Resolution of protracted conflict in Aceh

Resolution of protracted conflict in Aceh

Azhari Idris, Aceh Coordinator, Indonesian Conflict Study Network
(ICSN), Banda Aceh, az_idris@fastmail.fm

On the eve of the signing of a peace agreement to cease
hostilities in the violent conflict in the province of Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam (NAD) at the end of October 2002, this article is
written to put forward ideas to the warring factions (GAM and the
Indonesian government) and peacemakers on how the conflict in
Aceh could be settled.

It is generally believed that building peace in Aceh requires
commitment, continuity and seriousness on behalf of peacemakers,
including the government, rather than a fixed end-state. However,
peace is also a comprehensive idea. It can mean anything from the
absence of overt conflict to a condition where such perfect and
universal justice prevails, that even the potential for conflict
is eliminated. But to reach a sustainable peace in Aceh it is
important to lay down strong foundations for justice, for
example, economic and political justice and appropriate law
enforcement.

The people suffering from destruction caused by conflict
require immediate recovery. Without the means to provide justice,
rebuild their lives and develop an economy, violence may reemerge
all to easily.

The government and other peacemaking entities should work
hand-in-hand to restore hope and reenergize the people of Aceh
through the implementation of an economic agenda for peace. It
needs an economic approach whose benefits are distributed
equitably enough to provide people with secure livelihoods and a
stake in peace.

It is insufficient to merely get the insurgents to lay down
their arms if no visible economic alternatives to earn their
income and physical security are provided. Arms for some members
of insurgency groups have been, in part, their means of income
generation and self-protection.

Disarmament is one road towards peace-building, but
demobilized combatants require guaranteed physical security and
sources where they can earn a decent livelihood if we want to
prevent them from taking up an AK-47. The actual process of
disarmament is complicated by the nature of the weapons that are
used: light, cheap and easily hidden or transported.

It is virtually impossible to know what quantity of arms
exists in the war-torn region of Aceh; therefore, attempting to
disarm the population forcibly through a military operation is
often impossible. It is important, therefore, to devise a
strategy that not only addresses issues of security, but also
offers the right incentives for combatants to disarm willingly.
For example, attractive economic agendas should be established to
persuade combatants to lay down their arms and engage in
political dialog.

However, the implementation of an economic agenda cannot take
place in the midst of a protracted war: It needs a "corridor" of
peace through which development and other humanitarian actions
may start. For example, a humanitarian cease-fire agreed by the
Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government would allow for
the provision of humanitarian assistance, and for the start of
development of the war-affected population and other vulnerable
groups in Aceh.

The humanitarian cease-fire could be in the form of all or
some of the following:

* Days of tranquility -- truces negotiated to allow the
provision of health and humanitarian assistance as well as
allowing for other activities not possible during hostilities, as
has occurred in El Salvador, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Angola, Lebanon and Sri Lanka.

* Corridors of peace -- transit routes designated for safe
passage for noncombatants and humanitarian supplies, as in Sudan,
Uganda and Guatemala.

* Safe havens -- a term used in the Balkans conflict to
identify villages that were only for civilian inhabitants and not
to be attacked.

* Sanctuaries of peace -- health/medical institutions, e.g.
hospitals and clinics, to be exempted from hostilities, such as
in Croatia.

* Children as "zones of peace" or as a "conflict-free zone" --
children need special protection in situations of armed conflict,
such as in Mozambique.

Such humanitarian cease-fire agreements are crucial moments
for humanitarian intervention and to start economic recovery
programs for the conflict-affected population. Also, they are
important to ensure that delivery of humanitarian aid reaches its
beneficiaries and does not feed the ongoing conflict, but instead
is expected to reduce tension and mitigate violence. The signing
of a humanitarian cease-fire can provide an opportunity for
warring parties to continue settling their political differences
at the negotiation table.

However, in order to achieve a long-term peace in Aceh, it is
insufficient to focus merely on physical manifestations of
violence, as it requires a combination of initiatives: The full
spectrum of alliances, antagonisms and injustices associated with
war needs to be sufficiently addressed or violent conflict will
continue to erupt or re-erupt. This may include responding to
structural imbalances in the economy, which may be achieved
through economic decentralization.

By decentralizing the economy within the province of Aceh, the
local government will be able to enjoy a greater share of revenue
or tax, which can then be used to revitalize, regenerate, recover
and redevelop a local population's economy and infrastructure,
destroyed during the conflict.

This is aimed at supporting the alleviation of grievances
related to the improvement of life, education, health and
housing, and to alleviate poverty. The most recent government
policy, to grant special autonomy law to Aceh, is one of the
solutions. But it still requires commitment and amendments so
that the law will accommodate the entire population of Aceh,
politically, economically, socially and culturally. For example,
those who have lost relatives and parents are seeking justice;
therefore the law should also accommodate these groups.

One significant recovery to work for is the restoration of
agricultural production. Agriculture represents the dominant
economic source in Aceh, especially in rural areas. It can be a
major means of revitalizing markets that might have been
destroyed or abandoned due to conflict.

Agricultural development can further facilitate the
reintegration of combatants into ordinary civilian life and
motivate internally displaced people (refugees) to return. If a
visible alternative for an economy is guaranteed, it can prevent
young people from joining insurgency groups and encourage
combatants to lay down their arms, turn to promising economic
prospects and start channeling their aspirations through
political means.

Implementing agencies and the government should take immediate
initiatives to start their programs, despite the ongoing
conflict. Waiting for the conflict to end is similar to adding
more people to a cycle of poverty. People living in poverty are
easily mobilized to join a rebellion because they do not have
much to lose if they fight. The motivation is even stronger if
they find that joining an insurgency group provides an economic
opportunity.

Therefore, it is crucial to kick start the agriculture sector
in an initial effort to mitigate violence, create hope and
indirectly pressure warring factions to negotiate for the
improvement of people's lives through a humanitarian cease-fire.
Only then can the political arrangements between the Indonesian
government and the Free Aceh Movement start.

The writer was a consultant with the Henry Dunant Center for
Humanitarian Dialog, which is facilitating negotiations between
the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in
Geneva. He gained an MA in postwar recovery studies at the
department of politics at the University of York, UK.