Revisiting Aceh reconstruction

Teten Masduki and Firdaus Ilyas, Jakarta

It is relieving to note the reluctance of Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the chairman of the Executive Body for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR), to fully implement the Blueprint for the Development of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Nias, which was drawn up in April. The former minister's reason is that the blueprint is over-ambitious and unrealistic. Moreover, since the tsunami disaster five months ago, the blueprint has remained a "living document", subject to frequent revisions, rather than a finalized plan.

In contrast, after a devastating earthquake hit the Japanese city of Kobe in 1995, the blueprint was finished in a week. The reality here is that Indonesia lacks disaster management capacity, a precarious situation if one considers that most of Indonesian territory is vulnerable to disasters. A prompt reaction from a state that can quickly deal with disaster victims and help to restore their lives to at least a semblance of normality, is still beyond reasonable expectations here. Instead, a prolonged state of emergency becomes the Aceh tsunami victims' reality; a subsequent misfortune they have to face.

There is also the problem of aid misappropriation and corruption, which always haunts disaster management teams. From the outset, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono expressed his concern about possible corruption and spelled out the need for all parties to prevent the huge amount of international aid given to Aceh and North Sumatra from being a target of project manipulation. He said it would be acutely embarrassing if there was found to be any corruption in aid spending. Like other regions, Aceh and North Sumatra are unfortunately steeped in graft.

It seems that the reconstruction of disaster-stricken areas on the northern tip of Sumatra is designed for developing a new and ideal zone, instead of merely rebuilding damaged or destroyed parts of the region. And this is desired by the local communities affected by the disaster.

However, a discrepancy is soon apparent in budget estimates. The budget proposed by technical ministries and agencies reaches Rp 58.3 trillion, which is bigger than the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) estimate of Rp 48.7 trillion, which also takes account of the Nias earthquake on March 28. From the sector budget estimate, the social (education, health, religion and culture) is allocated Rp 14.56 trillion, the infrastructure sector (housing, communications, telecommunications, energy, drinking water, sanitation and natural resources infrastructure) Rp 26.59 trillion, the production sector (agriculture, fishery, trade, manpower, medium/small-scale enterprises and cooperatives and tourism) Rp 1.49 trillion, and cross sectors (environment, public administration, law, security, production facilities aid and banking) Rp 6.11 trillion.

The difference between the two total estimates indicates the absence of any standard database accessible by both groups, regarding the numbers of victims and refugees, the extent of infrastructure damage and so forth. The base calculations of both budgets still rely on the initial rough estimates of damage and loss assessment in the budget provided by Bappenas and the World Bank on Jan. 18. There has been no further verification, such as a quick population census.

Humanitarian Emergency Commission (KDK) monitoring results show the presence of errors in calculating the needs of nearly all sectors. In the housing development plan, for instance, data had indicated 514,150 refugees at the end of March. For Aceh, the average family size was put at 4.28 people, with each family being entitled to a 36-sq.m wooden house. It means that all the refugees in NAD need only 120,129 units.

Meanwhile, the Bappenas blueprint requires 196,975 units, representing an increase of 76,846 units. In addition, foreign and national private commitments list at least 47,751 units, some of which are being built.

Education enjoys the biggest allocation in the social sector, worth Rp 8,296 billion or about seven times as much as the value of the damage. The use of the number of post-tsunami school buildings damaged rather than student survivors as data is misleading, because the demand for school units and facilities should be consistent with the ratio of existing students.

Worse still, there is a difference between the numbers of school buildings calculated before and after the tsunami. Based on statistics from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (2003), the pre-tsunami total reached 5,229 schools, as against the Bappenas blueprint's 7,518 units -- an excess of 2,289 units.

Official data mentions the existence of 1,107,447 pre-tsunami students from kindergarten to high school levels in NAD. After the disaster, around 40,900 students were reported dead, 46,000 students were refugees and over 150,000 others were reported to be deprived of proper study facilities. These student records should serve as the basis for the reconstruction of school buildings.

More specifically, the demand for Islamic primary schools, with a total of 645,198 pre-tsunami students (2003 official figures), while the national standard of student capacity per class stands at 40 and the average number of classes per school at 6.82, should reach only 2,366 units for the whole of Aceh, instead of the 5,061 units contained in the blueprint. The number is thus almost doubled. Likewise, 1,062 junior high schools are listed while only 510 are actually needed.

In brief, the blueprint plans a total of 6,695 units ranging from primary to high schools. In fact, only 3,450 units are required based on the consideration of students' needs, which means the blueprint represents an inflation of 3,245. The real demand for schools has to take account of the distribution of students, particularly in disaster areas. But the differences should not be too striking.

Irrelevant database application is also found in the health sector, where the numbers of hospitals and public health centers serve as yardsticks rather than the population and the ratio of health facilities. Unfortunately, marked differences are also found in the blueprint's figures for the damage. In its main book, data on damage sustained by public health centers and auxiliary clinics involve 41 and 59 buildings respectively, while in its specifications, the figures are 64 and 174. The records are very confusing.

It would be wise for Kuntoro to re-examine the blueprint owing to the presence of many fundamental weaknesses and possible inaccuracies. We should also not forget that Indonesia today has insufficient funds for its national development.

The ideal reconstruction of Aceh and Nias rather than the mere rebuilding of damaged areas is acceptable, as long as this the area does not become an arena where bandits profit at the expense of the tsunami victims.

Teten Masduki is coordinator of Indonesia Corruption Watch and the Steering Committee of the Humanitarian Emergency Commission (KDK). Firdaus Ilyas is the KDK's data monitoring manager.