RI must take real steps toward reform

Pressure for political reform toppled Soeharto from the presidency on May 21. Political scientist J. Soedjati Djiwandono tracks how far we have traveled on the heralded road to reform under B.J. Habibie.

JAKARTA (JP): Exactly three years ago, in anticipation of 1996, I ended my review in this column by stating, "we may be in for a continuously declining political situation with a deepening crisis of confidence..."

I am afraid the prospects for 1999 do not seem any better.

Many have referred to the period since the resignation of Soeharto as an "era of reform". The reality, however, is that at best we are just moving from the New Order toward reform. We have reached only the door of reform, which is only slightly ajar.

Habibie added the word "reform" to the name of his essentially transitional Cabinet (despite his adamant but pointless denials), which is notably designated in Soeharto's style as a "Development Cabinet". This small and seemingly insignificant step may be construed by some as a foretaste of more progressive measures to come.

That would be no more than self-deceit. The climate of reform, characterized particularly by ample freedom of association and the press, is not a gift bestowed by Habibie nor his creation. It is a development he probably does not like but has to grudgingly accept.

The development was the fruit of the reform movement spearheaded by university students. The students, no doubt, represent the majority of the people, whose courage to express their views openly and whose awareness of the rotten political system over more than three decades were awakened by the deepening economic crisis.

The climate of reform, however, has continued to be accompanied by uncertainty and confusion, increasing although sporadic violence, and general lawlessness, with the breakdown of law and order. These have resulted from the worsening crisis of confidence, and thus of leadership.

Reform essentially forms part of democratization. As applied to Indonesia, it is to be understood particularly in the sense that sovereignty, robbed by the power of the state, is to be returned to the people. The implication is then that chaos and lawlessness, crisis of confidence, leadership and authority as a result of a complete breakdown of the political system due to decades of manipulation, can only be overcome through a fresh, free and fair election.

That should be the focus of our attention, the main political agenda of 1999. It should be our top priority. It should take precedence over the rest of the problems, however urgent and important they are, such as the continued investigation and legal proceedings against Soeharto and his cronies for corrupt, collusive and nepotistic practices, the issue of the Armed Forces' (ABRI) dual function, and the accountability of the present de facto government. The latter particularly relates to the military leadership for the missing activists, the shooting of student demonstrators, the May riots, the mass rapes, the Semanggi bloodshed in November, the killings and "witch-hunts" in East Java and many, many other incidents of violence.

However, given that the nation's economy will make an election possible, it is still hard to expect a peaceful, smooth, clean and really fair election. Since the nation's first election in 1955 -- by all accounts the only free, fair and most peaceful one the country has known since independence -- all the six elections under Soeharto's New Order were anything but free, fair and peaceful.

The implication is that we have a highly inexperienced and probably mostly not well-educated electorate. In this country, "traditional voters" are hardly found. This, combined with the participation of over 100 new political parties in the election, an array likely to confuse the people, and with the lengthy economic crisis leaving millions jobless, would render many among the electorate vulnerable to pressure of various kinds, including money politics.

Indeed, despite the large number of political parties, the contest is likely to be one basically between status quo forces on the one hand, and proreform forces on the other. But it is doubtful, for reasons just stated, if that means much to the electorate. Some status quo forces may be losing ground and others may be small but radical, prone to resort to almost any means to achieve their ends.

What needs to be done, therefore, to ensure a truly free and fair election, free from interference, manipulation, money politics and other forms of pressure, and to minimize violence right to the end, is the establishment of independent teams -- not one set up by the government -- as election watchdogs.

A lot of work needs to be done as of right now, particularly to ensure the enactment of the right laws on the election, the political parties and the composition of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), to be completed in the first month of 1999.

The election may be rough and costly, the results far from perfect. The resulting new government and other state institutions, particularly the DPR and MPR, may be far from our expectations. The economic crisis may not be immediately overcome. We may continue to be muddling through democratic experimentation for years to come.

In the face of the lawlessness, however, an election is the only choice we have if we are determined to carry on political reform toward greater democracy, if we do sincerely want a legitimate and authoritative government. It will be the right beginning, and the rest must then follow.