RI diplomacy loses swagger in crisis-hit 1998

RI diplomacy loses swagger in crisis-hit 1998

By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia's carefully-constructed foreign policy
stature as a prudent, respected regional player and a defender of
so-called "Third World" causes took a battering in 1998 because
of the economic and financial crisis.

Gone is the swagger of Indonesian diplomacy as its domestic
foundations as a proud developing state crumbled. The downturn
proved that a state's foreign prowess is not based on geo-
strategic factors alone, but also dependent upon its domestic
stability and affluence.

The crisis and the subsequent ascendancy of B.J. Habibie to
the vice-presidency and eventually the presidency interposed two
precarious elements affecting Indonesian foreign affairs not seen
in previous years.

As the crisis hit its lowest ebb with the rupiah's freefall,
the Foreign Ministry began to feel the financial burden of
supporting its missions abroad.

Despite the allocation to the foreign ministry's routine
budget of over Rp 1.3 trillion in the 1998/1999 state budget, the
dollar spending in having to support 111 diplomatic missions
around the world became unbearable.

Rather than immediately closing down diplomatic missions, the
ministry undertook severe austerity measures.

Senior foreign ministry officials insist that it is better to
preserve a diplomatic mission and streamline staff than closing
it down as it would be much more expensive and time consuming to
try and open it again in the future.

The streamlining measures taken included reducing both the
number of diplomats sent overseas and recruitment levels.

The rotation of diplomats was reduced from about 60 people to
20 -- 16 pulled back home and four being sent abroad.

Recruitment, short of being totally suspended, was also
reduced from an average of about 60 per year to 38.

Then Foreign Ministry Secretary-General Abdul Irsan tried to
remain upbeat saying these moves may be a blessing in disguise
"as they force us to maximize the ability of our diplomats".

However, the prevailing situation is such that now the foreign
ministry is brimming with grumbling idle diplomats. How does one
suddenly find a place for over 200 employees returning hurriedly
home?

The economic crisis also took center stage at most high level
international meetings in which Indonesia participated.

The parade of high-level talks and Summits -- the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), the G-15, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), APEC --
all touched on the crisis but produced mostly bare and ambiguous
initiatives.

Oddly enough, it was the very last summit of the year
involving the worst hit economies which produced a glimmer of
hope.

The Sixth ASEAN Summit held in communist Vietnam in mid-
December saw a pledge from the regional grouping to hasten
liberalization in an effort to stem the crisis.

The nine-ASEAN leaders also introduced "Bold Measures" as an
incentive to attract foreign investment in the next two years.

How effectively these economic "Bold Measures" pay off will
have to be seen.

Inconsistent

Even before he stepped down, it became obvious former
president Soeharto was increasingly disinterested in foreign
policy matters.

If for the past decade foreign affairs became a means of
showing off the Indonesian development success story, it was now
a mere distraction as the domestic drama unfolded and the long
hours of travel abroad wore out the aged president.

Soeharto, a leading proponent of NAM and ASEM, was
conspicuously absent during the two organizations' summits held
in South Africa and Britain respectively.

After his re-election in March, Soeharto gave B.J. Habibie the
special task of handling foreign policy matters.

In the two-months as vice president, Habibie made several
important official trips abroad, including to Japan and the ASEM
Summit, compared to his predecessor Try Sutrisno who only made
one.

Leo Suryadinata in the postscript of his book Indonesia's
Foreign Policy Under Soeharto said the appointment gave the
impression of Habibie as Indonesia's foreign minister
"extraordinaire".

With his newfound responsibility, Habibie, in turn, appointed
Dewi Fortuna Anwar as his foreign policy advisor.

The shrewd, eloquent doctorate holder had built a reputation
as a respected regional expert working out of the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences.

Her persuasive manner brought a new twist to the Indonesian
foreign policy triad of the foreign ministry-presidential office-
Armed Forces.

Foreign affairs analyst Bantarto Bandoro of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies noted that Habibie wanted to
surface as a figure knowledgeable in foreign affairs, thus he
appointed experts like Dewi to present him with new ideas.

There is no doubt that Habibie recognizes the importance of
foreign policy.

Leading his very first Cabinet meeting after taking over from
Soeharto, Habibie stressed that the aim of Indonesia's foreign
policy should be to revitalize the country's image.

Nevertheless his 1998 diplomatic report by all accounts was
poor.

Delegates at the recent ASEAN Summit in Hanoi remarked of
Habibie's style as "diplomacy on the go", where he would pitch
proposals in or make off-the-cuff statements without prior
consultation.

Bantarto in his assessment also said Habibie "made statements
which seem to be rather contradictory to Indonesia's foreign
policy as a whole".

"You really can't separate this sort of style from his
personal character...but it shows that he may not fully
comprehend the basic tenets of Indonesian foreign policy,"
Bantarto told The Jakarta Post.

"I'd like his advisors to caution him...Otherwise our foreign
policy will be labeled inconsistent," he added.

In the seven months of his presidency, Habibie has rattled
relations with two of Indonesia's closest neighbors.

He slighted Singapore for being late in coming to Indonesia's
aid, and mocked the island state as "a little red dot" on the
map.

Habibie also came dangerously close to, if not already,
breaking, the cardinal "non-intervention" policy which Indonesia
has so steadfastly preserved, when he displayed strong
dissatisfaction at the treatment of sacked Malaysian deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

Ahead

The East Timor issue continued to steal headlines in 1998.
While an internationally acceptable solution to this question may
still be far off, signs of progress were seen.

Habibie's government announced that it would give the former
Portuguese colony special status with wide ranging autonomy.

"The Indonesian government believes this proposal once again
reflects its sincerity and determination in seeking a peaceful
solution...Now we (Indonesia) expect the same kind of political
will and sincerity from the Portuguese side," Indonesia's
Ambassador for East Timor affairs F.X. Lopes da Cruz said.

Indonesia and Portugal, following talks in New York in August,
agreed to clarify the proposal further and have even agreed to
open interest sections in their respective capitals.

Another significant development worth noting was the adoption
by the Maritime Safety Committee of the London-based
International Maritime Organization, of three archipelagic north-
south sea-lanes proposed by Indonesia.

Upon the opening of the lanes in 1999, foreign shipping,
including military vessels, will be able to sail freely through
the three passages without prior permission.

Looking ahead, it seems predestined that Indonesia would play
a limited role in the international arena given its domestic
woes.

Nevertheless, there remains an innate view that Indonesia
historically has always played a leading role championing the
cause of developing states.

Bantarto expressed confidence that if within the next year the
country can put its house in order, then "in one to three years
we will be back to the kind of role we played before".

This instinctive desire to continue playing a role in the
international fora was no more evident than in the reaction
towards the recent bombing on Baghdad.

Despite the crucial problems facing the very survival of the
nation, House Speaker Harmoko in his closing address of the
second 1998/1999 Special Session of the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) still made it a point to urge the government to
try to help peacefully resolve the Gulf crisis.