Resuming military ties
Resuming military ties
The brouhaha of politics often belie the soundness of ties
between two nations. Millions in this country disapprove of
America's foreign policy, particularly in issues related to Iraq
and Afghanistan. However, they should not cloud what has been a
long-standing, amiable relationship among regular Indonesians and
Americans.
Liaison between Indonesia and the United States is not
dependent on the record of our men in uniform, and neither should
the quality of that relationship be defined by the conduct of our
respective armed forces.
Washington's decision to resume International Military
Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesia officers does nothing
to enhance or subtract from the overall bilateral relationship.
Nevertheless, it may help smoothen the "rough edges" that may
have the ability to stop the relationship from reaching its full
potential.
Military ties received a blow in 1992 following the Nov. 12,
1991, Santa Cruz shootings in East Timor in which dozens of
demonstrators were shot by security personnel. The U.S.
restricted and eventually suspended training and arms sales to
Jakarta. Restrictions were reinforced further by the U.S.
Congress in 1999 and 2003 after an ambush in Timika, Papua, in
which two Americans were killed.
Cooperation into investigation of the Timika shooting -- which
some have claimed may have involved Indonesian Military (TNI)
personnel -- has since become one of the prerequisites to
resuming ties.
The advent of a democratically elected leadership and the much
appreciated relief assistance of the U.S. military in the wake of
the tsunami in Aceh seemed to be an important catalyst in the
current revival of military ties.
The debate over whether the government here and the TNI have
truly satisfied these requirements remains contentious.
Questions also surround Washington's motivation on the gradual
normalization of military ties as being a part of the long-term
goal of re-engaging the TNI -- a vital ally in the fight against
terrorism in the world's most populous Muslim country.
One thing is clear though: the resumption of IMET provides
long-term benefits, not just in enhancing combat competence, but
in helping embed Indonesian officers with a perspective on the
proper role of the armed forces in a functioning democracy.
The values of these lessons will be immeasurable. Further
enlightening future TNI commanders as to the necessity to respect
human rights and to adhere to a civilian administration can only
help strengthen the democratic progress.
After seven years of reformasi, we have discovered that
instilling a prodemocracy mind set within military institutions
is not something that evolves naturally. We are confident that
IMET can -- albeit incrementally -- help take this process
forward.
IMET can also go a long way in helping to alleviate suspicion
of one another's motives. What better way to solidify two
country's relations than having each respective's "tools of war"
on familiar ground with the other? Allowing Indonesian officers
to be trained in the United States will build personal linkages
between top echelons of both armed forces.
A crucial caveat to our support for the resumption of IMET is
that it must not be exploited by the TNI as a symbolic
confirmation to return to "business as usual". This move must be
seen as a carrot to engage in further internal reform,
accountability and coming to terms with accusations of various
past abuses.
With or without IMET, these are the circumstances that the TNI
must accept in Indonesia's democratic environment.
The TNI may think IMET important as confirmation of its
"rehabilitated" status, but it would be far more distinguishing
to be embraced by its own nation rather than be regarded as an
anomalous institution that must be feared and contained.