Reshaping the military: An observer's perspective

Reshaping the military: An observer's perspective

Imanuddin Razak, Jakarta

Since the fall of the New Order regime, numerous articles and
analyses have been published about the reform of the Indonesian
Military (TNI), with many good suggestions aired about how to
professionalize the institution.

However, in practice these ideas have not been easy to
implement. While many writers discuss generalities, many have
failed to break down their reforms into concrete steps; reforms
that face resistance from the military, which has employed its
own propagandists in a concerted campaign to argue against them.

The best approach toward reform should be to find a compromise
that would accommodate the "ideal" civilian solution and the
general military position.

If there is no compromise on the issue, the sides will remain
divided, however much to-ing and fro-ing there is on the surface
-- like mixed water and oil inevitably find their positions in a
glass.

The idea to restructure the TNI -- mainly to quit its
involvement in business and politics -- has long been on the main
agenda of the post-1998 reform movement. A 2000 decree from the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) clearly divided the TNI and
the National Police (Polri), focussing the military on national
defense matters and the police on homeland security and gradually
reduced the military's role in politics. It also outlined the
timetable for further military reforms its businesses and overall
move toward complete civilian control.

Like most writers on the subject, this one agrees that the
most effective way to ensure the TNI reforms would be through
effective administrative control, in this case through control of
its budget. But to reach that level of control there are a lot of
steps that must be taken.

The excuse that the TNI has never been given an adequate
budget to finance its activities from the government has long
been the justification for its involvement in businesses, both
legal and illegal, that are completely outside of what most
states recognize as legitimate military activities.

While there is no guarantee that attempting to control the
military under a civilian budget would stop the proliferation of
military businesses, at least there would be real pressure put on
the TNI from the government and the public for it to focus on its
defense role.

Members of the TNI, of course, have also expressed their
commitment to quitting TNI businesses, with the Ministry of
Defense scheduled to submit a list of TNI concerns that must be
relinquished to the government early next month.

However, many people remain dubious of the TNI's seriousness
in quitting its businesses. It doesn't help that this list will
only consist of legal or registered TNI businesses and not
unregistered and unreported activities with financial volumes
thought by many to exceed those of the legal ones.

Another effective control on the military would be through the
empowerment of the House of Representatives (DPR) -- a
constitutional entity with the authority to draft and question
government policies, including those on the TNI.

Currently, the House only uses its powers during the
deliberation of the military's upcoming draft budget. It has
never exercised its ability to audit military spending and
otherwise question its activities.

Besides these legislative controls, there has been extensive
discussions about exercising control of the military, by putting
it completely under the supervision of the defense ministry.
Currently the TNI is partially under the supervision of the
Ministry of Defense, administratively at least, but remains
independent from the ministry regarding waging war and other non-
war security activities about which it directly reports to the
President.

The idea of putting the TNI completely under the defense
ministry -- which is also meant to get the TNI out of politics --
will be difficult, because the TNI's history is so closely
entwined with the development of a politically sovereign
Indonesia.

Most Indonesians recognize that while civilian politicians may
have created the concept of an independent Indonesia, it was the
military that did the actual job of kicking the colonials out,
with the Indonesian armed forces working to expel the Japanese
and the Dutch in the 1940s.

And even when Indonesia declared its independence on Aug. 17,
1945, and the country appointed a civilian, the high-profile
Sukarno, as president, the military, essentially a guerrilla
force, was still fighting the colonials in the countryside.

Later, the heightening tension between capitalism and
communism influenced Indonesia's domestic political affairs and
led to a serious military involvement in politics, which
culminated with the downfall of Sukarno and the appointment of
general Soeharto.

The military's dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine, which was
introduced during Sukarno's presidency and developed during
Soeharto's further deepened the military's involvement in
politics. The abolition of dwi fungsi later on did not help much
to strip the military of its by-this-time entrenched political
powers.

There, however, has been a gradual decrease in the military's
political involvement here, with the obvious evidence the
Constitutional requirement of all military officers to quit all
active duties prior to running for positions as high-ranking
state officials.

However, the decision to put the TNI under the defense
ministry should not be made too hastily otherwise there is likely
be civilian-military tension and conflict, possibly even the
disintegration of the entire nation.

Though many may consider it out-of-date, Soeharto's policy to
make a high-ranking official both a military and defense ministry
chief could be worth reevaluating. There was never any mention of
a conflict of interest between these roles in the past.

And while we await the government to come up with an adequate
military budget, we should not forget that cooperation with ASEAN
member countries is a good way to improve the professionalism of
our soldiers and to create a solid regional defense framework.

Indonesia and ASEAN could follow the footsteps of the European
Union (EU), whose member countries contribute to regional
security according to each member country's financial and
military capabilities. Despite these differences, the EU
countries have pledged to fight if one of their members is
attacked.

The author is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post.