Reviving Kodam mars reform

Reviving Kodam mars reform

M. Riefqi Muna, Executive Director, The RIDEP Institute, Jakarta

The military's commitment to continuing with its reform
agenda, particularly regarding the concept of its territorial
commands, is now being questioned following the unpopular
proposal to reinstate the Aceh military command. To some extent,
it indicates that any humanitarian effort to solve problems in
Aceh will remain non-existent. The dominant paradigm of
realpolitik is still clearly popular among decision makers, as
the state reveals its need to conduct military operations to
maintain its legitimacy.

Human costs will thus be inevitable. Apparently, the state
ranks human security second behind issues of securing its
sovereignty. Reinstating the military command would disrupt many
aspects of the reform movement, particularly that of the
Indonesian Military (TNI).

The military's seriousness in reforming itself has been
questioned because of unabated human rights abuses resulting from
military atrocities. Its command, control, communications and
intelligence functions will remain ineffective as long as the gap
between the guidelines released by the military headquarters and
what happens on the ground remains. The murder of Papuan (Irian
Jaya) leader Theys Hiyo Eluay, which suggests the involvement of
certain groups in the military, is a case in point.

Atrocities by the military place Indonesia in a difficult
position as the military consistently implements a security
approach to deal with opposition groups. Their term oknum,
referring to unscrupulous members of the military involved in
human rights abuses, is repeatedly stated to deny the involvement
of the military as an institution.

Previous military operations have traumatized the Acehnese,
but they are also facing further potential violence. To date,
there have been no positive signs that a just and peaceful
resolution to the conflict will be found. No perpetrators, either
civilian or military, have been put on trial.

So despite strong opposition from the Acehnese people, their
governor has decided to reestablish the military command, saying
that the decision was made to meet the people's demands. It
implies that the military headquarters have legitimate reasons to
curb separatist activists, by any means.

A close look at the plan to reinstate the military command
(Kodam) in Aceh clearly reveals that it was prepared well in
advance, during the B.J. Habibie administration, with the
involvement of certain generals. Several Acehnese leaders met
with the president to convey their opposition to the idea of
establishing the Kodam in Aceh.

To avoid further human suffering, it is important to structure
the territorial function of Indonesia's defense policy in
accordance with "normal" strategic calculations. A territorial
command is basically a chain-of-command structure, a political
organization of the armed forces, arranged geographically ranging
from the capital of the state to remote village units.

This territorial command has been used as the backbone of the
military's "dual function" doctrine, which the TNI says has
officially been abolished. Yet this function still largely
dominates the military mindset.

Therefore the recent downgrading of the position of Chief of
Territorial Staff (Kaster) into an assistant's post under the TNI
chief of general affairs, in practice, does not carry with it any
consequences. Instead, the military has become more assertive.

It is important to note the growing role of hardliners within
the TNI headquarters in terms of defense policy arrangements.
Hence the continuance of the territorial command function.

Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, when in office as Kaster, proposed a
plan to reduce the territorial function from the village level,
or Babinsa, to the level of regional commands, or Kodim, which
would take 10 years, in line with the retirement periods of many
current officers.

The plan to shift the local function of Binter (territorial
guidance, pembinaan teritorial) to the local administrative
institution seems to contain a hidden agenda: That the military
is only preserving its political interests. But the reformists in
TNI believe that reducing the territorial command function is
important to reduce their involvement in politics.

From here, the problematic issue emerges. The defense system
is based on the territorial/spatial aspect. But principles of
territorial command in other countries are not as political in
nature as in Indonesia, except in repressive regimes such as
Burma (Myanmar) or socialist and communist countries.

Therefore, the future defense structure should consider two
important aspects: Scenarios of threat assessments and the nature
of the Indonesian archipelago as a unit of territorial defense
that serves as a base for a unified military command from the
army, navy and air force units.

On the contrary, the territorial function is detrimental to
the defense posture since it only focuses on the army, in line
with the concept of the "Large Islands Defense System" of TNI's
strategy. This concept is of no relevance to the actual
geographic situation of the state as an archipelagic country.

This strategy was inherited from the revolutionary period for
guerrilla warfare, when our geographical boundaries did not yet
exist.

Indonesia must adjust its defense system to suit actual
conditions, and to consider issues such as technological changes,
and the development of non-traditional threats such as
information warfare. The defense system from the revolutionary
days must be replaced with the "Layered Defense System", with
greater involvement by the navy and air force, to defend state
boundaries largely located in the middle of the sea.

The new Defense Bill passed by the legislature (which has yet
to be signed by the President) has obviously indicated the need
to review old approaches, strategies, doctrines, and the
organization of the armed forces -- that is, to establish a
professional military that is free from politics.

Yet the debate on the territorial command function points even
more to whether TNI is really serious about its reform. We all
hope for the emergence of courageous soldiers committed to making
the country's future secure, instead of only fighting for power
and wealth. Such a commitment would befit the TNI's own rhetoric
of defending national interests and the unity of the state.