Regional security pact queried

Regional security pact queried

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): The signing of the Agreement on Maintaining
Security by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia in
December 1995, before the Labor government was defeated in the
general election early this year, was hailed at that time as
effectively removing one element of concern in Australia about an
Indonesia military threat to its security.

Since then, nearly a year has passed and lingering doubts
outside the government and defense bureaucracy in both countries
about the effectiveness of the agreement still remain. Additional
information that could clarify some unanswered questions has so
far not been forthcoming.

There are calls now in Australia for a public debate, which
could not have taken place at that time, given the secret
negotiations prior to the signing of the agreement. Former prime
minister Paul Keating frankly admitted at the time that the 18
months of secrecy surrounding the agreement's negotiations were
specifically designed to avoid public debate.

Concern outside government and defense establishment circles
are focused on its possible use as a vehicle for operational
scenarios, which leads to speculation about future directions,
because Australia's security policy has recently shown a more
active and high profile role. The signing of the agreement has
also caught the Indonesian general public by surprise, given the
secrecy surrounding the negotiations, leading to speculations
whether the Indonesian government has given up its non-aligned
stance.

By signing this agreement after a rethinking of security
priorities, both governments see it as one of the results of
confidence-building measures developed between the two countries
over the years to meet their broader objectives of enhancing both
global and regional security and promoting a sense of strategic
community between Australia and its most immediate neighbor.
Former prime minister Keating, on the occasion of the signing,
declared the agreement to be Australia's "key defense link to
Asia", with no need to establish additional bilateral security
pacts with other countries because the Five-Power Defense
Agreement (between Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and
Singapore) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.) in
addition, would be more than adequate to guarantee Australia's
security.

The agreement should be considered the linchpin of Australia's
regional security strategy, because for the first time, both
countries have agreed to consult each other on regional
challenges and possibly deploy forces together. The question
should be raised, however, whether it could provide some
guarantee for a smooth relationship between the two countries for
the coming years. This remains to be seen, because the agreement
appears to have some disturbing implications for both countries.

The military establishment in Australia has been arguing for a
three-stage implementation of the strategic partnership, i.e.
"increased defense contacts, followed by the establishment of a
formal security dialogue and culminating in the formulation of a
collective regional force". Although these have not yet been
implemented, it shows some indication of an increasing
militarization of Australia's foreign policy, which could have
some effects on broader foreign policy objectives, particularly
on what former foreign minister Gareth Evans termed "good
international citizenship", and on the public and parliamentary
oversight of Australia's foreign policy dealing with security.

Both countries realize that the common interest between the
two countries is preventing hegemony in Southeast Asia and Asia
in general. This is why Indonesia and Australia remain on
friendly terms, despite ups and downs in the past. Disputes
between the two countries in the last few years have centered on
domestic issues like democracy and the violation of human rights,
but both have managed to balance other interests against those
issues.

Canberra so far has tried to understand Indonesia's
sensitivities about being told how to conduct its domestic
affairs, despite pressure from the press and the general public.
Previous Australian governments, at least under former prime
minister Keating, on various occasions have tried to make clear
that although Australia is prepared to defend fundamental
international principles, it should not be forced to engage in
every dispute, which could harm relations between the two
countries.

In terms of human rights, Canberra also believes that the best
way to guarantee the preservation of good relations is to view
the issue as an Indonesian problem. The attempt to mobilize
international pressure is going to run into the same difficulties
as it did when Australia used this approach to condemn Indonesia
on the integration of East Timor, which is bound to provoke the
most intense resistance by Indonesia.

Although some circles in Australia believe that in some cases,
international pressure may do some good in cases like human
rights violations, previous Australian governments were
sufficiently aware of the danger of a deliberate strategy, as
proposed by non-governmental organizations, to create certain
institutions and then rely on international pressure to maintain
them. Therefore, any attempt to internationalize certain issues
will only elicit anti-Australian sentiments in Indonesia.

The Agreement on Maintaining Security has, in fact, focused on
one dimension of the threat factor: its nature and the dangers it
posed. Therefore, the effort on both sides to reach such an
agreement does not sufficiently reflect a common awareness of a
much wider set of pressing problems, apart from a possible
military attack on each other or by a third party.

Already in his report a few years ago, Paul Dibb has noted
that Indonesia's "principal security concerns are internal
stability and potential threats from its north", and any change
in attitude which identified Australia as a potential threat
would still leave it without the required military capabilities
to sustain "intensive joint operations against Australia". In
1991, then defense minister Robert Ray still foresaw no threats
to Australia, and foreign minister Gareth Evans described
Australia's regional security environment as "relatively
favorable".

Despite some suggestions that the end of the Cold War rendered
Australia's security environment less certain and potentially
hostile, with the possibility that regional powers such as Japan,
China and India might fill the void left by the reduced presence
of the United States and Russia, no subsequent analysis has
departed from these assessments.

It therefore now seems puzzling that, despite an awareness by
both governments about the many dimensions of the concept of
security -- such as economic security, environmental security and
political security -- the military dimension has been given a
prominent part in the agreement.

Especially, in the post-Cold War era, one could argue that
economic security would benefit Indonesia as well as Australia.
For Australia, it can be achieved in integrating 'win-win' ways
with other states, where all parties share in the gains, and
enter into transactions with an expectation of mutual opportunity
and advantage.

In addition, Australia's economic connection with Southeast
Asia is having profound cultural consequences within Australia.
Regional economic integration will be far more fundamental for
Australia's future identity and security than the regional
projection of Australia's military power or "joint responses" if
Indonesia or Australia -- or both of them -- is attacked by a
third party, as stated in the agreement.

Furthermore, the question becomes problematic if "joint
responses" mean joint military operations by the two countries in
responding to such an eventuality. This is question is
particularly relevant, given the ambiguous wording of the
agreement, which may contribute to a situation where, in an
operational context, the line between external and internal
"challenges" becomes extremely blurred.

In 1986, Harold Crouch, an observer on the role of the
military in Indonesia, pointed out that because of their internal
security role, the Indonesian Armed Forces are poorly equipped to
fight an external war. Therefore, if large numbers were
transferred to a conventional role, "the (Indonesian) government
would run the risk of not being able to deal with local political
upheavals".

In view of the ambiguous wording of the agreement,
particularly on where to draw a clear line between external and
internal challenges, both countries could be facing a
hypothetical situation in the future where Australian Defense
Force could be employed alongside the Indonesian Armed Forces,
thereby indirectly reinforcing Indonesia's internal security
capabilities.

For example, the wording of Article 2 of the agreement, which
needs some clarification, refers to "adverse challenges" rather
than "external threats", which is the standard term in defense
agreements. Similarly, an interpretation of Article 3, which says
that "mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security
field in areas to be identified by the two parties," could be
extended to areas facing an internal threat.

If this is the case, then the agreement has breached a
significant threshold, as it clearly contradicts Indonesia's
"non-aligned" foreign policy. On the other hand, however, it also
should be stated from the outset that the Australian government
so far has given some assurances that Australian forces would
never be used in direct or indirect support of other countries
which are facing internal security threats.

No one can deny that the possibility of a military threat
remains, even in the post-Cold War era. Yet the new threats in
the era of global interdependency would take many non-military
forms that have no military solutions. Therefore, to equate the
problem of security with the problem of armed conflict is to
oversimplify the nature of the threat.

In short, to seek military solutions in conflict management as
the only option can be regarded as a counter-productive response
to most security challenges. It seems that contrary to such a
view, both governments consider the agreement as the culmination
of a defense relationship now forming a second (and possibly
primary) diplomatic track.

The increase in defense links in the context of a lack of
consideration of other foreign policy objectives could have some
consequences for the relationship between the two countries in
the future. It could threaten to unbalance their broad diplomacy
objectives and remove them from the purview of those responsible
for the implementation of foreign policy in general.

Dr. Hilman Adil is Director at the Center of Social and
Cultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.