABRI) dual function, and the accountability of the
present de facto government. The latter particularly relates to
the military leadership for the missing activists, the shooting
of student demonstrators, the May riots, the mass rapes, the
Semanggi bloodshed in November, the killings and "witch-hunts" in
East Java and many, many other incidents of violence.

However, given that the nation's economy will make an election
possible, it is still hard to expect a peaceful, smooth, clean
and really fair election. Since the nation's first election in
1955 -- by all accounts the only free, fair and most peaceful one
the country has known since independence -- all the six elections
under Soeharto's New Order were anything but free, fair and
peaceful.

The implication is that we have a highly inexperienced and
probably mostly not well-educated electorate. In this country,
"traditional voters" are hardly found. This, combined with the
participation of over 100 new political parties in the election,
an array likely to confuse the people, and with the lengthy
economic crisis leaving millions jobless, would render many among
the electorate vulnerable to pressure of various kinds, including
money politics.

Indeed, despite the large number of political parties, the
contest is likely to be one basically between status quo forces
on the one hand, and proreform forces on the other. But it is
doubtful, for reasons just stated, if that means much to the
electorate. Some status quo forces may be losing ground and
others may be small but radical, prone to resort to almost any
means to achieve their ends.

What needs to be done, therefore, to ensure a truly free and
fair election, free from interference, manipulation, money
politics and other forms of pressure, and to minimize violence
right to the end, is the establishment of independent teams --
not one set up by the government -- as election watchdogs.

A lot of work needs to be done as of right now, particularly
to ensure the enactment of the right laws on the election, the
political parties and the composition of the House of
Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR), to be completed in the first month of 1999.

The election may be rough and costly, the results far from
perfect. The resulting new government and other state
institutions, particularly the DPR and MPR, may be far from our
expectations. The economic crisis may not be immediately
overcome. We may continue to be muddling through democratic
experimentation for years to come.

In the face of the lawlessness, however, an election is the
only choice we have if we are determined to carry on political
reform toward greater democracy, if we do sincerely want a
legitimate and authoritative government. It will be the right
beginning, and the rest must then follow.