Indonesian Political, Business & Finance News

RI-Canberra must cool things down

| Source: JP

RI-Canberra must cool things down

The following article is based on a paper presented by
Australian Ambassador to Indonesia John McCarthy at the
Indonesian Executive Circle on Sept. 23.

JAKARTA: What has been the rationale for Australia's approach
on East Timor? Simply this: The people in East Timor needed at
some time the opportunity to choose their future. And also the
hope -- still a distant one -- that East Timor might be removed
as a bone of contention between Australia and Indonesia.

I believe that we have pursued that approach ethically and
correctly. But let me deal with a few common misperceptions.

The first is that we have adopted a policy stance which runs
counter to Indonesian policy on East Timor. This is not so.

When Prime Minister (John) Howard wrote to President (B.J.)
Habibie in December last year, he said that the policy pursued by
the President of planning to accord wide-ranging autonomy to East
Timor was a significant and farsighted step. He also said that in
Australia's view, such an offer would need to include an
opportunity for the East Timorese at some stage to exercise self-
determination -- possibly many years later. President Habibie did
not accept this approach.

Subsequently, the President and his Cabinet decided to adopt a
different approach, namely a United Nations-organized popular
consultation in East Timor to choose between autonomy and
separation -- that choice subsequently to be ratified by the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It was not our policy. It
was Indonesia's policy, and we supported it.

We also supported the May 5 tripartite agreement by which
Indonesia, Portugal and the UN agreed to the creation of the
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to conduct the
popular consultation in East Timor.

As you know, the ballot took place on Aug. 30. Indonesia
accepted the outcome. So did we. The ballot was followed by
anarchy and destruction. We and many others sought the
intervention of a multinational force, but always on the
condition that both the (UN) Security Council and Indonesia
(agreed to the intervention). There was never any intention by
Australia to act without such an agreement.

A second misperception is that Australia has always been
biased in favor of independence for East Timor.

Actually, no. We have been one of the few countries which has
formally recognized (East Timor's) integration. Even after we
placed emphasis on the need for self-determination, we alluded to
the practical advantages of integration -- albeit in terms of the
people of East Timor deciding their future for themselves in a
free and fair process.

It has been suggested that Australians working for UNAMET
displayed bias. I have examined a number of the instances cited.
I do not expect you all to agree with me, but I believe that
UNAMET employees -- including Australians -- were professional
and neutral.

A third misperception is that Australia has been unnecessarily
intrusive in providing the largest contingent in -- and
leadership of -- the International Force for East Timor
(Interfet). I do not accept this contention. Our role in Interfet
derived from our geographic placement, the fact that we had
forces ready to be deployed and the fact that we believed we were
doing the right thing. And while many Indonesians to whom I have
spoken dislike the concept of foreign troops in East Timor and
have argued against Australian prominence, few have disagreed
with the fact that Interfet had to happen.

Australia's leadership role was established by the secretary-
general and the members of the United Nations, including the
other major contributors to the force. We understood the need for
a strong Asian presence in the force. Like Indonesia, we argued
for contributions by Indonesia's Asian neighbors.

What then, you ask, are our intentions?

We do not have strategic designs on East Timor. Australia has
enough problems controlling and administering its huge, parched
country. We have neither the resources nor the ambition to expand
our strategic reach. Nor is there any economic advantage for us
in East Timor's independence. We will gain no more -- and
probably less -- in terms of oil and gas revenue than would have
been the case had East Timor remained with Indonesia. It is also
apparent that we will be under a moral obligation to help support
East Timor economically for some time to come.

And what of our tone, about which I hear so much in Jakarta?

It is suggested here that our statements overreach themselves,
that our comments are arrogant and offensive to Indonesia.

As Indonesians often say -- albeit in a slightly different
context -- we are a plain spoken people. Essentially, what you
see is what you get. The reason that Australia argued for a
multinational force was that neither the people nor the
government of Australia could, in good conscience, stand aside
while witnessing the events which took place in East Timor after
the ballot. By the way, I do not claim that we have a monopoly on
outrage. You Indonesians also felt that you had seen enough.

Moreover, our system requires our leaders to express their
views. Just as you have your system, which we respect, we have
ours. What has often been reported here is where our leaders have
differed with Indonesia. In fact, our prime minister has often
referred in the last two weeks to our intention to have good
relations with Indonesia, and to our belief in the nation and
people of Indonesia.

Indonesians also take exception to many actions taken by
individuals or groups in Australia since the ballot. Travel and
trade boycotts were put in place by our unions, demonstrations
were held, damage was done to Indonesian government property and
the Indonesian flag was burned.

I ask you to note that most trade and travel boycotts have now
been lifted. Damage to Indonesian property is against our law and
we are prosecuting offenders. The prime minister has personally
called upon Australians not to burn flags and the Australian
Council for Trade Unions has advised its members not to do so.
And if some Australians have indeed been offensive to Indonesians
in Australia, the vast majority of us would reject such behavior
as un-Australian and unacceptable.

I do not wish to dwell on it, but this sort of problem has
been a two-way street. Our flag has also been burned -- often.
Businesses in Balikpapan with significant Australian interests
have been targeted by protesters bearing little resemblance to
students -- with Australian and Indonesian employees being
coerced into signing statements implicitly critical of Australia.
Australian offices elsewhere in Indonesia have been ransacked. We
have even had the odd problem in our own embassy. All this
amounts to un-Indonesian behavior toward foreigners.

Nothing is achieved by these open expressions of hostility. It
is in the interests of both our countries to cool things down.
For our part, we are doing our best to do the right thing by
Indonesians in Australia. I ask that Indonesians do the right
thing in Indonesia.

What do we want of Indonesia?

A look at recent history does not suggest that Australia has a
hidden agenda inimical to Indonesian interests. I am not here to
boast to you about what we have done, but we stood by Indonesia
in its time of deepest economic crisis -- just as we stood by the
other Asian countries most affected by crises: Korea and
Thailand.

For the last decade, successive Australian governments have
invested political energy and funding into a complex set of
arrangements to make the relationship between Indonesia and
Australia really work. We have opened up our schools and
universities to people from all over the world. Indonesians have
taken advantage of this on an unprecedented scale. I am not
suggesting that our approach has been wholly altruistic; we have
gained also. The process has worked for both of us. But none of
our actions have been, I would argue, those of an opponent of
Indonesia.

Second, we would like Indonesia to become strong and
resilient. And to this end, we want to see a sustained recovery
of the Indonesian economy. Those who argue that we seek a weak
Indonesia are wrong. A strong and cohesive Indonesia has been a
lynchpin of our strategic policy for three decades. That remains
our objective. It would also be our hope that an independent East
Timor would enjoy good relations with Indonesia.

People here say to us that we seem to have elected to put the
interests of some 800,000 people in East Timor ahead of those of
the 210 million in Indonesia. If only choices could be so simple.
You suggest to us that by taking the approach that we have on
East Timor we have foregone the capacity to live comfortably with
Indonesia. I do not agree with that contention. And please also
accept that had we stood aside from East Timor, we could not have
lived with ourselves.

In the end, I have to state what is a truism. We are neighbors
and it is our destiny to remain so. The events in East Timor --
particularly in recent weeks -- have been traumatic for both our
countries. Our differences over East Timor are serious, but
please understand that we in Australia have no designs upon your
integrity and that we have respect for your dignity.

You are a great nation which has come a long way in a short
time. You have the capacity and generosity to accept what the
people of East Timor have told all of us they want, and to give
them your blessing for the future.

As for us, it is our hope that as the months go by you will
concentrate less on the perceived wound that divides us and more
on the things that unite us.

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