RI foreign policy a case of style over substance

RI foreign policy a case of style over substance

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

If ever there was a time for Indonesia to have a banner year in
foreign affairs, it was 2005.

All the elements were in place: A newly elected president who
emerged as a poster boy for emerging democracy; a leader who --
compared to his bumbling and lumbering predecessors -- acted with
the dignified flair becoming of a president in the international
spotlight; global sympathy in the wake of the tsunami; and
domestic political stability unprecedented since the fall of
Soeharto in 1998.

This arsenal of sympathy, democracy and stability was a
powerful tool for improving the international perception of
Indonesia as a responsible, dependable and resourceful actor in
international fora.

But propriety will only get you so far in the global forum.
Talk is cheap and glossy veneers can be delusional.

In the end, style can never replace substance.

In all, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made at least seven
excursions abroad, for bilateral or summit meetings, covering 14
countries. That was some one-and-a-half months abroad.

In almost all his foreign visits, the President was greeted
with glowing praise. Finally, Indonesians had a president who
they could be proud to parade around. Someone who could deliver
speeches coherently and fluently in a foreign language, a man
whose physical presence was undeniable in photo lineups with
regional leader. At last there was a leader to challenge
Singapore's Lee Hsien Loong in the height department.

The President -- with the able assistance of the foreign
ministry -- certainly won several foreign policy trophies through
his diplomacy.

Indonesia also hosted the Asian-African Summit and a post-
tsunami summit, along with several other high-level meetings.

It put down its foot in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) as it pushed forward the concept of enlarging the East
Asia Summit to include India and Australia, to the chagrin of
summit host Malaysia.

Several breakthroughs were also achieved, not least the
resumption of military ties with the United States.

In many ways, it was a year of reassertion.

Jakarta was once again showing the Javanese traits of a (sub)
regional leader -- it may be shy in admitting that it wants to
lead ASEAN, but gets upset when someone else tries to.

Poor and full of pandemonium though the country may still have
been domestically, its coherent foreign policy was forcing the
region to again take account of Indonesian wishes.

Yes, 2005 was a year in which Indonesia staked its claim as
the first among Southeast Asian equals.

Susilo and the boys at Pejambon (the street where the foreign
ministry is located) were doing all the old things right.

Which thus begs the question: What about the new?

What "tangible" indication was there that our rejuvenated
foreign policy consistently reflected the new dynamics of Asia's
newest bastion of democracy?

There was no shortage of high speeches and platitudes --
diplomats and politicians are attuned to the fine art of empty
promises and deception -- but there was little "unadulterated"
policy action which reflected what Indonesia is today.

Pretentious though it may seem, it is only natural that this
country promote, defend and act to uphold the values which its
people's have so painfully suffered for.

Several years ago a young journalist in an article in this
newspaper asked the question, "Why has RI's foreign policy become
so foreign?"

That same query should again be raised given Jakarta's
consistency in not being consistent with the nation's emerging
values.

Persistently turning the other cheek, or providing face-saving
alternatives to Myanmar, it took international reproach before
Indonesia and ASEAN started to budge on its from its stance on
the military regime there.

Another case of style over substance is the fact that despite
all the standing ovations he received abroad -- and even hosting
a special summit on investment -- the President's charm has not
succeeded in wooing investors to this country.

Of course, the burden should not all be placed on the
execution of foreign policy. But it shows this inconsistency of
policy implementation within the administration, and the
fallibility of exterior beauty.

"Attractive, but difficult," was the realistic assessment
of a prospective investor after standing to applaud Susilo during
a speech abroad.

Despite the long hours of brainstorming and stacks of papers
by officials at Pejambon, there has also been no realistic vision
of how Indonesia will place itself in Asia's evolving
geostrategic balance. It seems to be neither here nor there.

Perhaps it is too early to hedge bets, but based on the
President's statements there seems to be no clue about where the
third largest country in Asia (Indonesia) will position itself
vis-a-vis China and India.

"In the middle" would be the crude answer, but this is not a
simple case of parking a car between a container truck and a
bulldozer.

Both India and Indonesia have been reaching out more visibly
to each other this year, but what this signifies in the long run
we dare to contend that not even the President knows.

So a banner for Indonesia's foreign policy in 2005?
"Definitely no, but it wasn't bad."

A better 2006? "Perhaps."