Restoring peace in Maluku

Some two years ago, when the communal conflicts in Ambon and Maluku seemed to continue unabated, many people became suspicious of possible foul play. Several non-governmental organizations raised suspicions that the conflicts were being deliberately prolonged in order to achieve certain political goals.

One of the suspected scenarios is that a prolonged conflict would demand a strong military presence in the area, which could lead to the imposition of martial law in the troubled province. This, some suspect, is part of a larger scheme by the antireform group within the Indonesia Military (TNI) to maintain power in the country against efforts to rein in the military under the civilian leadership.

The TNI strongly denied the allegation, but nevertheless the suspicions did not diminish. When violence flared up again with the attack on the Christian village of Soya on April 28 following a few weeks of peace, many saw it as an attempt to jeopardize the Feb. 12, 2002 peace deal, signed in the South Sulawesi hill resort of Malino.

The supporters of "the Army want to keep Maluku under its control" theory seemed justified in their suspicions by last week's appointment of Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso as commander of the newly named Security Restoration Operations Command and head of the Pattimura Regional Military Command in the troubled province. The appointment of a two-star general, the first after a couple of years under the command of a one-star general, and possibly the presence of more soldiers in the area, has sparked a wide range of criticism.

Sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola of the University of Indonesia, for example, says that Djoko's appointment indicated that the TNI had managed to impose martial law by stealth. "The TNI wanted to impose martial law, but because the Ambonese public and most legislators rejected the idea, the TNI engineered the situation in such a way that it instead set up a new security command body. Even though Maluku is under a state of civilian emergency, it is now, in effect, martial law", he said.

Similarly, human rights activist Munir said last week that the formation of a new security command in Maluku went against all prevailing regulations, including Law No. 23/1959 on a state of emergency, which clearly stipulates that the police are the front-line authority during a state of civil emergency.

Under a state of civil emergency, it is the Maluku governor, a civilian, who is in charge. But, in the past, there was an apparent reluctance on the part of the local military and police command to fully obey the governor's instructions. On the other hand, the governor also seemed hesitant in giving orders to the military and police.

Understandably, the absence of a firm leadership caused problems, including outbreaks of communal violence and repeated clashes between police and Army personnel.

Suspicions aside, we have believed all along that the violence in Maluku cannot be settled only by military action. To reach a lasting peace, the political, social, economic, religious, cultural and demographic factors in Maluku must also be taken into consideration. Thus, stronger military action, which in the near future might be taken by the newly established Security Restoration Operations Command, is no guarantee that peace will be restored in Maluku.

The large number of deserters from both the Army and the police (who later joined the conflicting militias) is proof that the loyalty of soldiers and police in the province is doubtful at best. The fact certainly has been known for years and yet only last week a top Army general, Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, threatened to take firm action.

If firm action also involves a total replacement of the military and police forces in the province with fresh soldiers from outside Maluku, indeed it would be a big and costly operation. This would further fuel suspicion that the operation is another scheme of the Army.

There is no doubt that the violence in Maluku, and in other regions as well, must be immediately stopped. That the police are incompetent in preserving law and order is just too obvious. That we need a strong Army to maintain our national stability and sovereignty is also beyond question. But if we let incompetence reign for too long, and if we continue to tolerate certain parties benefiting by capitalizing on the destabilization of our nation, then we should forget our dream to build Indonesia anew. And that also means that the police force must be revamped and the TNI should show more commitment in reforming itself.