Thu, 16 Dec 2004

Reviewing maritime security code

Catherine Zara Raymond, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

Following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, governments have moved to ensure that port infrastructure and commercial shipping are rendered less vulnerable to maritime terrorist attacks.

Requested by the U.S., the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) -- a specialised maritime agency of the United Nations -- developed an international maritime security code to address some of the perceived vulnerabilities.

In December 2002, adoption of the new code -- the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) -- was made mandatory under international law.

The code entered into force on July 1. It covers cargo vessels more than 500 gross tonnes on international voyages, port facilities serving ships on international voyages, passenger ships and mobile offshore drilling units.

It requires ships and port facilities to carry out security assessments, after which ships are required to create security plans, appoint security officers and company security officers. Ships must also carry certain onboard equipment.

Requirements include the creation of port facility security plans and port facility security officers. Port facilities are also obliged to keep certain security equipment.

As each ship and port facility has its own risk level, the ISPS Code requires the contracting governments to set an appropriate security level in order to communicate this to the relevant parties.

The security levels are 1, 2, and 3 (corresponding to normal, medium and high threat situations, respectively). When there is a heightened risk of a security incident, the security level is raised. Ships and terminals are then required to take extra protective security measures.

Has the code been successfully implemented?

Despite some initial hiccups, implementation has largely been a success. According to the latest figures, 89.5 percent of more than 9,000 declared port facilities have had their port facility plans approved, and 90 percent of the ships have had their International Ship Security Certificates issued.

In Singapore, port facilities and ships met requirements on deadline. In fact, Singapore's container ships began to be certified as ISPS compliant 10 months before the deadline.

On the other hand, implementation in Africa has been less successful. Only half of the countries in Africa to which the code applies have had their port facility plans approved.

Former Soviet and Eastern European countries are also lagging far behind.

Has the ISPS Code reduced maritime vulnerability?

In theory, compliance with the code should reduce such vulnerability. Reducing the vulnerability of ships to attack from pirates is particularly important in South-east Asia, which is home to one of the world's busiest and economically valuable shipping lanes -- the Strait of Malacca. Pirate attacks in Indonesian waters, or armed robbery as it is often referred to, account for a quarter of the global total. It has been estimated that across the globe, pirate attacks result in losses of US$25 billion (S$41 billion) each year.

However, according to evidence gathered by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) from its Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, while there has been a decrease in the number of pirate attacks reported worldwide in the first nine months of this year, the figure is expected to spike towards the end of the year, due to delayed reporting.

Are there flaws in the new code?

A number of problems have started to come to light, which point to serious deficiencies in the code itself and in its implementation.

One of the main problems is that the IMO is powerless when it comes to enforcing its regulations. It can only monitor compliance.

Combine the IMO's inability to enforce its regulations with the simple fact that most of the poorer nations lack resources and people with sufficient expertise to enforce the standards, and the result is only a veneer of compliance with the new security standards.

In order to address this problem, the IMO has developed a new "train-the-trainer" programme. Under this, qualified and approved instructors will train those responsible for training and implementing the ISPS Code in the various countries.

Meeting the code requirements places substantial additional costs on ship owners. Some have to increase their crew size. Costs incurred by ports as a result of new security measures are also passed on to the ship owners in the form of extra charges. The most recent example is the Port of Brisbane, which will charge its users an extra A$1.4 million (S$1.7 million) next year to cover charges incurred as a consequence of implementing the ISPS Code.

A glaring flaw in the code is that it applies only to ships over 500 gross tonnes that are employed on international voyages. It does not apply to most fishing vessels and tugboats, which are usually under 500 gross tonnes. It also does not apply to the many merchant ships engaged in domestic trade. There are thus a large number of ships operating in South-east Asian waterways that are not covered.

This is worrying given the recent spate of attacks on tugboats in the Malacca Strait. In the latest attack, on Nov 30, the captain and chief engineer of a Malaysian tugboat were kidnapped.

To address this problem, Singapore has introduced additional measures, such as the Harbour Craft Security Code, to ensure that harbour craft plying its port waters comply with general security standards.

Also, small vessels not covered by the ISPS Code are required to fill up a "Ship Self-Security Assessment Checklist" prior to entering Singapore's port waters.

The ISPS Code clearly has a number of limitations and it will not reduce significantly the vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack from terrorists or pirates. However, as Captain Mukundan of the IMB states, it is a necessary first step.

The writer is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.