Revisiting the 1962 New York Agreement on Papua
Revisiting the 1962 New York Agreement on Papua
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Dupito Simamora
Indonesian Diplomat to UN
New York
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Recently, there has been greater attention given to Papua by
various parties, which has led to charges that the right of the
Papuans to self-determination has been denied, not safeguarded.
This is closely related to the 1969 Act of Free Choice (AFC).
These critics further argue that the United Nations should
review the AFC, sometimes derided as the "Act of No Choice".
It is timely now to review the process of the return of the
territory to Indonesia in a comprehensive and objective manner.
The question of Papua is closely linked to Indonesia's
struggle against colonialism. Despite Indonesia's declaration of
independence on Aug. 17, 1945, the Netherlands tried to extend
its three-and-a-half-century colonization of the country. Thanks
to the intervention of the UN Security Council, a peaceful
settlement was achieved in the Hague Round Table Conference in
1949, during which the Netherlands unconditionally accepted and
recognized the independence and sovereignty of Indonesia.
However, the Dutch left the issue of Papua unresolved. This
was a difficult compromise for Indonesia, but it had good faith
that the matter would be resolved within a year as stipulated in
the 1949 agreement.
If the Netherlands had not reneged on the original agreement,
a final solution would have been reached on a purely bilateral
basis in 1950. West Papua was part of the Netherlands East
Indies, and previous agreements between Indonesia and the
Netherlands, such as the Linggarjati, stipulated that the
territory of the Unitary State of Indonesia comprised the entire
territory of the Netherlands East Indies. In spite of still being
under a foreign occupying power, Papua was part of the new
Republic.
Following the failure to resolve the issue, Indonesia has,
since 1954, consistently referred the dispute to the UN General
Assembly. Following several protracted negotiations that enjoyed
the full involvement and agreement of then UN secretary-general U
Thant, Indonesia and the Netherlands accepted a U.S. peace plan
under that country's ambassador to the UN, Elsworth Bunker.
On Aug. 15, 1962, the two governments signed the New York
Agreement, which resolved the dispute. The agreement was
presented to the General Assembly, which later adopted resolution
1752 (XVII) in favor of a UN role in easing the transition to
Indonesian control, and giving the secretary-general latitude in
administering the territory. In conformity to the agreement, the
Netherlands transferred the administration of Papua to the UN
Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (UNTEA) on Oct.
1, 1962, which in turn transferred it to Indonesia on May 1,
1963.
After the AFC in 1969, Indonesia and the Netherlands, along
with four other UN members, submitted a draft resolution to the
General Assembly, which was later adopted as resolution 2504
(XXIV).
The UN had therefore completed its task of finding a lasting
and peaceful solution to the long and painful dispute between the
Netherlands and Indonesia. Both countries fully accepted the 1969
New York Agreement and the conduct of the AFC, which was evident
in their sponsorship of the historic resolution marking the
successful conclusion of decolonization in Indonesia.
The peaceful settlement of the Papua issue in the General
Assembly is part and parcel of the Security Council's successful
intervention in the Indonesian issue, which led to the country's
membership in the UN.
It is a success story for the UN, which exercised its Charter
responsibilities in first securing an independent and sovereign
Indonesia, and then completed decolonization of the country.
Some critics are quick to draw attention to the claim by
former under-secretary-general Narasimhan Chakravarty that the
AFC was a "whitewash". That kind of claim should neither be taken
at face value, nor should the efforts of the entire organization
be so lightly dismissed.
Contrary to the views of critics who desire a review of the
AFC, the United Nations' handling of the matter should be used as
a model for other conflict situations. In his recent book on the
UN under U Thant, Bernard J. Firestone observes that the UN
demonstrated that it was capable of innovative peacekeeping.
In his view, the UN operation in Papua, through the UNTEA, was
extraordinary because it was the first time that it was being
tasked with direct administration of a territory. Firestone
further pointed out that the Papuans were consulted through
representative councils, and that the 1969 plebiscite revealed
that the inhabitants of West Papua favored maintaining their link
with Indonesia. This achievement must be appreciated with an
understanding of the difficult terrain and the condition of the
population at that time.
Some people are inclined to think that the UN involvement in
both cases suggests that the time has come to "liberate" Papua.
The comparison is irrelevant because Papua involved an
occupied territory of an independent and sovereign Indonesia by
the Dutch, in contravention to its commitment to the Charter. On
the other hand, East Timor was recognized as one of the non-self-
governing territories to which General Assembly resolutions 1514
(XV) and 1541 (XV) are applicable.
While some contend that East Timor's decolonization will
weaken Indonesia's claim over Papua, the writer believes that
developments in East Timor reinforces Indonesian territorial
integrity over its present territory.
During his recent visit to Indonesia and East Timor, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed that East Timor is a unique
case since it was not originally a part of Indonesia and that
Indonesia's Constitution says that the territory of Indonesia
will be the territory of the former Dutch colony. Annan also
pointed out that the UN respects Indonesia's territorial
integrity and should not be expected to create several East
Timors out of Indonesia.
It is also important to be cautious in considering what is
relevant to the issue of self-determination. Being ethnically
different should not be a divisive factor, because in countries
of diverse ethnicities that would be very dangerous indeed.
Dissatisfaction with human rights situations, different
religious convictions, socio-economic disparities and rights of
indigenous peoples do not in themselves justify demands for self-
determination. Differences should not lead to calls for
separatism. If we choose to splinter into ethnic, tribal or
religious groupings, few countries can expect to be safe from
turmoil.
Alleviating people's grievances will not be accomplished by
reviewing the 1969 AFC. Hence, the separatist group and its
supporters should discard this idea as it would only disrupt the
development process, and would also contravene the principles of
the UN Charter and relevant UN resolutions.
On the contrary, the attainment of greater welfare for the
people would best be served through the implementation of the
2001 special autonomy law.