RI foreign policy falls from grace
RI foreign policy falls from grace
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat
JAKARTA (JP): Foreign policy analyst Soedjati Djiwandono in a
column in this paper recently described Indonesian foreign policy
as being in disarray.
His feeling reflected the dismay of many observers that
Indonesian foreign policy was not only in disarray, but had lost
its dignity.
Rash personal impulses, reckless abandonment of various
"cornerstones", and just a plain lack of decorum have all seen a
painful fall from grace which could end with Indonesia, like
President Abdurrahman Wahid's many cliches, being a joke on the
international scene.
Several foreign policy ideas articulated in 2000 left many
nonplused. Not because they were innovative, but because they
seemed to betray the fundamental tenets so carefully constructed
in the past.
What is even more worrying is that they were introduced
without any clear blueprint leaving even Indonesian diplomats
often privately dismissing their superiors' remarks.
Foreign relations, just like any other relationship, is based
on perception. One can only wonder with deflation the perception
our neighbors have of us.
President Abdurrahman has adopted a particular liking to
foreign policy since his inauguration 14-months ago, including a
ferocious appetite for endless trips abroad which has seen him
visit some 40 countries.
Palace officials initially argued that despite unresolved
domestic problems, he needed to go abroad to solicit investment
and convince the world that Indonesia remains a good place for
business.
But with investments only trickling in, the rhetoric changed
in 2000 with foreign excursions being a way to ensure support for
territorial integrity.
How many of these expressions of support can eventually be
counted upon still remains questionable as they were mostly
polite rhetorical statements.
Let's not forget it is also part of diplomatic custom not to
immediately or publicly engage in a dispute with a visiting head
of state.
Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab argued that foreign policy is
partly interpersonal relationships and the President's efforts
were part of network building.
It was during such foreign visits that the President would
often utter a remark or pronounce a new concept that would leave
those at home baffled.
One such case was the idea of a closer alliance, or even axis
perhaps, with India and China.
But Abdurrahman neglected the fact that China and India have
rarely allied themselves. Thus far, neither Beijing nor New Delhi
have shown any interest in the idea.
Respected foreign policy analyst Juwono Sudarsono tried to
rationalize Abdurrahman's thinking, suggesting that it was part
of his humanitarian vision.
"Actually Gus Dur's vision is good. He wants to connect the
global and the local," Juwono told The Jakarta Post.
But he conceded that "the method to realize it is rather
difficult ... How to match the humanitarian vision of Gus Dur
with the realities of real politik."
"The difficulty is translating it into a policy, which is
state-centered, which often means having to choose between the
good and the less good," Juwono said.
Unfortunately, the problem is not really with the
"translation", since if it was really a concerted and defined
policy why then has there been virtually no follow-up.
This was a glaring example of the most inexplicable weakness
in foreign policy in 2000: too many ideas were simply not thought
through and disregarded the circumstances and consequences.
It also seemed to fly in the face of the domestic realities of
Indonesia's own ability to pursue such an ambitious endeavor.
Another example was Abdurrahman's introduction of a West
Pacific Forum (WPF) which would comprise Indonesia, East Timor,
Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.
This proposal seems to have emerged merely as a result of
Abdurrahman's sheer disappointment at the cold reception for many
of his suggestions during the ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) summit in Singapore in November.
There are so many things perplexing about the proposed Forum.
First, what specific tangible benefit is there for Indonesia? Are we
merely trying to lure Australian dollars?
Second, it includes East Timor which at present is not a
state.
Third, during talks with senior officials both at the foreign
ministry and the Merdeka Palace, most shrug their shoulders when
queried about the details.
By all accounts, even foreign minister Alwi Shihab failed to
present a concept paper when he verbally tried to further
introduce the idea of such a Forum during a meeting with
Australian ministers last month.
Another case where personal impulses seemed to get the better
of sound judgment was Abdurrahman's tirade against Singapore in
November.
The President threw etiquette out of the window when he
launched an insidious verbal assault against Singapore while
still in the island state.
Even if his remarks were relevant, it was neither the time,
the place nor the way such racially charged comments should have
been made especially by the highest representative of a nation
which boasts of itself as being cultured and dignified.
While Abdurrahman and Alwi may be perceived as humanitarian
characters and great communicators, their protocol skills
sometimes left something to be desired.
Alwi Shihab at the final media briefing of the Post
Ministerial Conference in Bangkok in July did not even have the
patience to wait till Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, who
chaired the event, finished reading his closing statement before
standing up and shaking everybody's hand to leave.
To the chuckles of hundreds in the room, Alwi created quite a
stir as he shook the hands of over a dozen surprised looking
ministers leaving Surin somewhat confused as to what was going on
behind him.
When queried why Alwi could not even wait another five minutes
to make his departure, officials excused their minister's
behavior saying Alwi was late for his flight home.
In late November, Alwi declared that Indonesian foreign policy
would be based on Ecumenical Diplomacy.
Ecumenism is derived from the Greek word oikoumene. As a
movement, it represents an effort to bring about worldwide
cooperation for unity among Christian churches.
Alwi defined ecumenical diplomacy as "embracing all nations to
widen relationships and mutually beneficial cooperation."
Such a definition implicitly suggests a political equidistance
to all nations irrespective of whether their values conflict with
the principles enshrined in the preamble of the 1945
Constitution.
If such is the case than it could explain why Abdurrahman and
Alwi have been so adamant about opening diplomatic ties with
Israel.
However, let's not forget that Indonesia's forefathers never
implied that "free and active" foreign policy meant that
Indonesia should remain neutral!
Is Indonesia thus also discarding priorities based on a
geopolitical footprint in which Southeast Asia has been the most
immediate ring of regional resilience? What are the priorities
based upon, then?
If that is the outlook for Indonesian foreign policy in the
immediate future how will it bode for our neighbors and the
future of ASEAN.
While these questions remain abuzz, another seeming
contradiction emerges in that Alwi professes that Asia-Pacific
remains a primary theater of our foreign policy.
Some have scoffed at this "new" approach describing it as
Alwi's attempt at making his personal mark on foreign policy.
Others jest that he is showing off his Harvard seminary spirit
as, in practice, ecumenical diplomacy is nothing more than a
fancy way of describing a good neighbor policy.
In past years the poor quality of Indonesian diplomats has
been the perennial excuse in rationalizing Indonesia's foreign
policy failings, but in 2000 they may be exempted.
Our professional envoys and the foreign ministry in general
were mostly sidelined as Abdurrahman and Alwi engaged in their
personal brand of foreign policy.
Kusnanto Anggoro of the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) described foreign affairs in the past 14 months as
"a policy of no policy".
Speaking to the Post, he questioned the introduction of
policies which, viewed from a real politik point of view, were
alien and had unrealistic aims such as the examples mentioned
above.
When asked, Kusnanto acknowledged that it had reached "a level
which was embarrassing", using the words "a loss of direction".
Many concede that there is little that can be done to modify
the situation as it is the result of the personal traits, or even
flaws, of the foreign policy actors themselves.
We can only hope that the consistency of the past has laid a
strong enough bedrock to withstand the confusion of the present
and the uncertainties of tomorrow, particularly in ASEAN.
History reminds us that Indonesia had veered from its outlined
foreign policy course before, particularly in the latter years of
first president Sukarno.
But as one experienced foreign policy observer and
practitioner privately tutored: "Bung Karno was hated, was
feared...but he was never laughed at."
The writer is a journalist with The Jakarta Post.