RI diplomacy loses swagger in crisis-hit 1998
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat
JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's carefully-constructed foreign policy stature as a prudent, respected regional player and a defender of so-called "Third World" causes took a battering in 1998 because of the economic and financial crisis.
Gone is the swagger of Indonesian diplomacy as its domestic foundations as a proud developing state crumbled. The downturn proved that a state's foreign prowess is not based on geo- strategic factors alone, but also dependent upon its domestic stability and affluence.
The crisis and the subsequent ascendancy of B.J. Habibie to the vice-presidency and eventually the presidency interposed two precarious elements affecting Indonesian foreign affairs not seen in previous years.
As the crisis hit its lowest ebb with the rupiah's freefall, the Foreign Ministry began to feel the financial burden of supporting its missions abroad.
Despite the allocation to the foreign ministry's routine budget of over Rp 1.3 trillion in the 1998/1999 state budget, the dollar spending in having to support 111 diplomatic missions around the world became unbearable.
Rather than immediately closing down diplomatic missions, the ministry undertook severe austerity measures.
Senior foreign ministry officials insist that it is better to preserve a diplomatic mission and streamline staff than closing it down as it would be much more expensive and time consuming to try and open it again in the future.
The streamlining measures taken included reducing both the number of diplomats sent overseas and recruitment levels.
The rotation of diplomats was reduced from about 60 people to 20 -- 16 pulled back home and four being sent abroad.
Recruitment, short of being totally suspended, was also reduced from an average of about 60 per year to 38.
Then Foreign Ministry Secretary-General Abdul Irsan tried to remain upbeat saying these moves may be a blessing in disguise "as they force us to maximize the ability of our diplomats".
However, the prevailing situation is such that now the foreign ministry is brimming with grumbling idle diplomats. How does one suddenly find a place for over 200 employees returning hurriedly home?
The economic crisis also took center stage at most high level international meetings in which Indonesia participated.
The parade of high-level talks and Summits -- the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G-15, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), APEC -- all touched on the crisis but produced mostly bare and ambiguous initiatives.
Oddly enough, it was the very last summit of the year involving the worst hit economies which produced a glimmer of hope.
The Sixth ASEAN Summit held in communist Vietnam in mid- December saw a pledge from the regional grouping to hasten liberalization in an effort to stem the crisis.
The nine-ASEAN leaders also introduced "Bold Measures" as an incentive to attract foreign investment in the next two years.
How effectively these economic "Bold Measures" pay off will have to be seen.
Inconsistent
Even before he stepped down, it became obvious former president Soeharto was increasingly disinterested in foreign policy matters.
If for the past decade foreign affairs became a means of showing off the Indonesian development success story, it was now a mere distraction as the domestic drama unfolded and the long hours of travel abroad wore out the aged president.
Soeharto, a leading proponent of NAM and ASEM, was conspicuously absent during the two organizations' summits held in South Africa and Britain respectively.
After his re-election in March, Soeharto gave B.J. Habibie the special task of handling foreign policy matters.
In the two-months as vice president, Habibie made several important official trips abroad, including to Japan and the ASEM Summit, compared to his predecessor Try Sutrisno who only made one.
Leo Suryadinata in the postscript of his book Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Soeharto said the appointment gave the impression of Habibie as Indonesia's foreign minister "extraordinaire".
With his newfound responsibility, Habibie, in turn, appointed Dewi Fortuna Anwar as his foreign policy advisor.
The shrewd, eloquent doctorate holder had built a reputation as a respected regional expert working out of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.
Her persuasive manner brought a new twist to the Indonesian foreign policy triad of the foreign ministry-presidential office- Armed Forces.
Foreign affairs analyst Bantarto Bandoro of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that Habibie wanted to surface as a figure knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus he appointed experts like Dewi to present him with new ideas.
There is no doubt that Habibie recognizes the importance of foreign policy.
Leading his very first Cabinet meeting after taking over from Soeharto, Habibie stressed that the aim of Indonesia's foreign policy should be to revitalize the country's image.
Nevertheless his 1998 diplomatic report by all accounts was poor.
Delegates at the recent ASEAN Summit in Hanoi remarked of Habibie's style as "diplomacy on the go", where he would pitch proposals in or make off-the-cuff statements without prior consultation.
Bantarto in his assessment also said Habibie "made statements which seem to be rather contradictory to Indonesia's foreign policy as a whole".
"You really can't separate this sort of style from his personal character...but it shows that he may not fully comprehend the basic tenets of Indonesian foreign policy," Bantarto told The Jakarta Post.
"I'd like his advisors to caution him...Otherwise our foreign policy will be labeled inconsistent," he added.
In the seven months of his presidency, Habibie has rattled relations with two of Indonesia's closest neighbors.
He slighted Singapore for being late in coming to Indonesia's aid, and mocked the island state as "a little red dot" on the map.
Habibie also came dangerously close to, if not already, breaking, the cardinal "non-intervention" policy which Indonesia has so steadfastly preserved, when he displayed strong dissatisfaction at the treatment of sacked Malaysian deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
Ahead
The East Timor issue continued to steal headlines in 1998. While an internationally acceptable solution to this question may still be far off, signs of progress were seen.
Habibie's government announced that it would give the former Portuguese colony special status with wide ranging autonomy.
"The Indonesian government believes this proposal once again reflects its sincerity and determination in seeking a peaceful solution...Now we (Indonesia) expect the same kind of political will and sincerity from the Portuguese side," Indonesia's Ambassador for East Timor affairs F.X. Lopes da Cruz said.
Indonesia and Portugal, following talks in New York in August, agreed to clarify the proposal further and have even agreed to open interest sections in their respective capitals.
Another significant development worth noting was the adoption by the Maritime Safety Committee of the London-based International Maritime Organization, of three archipelagic north- south sea-lanes proposed by Indonesia.
Upon the opening of the lanes in 1999, foreign shipping, including military vessels, will be able to sail freely through the three passages without prior permission.
Looking ahead, it seems predestined that Indonesia would play a limited role in the international arena given its domestic woes.
Nevertheless, there remains an innate view that Indonesia historically has always played a leading role championing the cause of developing states.
Bantarto expressed confidence that if within the next year the country can put its house in order, then "in one to three years we will be back to the kind of role we played before".
This instinctive desire to continue playing a role in the international fora was no more evident than in the reaction towards the recent bombing on Baghdad.
Despite the crucial problems facing the very survival of the nation, House Speaker Harmoko in his closing address of the second 1998/1999 Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) still made it a point to urge the government to try to help peacefully resolve the Gulf crisis.