Responding to uncertain times

Damien Kingsbury Head of Philosophical, Political and International Studies Deakin University Australia

It is a rule of thumb that when the general environment becomes increasingly uncertain, or dangerous, one should increase one's alertness, take whatever precautionary measures are practically available, and most of all not provoke the situation. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the Australian government has done almost the opposite.

Australia's involvement in Afghanistan was relatively successful in that there were few Australian casualties. But the scattering of al-Qaeda operatives through Southeast Asia, Afghanistan sliding back towards fractious warlordism, and its regaining the place of world's largest producer of opium and heroin -- which is now on Australian streets -- has been somewhat less of a success.

However, Afghanistan did mark Australia as being actively involved in an ambiguous global conflict, and has been openly identified by the still free Osama bin Laden as a provocation.

Australia's alertness -- its intelligence analysis -- has since then been woeful. The United States government has regarded Australia as having greater expertise on Indonesia than it does. Yet it was the U.S. that warned its own citizens of an attack against a Western target in Indonesia, not Australia.

At least as ill-informed is the Howard government's positioning for war against Iraq. Like Afghanistan, it is highly likely that a U.S.-led attack on Iraq will crush most opposition relatively quickly. But the consequences do not appear to have been accounted for, and it remains unclear how Australia's interest will be served by having a presence there.

President George W. Bush's view that a change of regime in Iraq will lead to democratization in the Middle-East, which has virtually no direct impact on Australia, is at best wishful thinking. In any case, "liberated" Kuwait remains undemocratic, while monarchic Saudi Arabia would only be alienated from the U.S.-led cause by a push towards democracy.

At least as likely as democratization in the Middle East is that a U.S.-led attack will conversely strengthen the cause of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Quite conceivably, governments from Egypt to Pakistan -- a nuclear power -- that have just managed to hold the line against Islamic revolutionary fundamentalism could collapse.

The geo-strategic environment would then be vastly more uncertain, and Australia's position in it even more, rather than less, exposed.

If one thing can be said for the Howard government's understanding of this, it is that there is an awareness that such provocation may lead to a more hostile environment. Hence the suggestion that Australia should investigate a "Son of Star Wars" missile defense system. And Defense Minister senator Robert Hill has yet again raised the worrying proposition that Australia should renew its links with the Indonesian military's brutal special forces, Kopassus.

"Son of Star Wars", even if it could work, has already been identified by Australia's neighbors as a provocation, and its cost would be overwhelming, grossly distorting government spending. The money would likely come from major cuts in education, health and social services, and another "special" tax.

As for the TNI and Kopassus, perhaps the government has forgotten that the military officers that perpetrated the horrors of East Timor in 1999 remain free, and according to Indonesia's foreign minister, Hasan Wirajuda, the responsible generals will never have to faces the latest UN charges.

This is not to mention that Kopassus has been sighted on numerous recent occasions training the notorious Laskar Jihad Islamic militia in West Papua. The Laskar Jihad, many of whose fighters trained in Afghanistan, announced that it was disbanded immediately after the Bali bombing.

However, TNI generals clearly still see a use for an army- trained fundamentalist Islamic militia in resolving political questions. And these are the people Senator Hill wants to get back into bed with?

When such Australian policies seem so wrong-headed, and are opposed by such a large section of the Australian population, it is easy to be critical. But what of alternatives?

With Afghanistan there is little hope short of a massive and long-term aid program. Yet it has a long and deeply embedded history as a failed state, and expecting real, positive change there is probably not realistic.

Given the links that have spread from Afghanistan and Pakistan closer to Australia, Australian intelligence in these areas not only has to be upgraded, but the analysis has to provide more and more closely considered potential scenarios, including some that might not be palatable to our neighbors.

In terms of Iraq, Australia should strongly support a policy of containment and further strengthen the investigative capacity of the weapons inspectors now there. The official rationale for a war against Iraq remains unconvincing, while the unofficial rationale of legitimizing Bush's presidency and securing long- term oil supplies to the U.S. is of doubtful benefit to Australia.

Further, Australia must continue to support Indonesia's otherwise uneven process of democratization, and expand aid, trade, educational and cultural links. The TNI, however, has nothing to contribute to any of this, and indeed its most recent bid to be able to declare emergency without recourse to the government is being widely seen in Indonesia as potentially setting the stage for a military coup.

Indonesia's post-2004 political environment looks uncertain. To that end, Australia cannot renew links with the TNI until it is firmly under civilian control. That will mean the dismantling of its independent business empires, which make it largely independent of government funding. In the interim, Australia must keep a studied neutrality towards Indonesia's security forces.

We do live in increasingly uncertain times. But that is all the more reason for Australia to be cautious about its responses. Australia's goal should be to contribute towards the reduction of tensions both global and local, not their escalation.