Tue, 25 Mar 2003

Resorting to violence

Ignas Kleden, Sociologist, The Center for East Indonesian Affairs (CEIA), Jakarta

It is generally believed that one of the main reasons why democracy is desirable is to prevent the use of physical violence, both in the state-society relationship as well as in social, interindividual and intergroup intercourse. This is achieved by substituting the power of physical force with the power of debate. Instead of employing military power or weapons in political competition people are required to use reasoning, argument and persuasion.

This is based on the assumption that the use of physical power would only bring about the strongest as winners, whereas the use of discourse might produce an opinion that is beneficial to as many people as possible.

A strong man will not necessarily care about the interests of others, but an opinion that has been publicly scrutinized by many can be expected to benefit people who have participated in debate to produce it.

This is why a government that cannot convince its people of the worth of its policy tends to take authoritarian action to get the policy accepted. Such action might be "justified" by the assumption that the people cannot, as yet, appreciate the benefits of the policy. It might also be assumed that the benefits would be understood after the policy concerned had been forcibly implemented.

This is not always the case. Force and compulsion are often used by a government because there is not enough patience to go through debate, which requires more time and energy. The use of force and violence can enable implementation of a policy more quickly, at the cost of the democratic process of learning.

What is learned in such a process is how to come to a common agreement through understanding and appreciation of a contested opinion, all taking place within a context of freedom.

In everyday life temptation toward violence is also experienced in interindividual and intergroup relations. The more a person or party is able to argue discursively, the less the temptation to rely on violence, and the other way round.

This is comparable to the situation in the classroom, where the teacher tends to be authoritarian toward students if he has not prepared the teaching material very well.

However, there is another temptation, whereby a person or a group is not willing to pay the required social cost, such as time for learning or negotiation, patience to go through standard operational procedures or the willingness to arrive at a consensus or solution that can be accepted by all people representing different opinions.

If one wants to arrive at a quick solution, one can enforce a ready-made proposal that has been unilaterally established in order that it is accepted without further ado by other parties, with the help of violent action or intimidation. This shortcut procedure might be more effective for the one who uses it, but it costs the freedom and rights, or even security, of other parties.

Such a shortcut is antidemocratic. From the perspective of human rights it is a violation of the human rights of others. From a legal point of view it is a violation of the law.

The attack on Tempo newsmagazine on March 8 is a good case in point. Given the dissatisfaction of Tomy Winata and his group about a report on the plan to renovate the market at Tanah Abang, there was no justification whatsoever for such dissatisfaction to be expressed or channeled through violence. In contrast, there were alternative ways to communicate their dissatisfaction and complaints in lawful ways, which might have taken longer but nevertheless could have served their aims without hurting the rights of others unnecessarily due to violence, or even thuggery.

The lawful ways are writing a letter to an editor to protest or refute a report, submitting the case to the Press Council, which is entitled to mete out professional punishment, taking the case to court or taking initiatives to boycott the magazine.

To the dismay of everybody, however, the violence against Tempo took place, perpetrated by a group of people who said their action was spontaneous, to demand rehabilitation of the reputation of Tomy Winata. The very violence and intimidation, however, turned out to render the original dispute between Tomy Winata and Tempo much less significant in the collective consciousness than the damage caused by the violence itself.

Public protests after the incident were focused on violent action per se, which is seen as an imminent danger that threatens the freedom of the press. If everybody who supposedly suffered from an alleged defamation, the validity of which should properly be decided upon by the court, felt entitled to resort to violence against the press in order to have his or her name rehabilitated, the result would be anarchy.

Besides that, the fear brought about by violence can produce a sort of self-imposed censorship among journalists. This would certainly affect their performance to the disadvantage of readers, whose right to information would not satisfactorily be served. This is quite apart from the right of journalists to physical security in doing their jobs and their freedom from fear while investigating a case in order to obtain credible information for their readers.

Should we regard the dispute between Tomy Winata and Tempo as a limited legal case to be decided upon by the courts, or should we view it as a broader instance of naked violence used as a means to intimidate, hence limit, the freedom of the press? To prevent a future recurrence it would be wiser to opt for the second view.