RI foreign policy proves durable
By Rizal Sukma
This is the first of two articles on Indonesia's foreign policy which was first inducted on Sept. 2, 1948.
JAKARTA (JP): Forty-nine years ago today, Indonesia's first prime minister Mohammad Hatta laid down the foundations of Indonesia's foreign policy.
At the time, Hatta had to respond to the differing demands of contending political forces about the status of Indonesia in world politics. These demands came amid the growing rivalry between two opposing blocs led by the United States and the former Soviet Union.
Hatta's cabinet was faced with strong pressure from leftist political forces to align the newly born republic with the Soviet camp. But Hatta was bound to resist this pressure.
Faced with the urgent need to define Indonesia's international identity, amid this intense domestic political rivalry, he outlined the basic principles of Indonesia's foreign policy to the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat). These principles became the substance of an active and independent policy (bebas-aktif).
Did the fighting Indonesian people have no other course of action open to them other than to choose between being pro- Russian or pro-American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideas?
The government is of the opinion that Indonesia should not be a passive participant in international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal -- the goal of a fully independent Indonesia.
This position was taken with two important objectives in mind. First, to the outside world, it constituted an identification of Indonesia's place and position in the international system. It registered the rejection by Indonesia's government of a commitment to either bloc and the rivalry between the two superpowers.
Second, it was intended to mitigate domestic rivalry between the competing elite. Through an independent position in world politics, Hatta sought to prevent ideological rivalry between Washington and Moscow from aggravating acute political differences among the country's political elite.
In other words, the principle of bebas-aktif grew out of the need of Indonesia's government to cultivate national unity by making its foreign policy serve that domestic objective. The promulgation of the principle was closely affected by the objective condition of both international and domestic politics at that time.
Since its formulation in 1948, the implementation of the policy has been replete with various nuances. During the 52 years since Indonesia achieved independence, its foreign policy has undergone a number of significant changes and the world in which the principle was implemented has also changed.
What does bebas-aktif mean for the New Order and has it also undergone a change in the last 20 years?
According to Hatta, the bebas-aktif foreign policy comprises four fundamental premises. First, the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy should be based on an ideological foundation, namely the state's Pancasila (Five Principles).
Second, foreign policy should be aimed at safeguarding national interests as defined in the 1945 Constitution.
Third, the pursuit of national interest would be best served through an independent policy.
Finally, Indonesia's foreign policy should be conducted pragmatically, that is, it "should be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face".
Hatta also firmly believed that Indonesia's objectives and national interests would be best served through a strong commitment to the framework he designed.
This would serve three immediate tasks facing Indonesia after independence:
a. safeguarding national independence, sovereignty, and security
b. maintaining internal consolidation
c. safeguarding economic interests
More importantly, the bebas-aktif foreign policy, according to Hatta, has three significant characteristics: anti-colonialism, independence and pragmatism.
Despite such a clear conceptualization, the term soon proved difficult to accurately define and operate.
Even though successive Indonesian governments reiterated their commitment to the principle, their opinions differed with regard to what bebas-aktif should truly mean and how actual implementation of the principle should be carried out.
An expert on Indonesia's foreign policy, Franklin Weinstein, observes that from 1950 until the time he wrote about the policy, in 1976, the principle of bebas-aktif had at least five meanings.
During the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, the policy assumed two meanings. First, in the early 1950s it was defined as a policy which precluded the government from entering into any international agreement which would align Indonesia with either opposing bloc. In other words, Indonesia should stay out of a pact. However, such a position was not meant to preclude Indonesia from being active in establishing world peace.
Second, in the mid-1950s, the definition of the policy was broadened to include the obligation of establishing a balance in Indonesia's relations with the two blocs.
When Indonesia entered the period of guided democracy in 1959, the principle of bebas-aktif acquired its third and fourth meanings.
In the early 1960s, president Sukarno extended its meaning to include a balance in foreign economic relations so that Indonesia did not lean toward the West or the East.
By the mid-1960s, as Sukarno sought to radicalize domestic and foreign policy, bebas-aktif was defined in terms of Indonesia's ability to lead an international movement of the developing world against neo-imperialism.
The fifth meaning of bebas-aktif found its expression in the foreign policy of the New Order. Weinstein argues that the New Order attempted to combine the meanings of bebas-aktif from previous periods to justify the course of the foreign policy it intended to pursue.
Thus, he found that the pronouncement of the New Order's foreign policy contained the determination to avoid dependence on foreign powers; the return of the 1950s "no pacts" interpretation; the reiteration of commitment to non-alignment; continued adherence to the principle of anti-colonialism and neo- imperialism; the need to blend policy with flexibility and pragmatism; and the aspiration to play a leading role in the Southeast Asian region.
The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
Window: Hatta also firmly believed that Indonesia's objectives and national interests would be best served through a strong commitment to the framework he designed.