Resolution of protracted conflict in Aceh

Azhari Idris, Aceh Coordinator, Indonesian Conflict Study Network (ICSN), Banda Aceh, az_idris@fastmail.fm

On the eve of the signing of a peace agreement to cease hostilities in the violent conflict in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) at the end of October 2002, this article is written to put forward ideas to the warring factions (GAM and the Indonesian government) and peacemakers on how the conflict in Aceh could be settled.

It is generally believed that building peace in Aceh requires commitment, continuity and seriousness on behalf of peacemakers, including the government, rather than a fixed end-state. However, peace is also a comprehensive idea. It can mean anything from the absence of overt conflict to a condition where such perfect and universal justice prevails, that even the potential for conflict is eliminated. But to reach a sustainable peace in Aceh it is important to lay down strong foundations for justice, for example, economic and political justice and appropriate law enforcement.

The people suffering from destruction caused by conflict require immediate recovery. Without the means to provide justice, rebuild their lives and develop an economy, violence may reemerge all to easily.

The government and other peacemaking entities should work hand-in-hand to restore hope and reenergize the people of Aceh through the implementation of an economic agenda for peace. It needs an economic approach whose benefits are distributed equitably enough to provide people with secure livelihoods and a stake in peace.

It is insufficient to merely get the insurgents to lay down their arms if no visible economic alternatives to earn their income and physical security are provided. Arms for some members of insurgency groups have been, in part, their means of income generation and self-protection.

Disarmament is one road towards peace-building, but demobilized combatants require guaranteed physical security and sources where they can earn a decent livelihood if we want to prevent them from taking up an AK-47. The actual process of disarmament is complicated by the nature of the weapons that are used: light, cheap and easily hidden or transported.

It is virtually impossible to know what quantity of arms exists in the war-torn region of Aceh; therefore, attempting to disarm the population forcibly through a military operation is often impossible. It is important, therefore, to devise a strategy that not only addresses issues of security, but also offers the right incentives for combatants to disarm willingly. For example, attractive economic agendas should be established to persuade combatants to lay down their arms and engage in political dialog.

However, the implementation of an economic agenda cannot take place in the midst of a protracted war: It needs a "corridor" of peace through which development and other humanitarian actions may start. For example, a humanitarian cease-fire agreed by the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government would allow for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and for the start of development of the war-affected population and other vulnerable groups in Aceh.

The humanitarian cease-fire could be in the form of all or some of the following:

* Days of tranquility -- truces negotiated to allow the provision of health and humanitarian assistance as well as allowing for other activities not possible during hostilities, as has occurred in El Salvador, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Lebanon and Sri Lanka.

* Corridors of peace -- transit routes designated for safe passage for noncombatants and humanitarian supplies, as in Sudan, Uganda and Guatemala.

* Safe havens -- a term used in the Balkans conflict to identify villages that were only for civilian inhabitants and not to be attacked.

* Sanctuaries of peace -- health/medical institutions, e.g. hospitals and clinics, to be exempted from hostilities, such as in Croatia.

* Children as "zones of peace" or as a "conflict-free zone" -- children need special protection in situations of armed conflict, such as in Mozambique.

Such humanitarian cease-fire agreements are crucial moments for humanitarian intervention and to start economic recovery programs for the conflict-affected population. Also, they are important to ensure that delivery of humanitarian aid reaches its beneficiaries and does not feed the ongoing conflict, but instead is expected to reduce tension and mitigate violence. The signing of a humanitarian cease-fire can provide an opportunity for warring parties to continue settling their political differences at the negotiation table.

However, in order to achieve a long-term peace in Aceh, it is insufficient to focus merely on physical manifestations of violence, as it requires a combination of initiatives: The full spectrum of alliances, antagonisms and injustices associated with war needs to be sufficiently addressed or violent conflict will continue to erupt or re-erupt. This may include responding to structural imbalances in the economy, which may be achieved through economic decentralization.

By decentralizing the economy within the province of Aceh, the local government will be able to enjoy a greater share of revenue or tax, which can then be used to revitalize, regenerate, recover and redevelop a local population's economy and infrastructure, destroyed during the conflict.

This is aimed at supporting the alleviation of grievances related to the improvement of life, education, health and housing, and to alleviate poverty. The most recent government policy, to grant special autonomy law to Aceh, is one of the solutions. But it still requires commitment and amendments so that the law will accommodate the entire population of Aceh, politically, economically, socially and culturally. For example, those who have lost relatives and parents are seeking justice; therefore the law should also accommodate these groups.

One significant recovery to work for is the restoration of agricultural production. Agriculture represents the dominant economic source in Aceh, especially in rural areas. It can be a major means of revitalizing markets that might have been destroyed or abandoned due to conflict.

Agricultural development can further facilitate the reintegration of combatants into ordinary civilian life and motivate internally displaced people (refugees) to return. If a visible alternative for an economy is guaranteed, it can prevent young people from joining insurgency groups and encourage combatants to lay down their arms, turn to promising economic prospects and start channeling their aspirations through political means.

Implementing agencies and the government should take immediate initiatives to start their programs, despite the ongoing conflict. Waiting for the conflict to end is similar to adding more people to a cycle of poverty. People living in poverty are easily mobilized to join a rebellion because they do not have much to lose if they fight. The motivation is even stronger if they find that joining an insurgency group provides an economic opportunity.

Therefore, it is crucial to kick start the agriculture sector in an initial effort to mitigate violence, create hope and indirectly pressure warring factions to negotiate for the improvement of people's lives through a humanitarian cease-fire. Only then can the political arrangements between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement start.

The writer was a consultant with the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialog, which is facilitating negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Geneva. He gained an MA in postwar recovery studies at the department of politics at the University of York, UK.