Resuming military ties
The brouhaha of politics often belie the soundness of ties between two nations. Millions in this country disapprove of America's foreign policy, particularly in issues related to Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they should not cloud what has been a long-standing, amiable relationship among regular Indonesians and Americans.
Liaison between Indonesia and the United States is not dependent on the record of our men in uniform, and neither should the quality of that relationship be defined by the conduct of our respective armed forces.
Washington's decision to resume International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesia officers does nothing to enhance or subtract from the overall bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, it may help smoothen the "rough edges" that may have the ability to stop the relationship from reaching its full potential.
Military ties received a blow in 1992 following the Nov. 12, 1991, Santa Cruz shootings in East Timor in which dozens of demonstrators were shot by security personnel. The U.S. restricted and eventually suspended training and arms sales to Jakarta. Restrictions were reinforced further by the U.S. Congress in 1999 and 2003 after an ambush in Timika, Papua, in which two Americans were killed.
Cooperation into investigation of the Timika shooting -- which some have claimed may have involved Indonesian Military (TNI) personnel -- has since become one of the prerequisites to resuming ties.
The advent of a democratically elected leadership and the much appreciated relief assistance of the U.S. military in the wake of the tsunami in Aceh seemed to be an important catalyst in the current revival of military ties.
The debate over whether the government here and the TNI have truly satisfied these requirements remains contentious.
Questions also surround Washington's motivation on the gradual normalization of military ties as being a part of the long-term goal of re-engaging the TNI -- a vital ally in the fight against terrorism in the world's most populous Muslim country.
One thing is clear though: the resumption of IMET provides long-term benefits, not just in enhancing combat competence, but in helping embed Indonesian officers with a perspective on the proper role of the armed forces in a functioning democracy.
The values of these lessons will be immeasurable. Further enlightening future TNI commanders as to the necessity to respect human rights and to adhere to a civilian administration can only help strengthen the democratic progress.
After seven years of reformasi, we have discovered that instilling a prodemocracy mind set within military institutions is not something that evolves naturally. We are confident that IMET can -- albeit incrementally -- help take this process forward.
IMET can also go a long way in helping to alleviate suspicion of one another's motives. What better way to solidify two country's relations than having each respective's "tools of war" on familiar ground with the other? Allowing Indonesian officers to be trained in the United States will build personal linkages between top echelons of both armed forces.
A crucial caveat to our support for the resumption of IMET is that it must not be exploited by the TNI as a symbolic confirmation to return to "business as usual". This move must be seen as a carrot to engage in further internal reform, accountability and coming to terms with accusations of various past abuses.
With or without IMET, these are the circumstances that the TNI must accept in Indonesia's democratic environment.
The TNI may think IMET important as confirmation of its "rehabilitated" status, but it would be far more distinguishing to be embraced by its own nation rather than be regarded as an anomalous institution that must be feared and contained.