Revisiting Aceh reconstruction

Revisiting Aceh reconstruction

Teten Masduki and Firdaus Ilyas, Jakarta

It is relieving to note the reluctance of Kuntoro
Mangkusubroto, the chairman of the Executive Body for the
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR), to
fully implement the Blueprint for the Development of Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Nias, which was drawn up in April. The
former minister's reason is that the blueprint is over-ambitious
and unrealistic. Moreover, since the tsunami disaster five months
ago, the blueprint has remained a "living document", subject to
frequent revisions, rather than a finalized plan.

In contrast, after a devastating earthquake hit the Japanese
city of Kobe in 1995, the blueprint was finished in a week. The
reality here is that Indonesia lacks disaster management
capacity, a precarious situation if one considers that most of
Indonesian territory is vulnerable to disasters. A prompt
reaction from a state that can quickly deal with disaster victims
and help to restore their lives to at least a semblance of
normality, is still beyond reasonable expectations here. Instead,
a prolonged state of emergency becomes the Aceh tsunami victims'
reality; a subsequent misfortune they have to face.

There is also the problem of aid misappropriation and
corruption, which always haunts disaster management teams. From
the outset, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono expressed his
concern about possible corruption and spelled out the need for
all parties to prevent the huge amount of international aid given
to Aceh and North Sumatra from being a target of project
manipulation. He said it would be acutely embarrassing if there
was found to be any corruption in aid spending. Like other
regions, Aceh and North Sumatra are unfortunately steeped in
graft.

It seems that the reconstruction of disaster-stricken areas on
the northern tip of Sumatra is designed for developing a new and
ideal zone, instead of merely rebuilding damaged or destroyed
parts of the region. And this is desired by the local communities
affected by the disaster.

However, a discrepancy is soon apparent in budget estimates.
The budget proposed by technical ministries and agencies reaches
Rp 58.3 trillion, which is bigger than the National Development
Planning Board (Bappenas) estimate of Rp 48.7 trillion, which
also takes account of the Nias earthquake on March 28. From the
sector budget estimate, the social (education, health, religion
and culture) is allocated Rp 14.56 trillion, the infrastructure
sector (housing, communications, telecommunications, energy,
drinking water, sanitation and natural resources infrastructure)
Rp 26.59 trillion, the production sector (agriculture, fishery,
trade, manpower, medium/small-scale enterprises and cooperatives
and tourism) Rp 1.49 trillion, and cross sectors (environment,
public administration, law, security, production facilities aid
and banking) Rp 6.11 trillion.

The difference between the two total estimates indicates the
absence of any standard database accessible by both groups,
regarding the numbers of victims and refugees, the extent of
infrastructure damage and so forth. The base calculations of both
budgets still rely on the initial rough estimates of damage and
loss assessment in the budget provided by Bappenas and the World
Bank on Jan. 18. There has been no further verification, such as
a quick population census.

Humanitarian Emergency Commission (KDK) monitoring results
show the presence of errors in calculating the needs of nearly
all sectors. In the housing development plan, for instance, data
had indicated 514,150 refugees at the end of March. For Aceh, the
average family size was put at 4.28 people, with each family
being entitled to a 36-sq.m wooden house. It means that all the
refugees in NAD need only 120,129 units.

Meanwhile, the Bappenas blueprint requires 196,975 units,
representing an increase of 76,846 units. In addition, foreign
and national private commitments list at least 47,751 units, some
of which are being built.

Education enjoys the biggest allocation in the social sector,
worth Rp 8,296 billion or about seven times as much as the value
of the damage. The use of the number of post-tsunami school
buildings damaged rather than student survivors as data is
misleading, because the demand for school units and facilities
should be consistent with the ratio of existing students.

Worse still, there is a difference between the numbers of
school buildings calculated before and after the tsunami. Based
on statistics from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs (2003), the pre-tsunami total reached 5,229
schools, as against the Bappenas blueprint's 7,518 units -- an
excess of 2,289 units.

Official data mentions the existence of 1,107,447 pre-tsunami
students from kindergarten to high school levels in NAD. After
the disaster, around 40,900 students were reported dead, 46,000
students were refugees and over 150,000 others were reported to
be deprived of proper study facilities. These student records
should serve as the basis for the reconstruction of school
buildings.

More specifically, the demand for Islamic primary schools,
with a total of 645,198 pre-tsunami students (2003 official
figures), while the national standard of student capacity per
class stands at 40 and the average number of classes per school
at 6.82, should reach only 2,366 units for the whole of Aceh,
instead of the 5,061 units contained in the blueprint. The number
is thus almost doubled. Likewise, 1,062 junior high schools are
listed while only 510 are actually needed.

In brief, the blueprint plans a total of 6,695 units ranging
from primary to high schools. In fact, only 3,450 units are
required based on the consideration of students' needs, which
means the blueprint represents an inflation of 3,245. The real
demand for schools has to take account of the distribution of
students, particularly in disaster areas. But the differences
should not be too striking.

Irrelevant database application is also found in the health
sector, where the numbers of hospitals and public health centers
serve as yardsticks rather than the population and the ratio of
health facilities. Unfortunately, marked differences are also
found in the blueprint's figures for the damage. In its main
book, data on damage sustained by public health centers and
auxiliary clinics involve 41 and 59 buildings respectively, while
in its specifications, the figures are 64 and 174. The records
are very confusing.

It would be wise for Kuntoro to re-examine the blueprint owing
to the presence of many fundamental weaknesses and possible
inaccuracies. We should also not forget that Indonesia today has
insufficient funds for its national development.

The ideal reconstruction of Aceh and Nias rather than the mere
rebuilding of damaged areas is acceptable, as long as this the
area does not become an arena where bandits profit at the expense
of the tsunami victims.

Teten Masduki is coordinator of Indonesia Corruption Watch and
the Steering Committee of the Humanitarian Emergency Commission
(KDK). Firdaus Ilyas is the KDK's data monitoring manager.