Reviving spy network a dangerous decision
Ardimas Sasdi, Jakarta
One of the bizarre aspects of the government's plan to revive the notorious regional intelligence network has been that it has ignored the anxiety of the people. Even more bizarrely, is its decision to secretly set up the agency despite the hue and cry about it.
Sudarsono Hardjosoekarto, the Director General of Nation Unity and Politics at the Ministry of Home Affairs, said on Wednesday -- a week after idea was launched by the President -- that almost all regional administrations had established the intelligence community (Kominda).
What a swift action; a contrast to the inefficiency and irresponsiveness that normally characterizes the bureaucracy. But this showed the government would do anything and at any cost to achieve its goals, even though this would mean ignoring the voice of the people, who are still traumatized by bad experiences dealing with intelligence agents in the past.
The haste and secretive way by which the government worked probably explains why there was a mix-up in names used by officials for the agency.
In a bid to track down terrorists, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered the country's governors last Thursday to revive Bakorinda, a Regional Intelligence Coordinating Agency which was made known to the people only after the announcement.
J. Kristiadi, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told a national newspaper, "The people are questioning about an agency the government wants to revive? In the past there were Bakin (State Intelligence Coordinating Board), Pusintelstrat (Strategic Intelligence Center), Sintel Kopkamtib (Intelligence Center for Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), Bais (ABRI's Strategic Intelligence Agency) and intelligence agencies under the police force and prosecutor's office."
The four intelligence agencies, except Bakin, were under the military, but all were chaired by generals close to Soeharto. Like intelligence bodies in authoritarian countries, the agencies were the arm of Soeharto to stifle opposition with powers to conduct surveillance, infiltrate targets and arrest suspects deemed as state enemies. These agencies were also responsible for screening people, who would be promoted to key positions in the executive branch.
With accountability lacking, agents often used foul methods like physical and mental torture to extract information from detainees. The results were predictable: detainees suffered and refuted testimonies in court, saying that they were framed or forced to admit crimes they never did during questioning.
Intelligence agents also spied on clerics, priests, activists of non-governmental organizations and academicians under the pretext of preventing extremism, leaving disastrous impacts. Academicians, for example, avoided discussion on sensitive issues, although this is still within a corridor of academic freedom after seeing outspoken scholars lose their positions or have their professorship delayed by rectors, who were military figures or academics loyal to Soeharto.
The list of abuses of intelligence agencies in the past, which deepened public resentment toward the network, is long. One of the most extreme examples was the use of intelligence agents by state-owned and private companies to coerce people to accept prices unilaterally set by them to acquire land for mega projects.
The negative image and trauma are still fresh in the minds of the people. So it comes as no surprise that the public strongly opposes plans to revive the regional intelligence network in provinces or expand intelligence powers.
"It sounds scary," Agung Yudhawiranata of the rights group Elsam told The Associated Press. "We worry that the Soeharto era has returned and that the agency will use the pretext of fighting terrorism to violate individuals' rights ..."
Activists like Agung are fully aware of the threat of terrorism, which has continued to haunt Indonesia since the Bali bombings in 2002. The subsequent attacks on the JW Marriott Jakarta hotel, the Australian Embassy and more recently, the public market in Tentena in 2005, have opened the eyes of the public to the fatal threat of terrorism.
But public anxiety, including that of journalists who know well how difficult it was to carry out their journalistic duty during the New Order era, over the possibility of abuse of intelligence agencies by the power holders, still dominated by remnants of the New Order regime, outweigh their fears of terrorism. This notion was properly illustrated by a hard-hitting editorial of The Jakarta Post.
"In the fight against terrorism, law enforcers can complain all they want about their lack of power .... But until there are much better checks and balances, we would like to see their improved record in this war before giving them a blank check and a potential return to the days when intelligence authorities professed ignorance about civil liberties and thought their job was to serve whoever had the power to define a 'state enemy'."
The promise of the government that the revival of the intelligence network would not impinge on the young, hard-gained democracy is simply not enough. The people want to see a change in the culture of intelligence agents and improved cooperation among intelligence agencies, which is lacking due to vested interests.
Part of the demand is the creation of an effective checks and balances system through a promulgation of laws on intelligence and information acts, and the reopening or trial of past cases, whose masterminds have not been punished. The trials could start with prominent cases like the poisoning of rights activist Munir and the kidnapping of activists in the late 1990s.
Until these conditions have been met, the public should think twice before endorsing the government's plans to revive the intelligence agency as the plan carries so many dangers. It may destroy a fair measure of the freedom we have achieved, and if this happens it will turn the clock back to the dark era of Soeharto.
The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.