Revolt of the Iranian mullahs

Karim Sadjadpour, Project Syndicate

Iran's election fiasco seemingly confirmed for Iranian reformists a conclusion that tens of millions of Iranian citizens reached long ago -- the country's Islamic government, as it exists today, is beyond rehabilitation. Whether ordinary Iranians now believe that the reformers are also beyond redemption is an open question.

Iranian reformers had tried (to no avail) since the landslide 1997 election of President Mohammed Khatami, to change the system from within. Iranians were initially hopeful, but after years of waiting in vain they grew impatient. Now they are despondent.

Reformists were justly criticized for lacking unity and resolve, but in truth their greatest impediment was a lack of constitutional authority. Power in Iran lies in the hands of the unelected conservative establishment, namely Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the twelve-member Islamic Guardian Council. They have no intention of parting with it.

The Guardian Council's barring of over 2,000 mostly reformist candidates from participating in the parliamentary elections was the last straw. Reformist parties boycotted the vote. Despite a frenzied public relations campaign by regime officials, only half of all eligible voters participated. In Tehran, the country's political heart and soul, less than a third of the electorate turned out.

Foreign journalists declared it the biggest legitimacy crisis in the 25-year history of the Islamic Republic, but Iranians seemed surprised by the commotion. Egregious abuse of power by conservative hardliners is not newsworthy to them. They held no illusions that their country was a democracy.

Iran's near-term political future remains unclear. How reformists regroup, and how the youthful Iranian populace reacts, depends largely on the path the conservatives take.

Similar to reformists, who encompass a broad range of political ideals, Iranian conservatives are a mixed bag. Many are reactionary religious fundamentalists who abhor the concept of democracy. "It doesn't matter what people think," the powerful cleric Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi once said. "The people are ignorant sheep."

However, a small but increasing number of conservative thinkers -- while not democrats -- advocate a more pragmatic and conciliatory approach, essentially adopting the language that once worked so well for the now-beleaguered reformists. "It's better for all of us that mainstream conservatives go to parliament, people who are not extremist but pragmatic and moderate," according to the influential newspaper editor Amir Mohebian, who is emerging as the face of Iranian "compassionate conservatism."

Whether conservative ideologues or pragmatists dominate the new parliament -- which takes office in June -- remains to be seen. Either way, the conservatives must weigh their strategy carefully.

A more ideological and antagonistic approach -- in the form of increased political and social repression -- could stir Iran's discontented masses, reviving the non-violent but radicalized reformists. Some of these now call for passive resistance and civil disobedience.

It will be the task of Ayatollah Khamenei to rein in conservative ideologues and make sure that pragmatic conservatism prevails. That Khamenei is himself more of an ideologue makes that task doubly difficult for him. Although he is capable of providing people with increased political and social freedoms, he is simply unwilling.

Above all, the conservatives' fate -- and the fate of the regime as a whole -- depends on the country's punishing economy. Despite Iran's vast oil wealth, close to a third of the population lives in poverty. Inflation and unemployment remain rampant.

Demographics exacerbate these conditions. Two-thirds of Iran's 69 million people are under 30 years old, and officials admit they have no way of accommodating the burgeoning labor force. For the majority of Iranians, economic improvement is the priority. As a 57-year old retired Iranian professional moonlighting as a taxi driver told me, "When your stomach is empty you don't cry for democracy, you cry for bread!"

Conservatives, no less than reformers, must come to terms with this reality. No matter how hard they try, there exists no simple or immediate solution to Iran's endemic economic corruption and mismanagement. As a result, Iran's near-term political prospects appear ominous.

But reasons to be hopeful about the long-term political future do exist. An indigenous civil society has emerged; indeed, Iran appears to be the only nation in the Islamic Middle East that is building a sustainable liberal foundation from the bottom up. Monarchic and theocratic systems have both failed. Backers of a socialist model have gone the way of the Soviet Union. Liberal democracy is essentially the last man standing in Iran.

The road from authoritarianism to democracy will not be smooth or short. Agitators for reform will continue to push. Regime loyalists will continue to push back. In the absence of a credible and readily available political alternative, deadlock will likely continue, with the pace of change slower than the population demands.

So the long term could be long in coming. Courageous Iranians who have labored to reform their country may continue to feel as though they are plowing the seas.

Karim Sadjadpour is an analyst with the International Crisis Group and currently a visiting fellow at the American University of Beirut.