Regional security pact queried

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): The signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security by the foreign ministers of Indonesia and Australia in December 1995, before the Labor government was defeated in the general election early this year, was hailed at that time as effectively removing one element of concern in Australia about an Indonesia military threat to its security.

Since then, nearly a year has passed and lingering doubts outside the government and defense bureaucracy in both countries about the effectiveness of the agreement still remain. Additional information that could clarify some unanswered questions has so far not been forthcoming.

There are calls now in Australia for a public debate, which could not have taken place at that time, given the secret negotiations prior to the signing of the agreement. Former prime minister Paul Keating frankly admitted at the time that the 18 months of secrecy surrounding the agreement's negotiations were specifically designed to avoid public debate.

Concern outside government and defense establishment circles are focused on its possible use as a vehicle for operational scenarios, which leads to speculation about future directions, because Australia's security policy has recently shown a more active and high profile role. The signing of the agreement has also caught the Indonesian general public by surprise, given the secrecy surrounding the negotiations, leading to speculations whether the Indonesian government has given up its non-aligned stance.

By signing this agreement after a rethinking of security priorities, both governments see it as one of the results of confidence-building measures developed between the two countries over the years to meet their broader objectives of enhancing both global and regional security and promoting a sense of strategic community between Australia and its most immediate neighbor. Former prime minister Keating, on the occasion of the signing, declared the agreement to be Australia's "key defense link to Asia", with no need to establish additional bilateral security pacts with other countries because the Five-Power Defense Agreement (between Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.) in addition, would be more than adequate to guarantee Australia's security.

The agreement should be considered the linchpin of Australia's regional security strategy, because for the first time, both countries have agreed to consult each other on regional challenges and possibly deploy forces together. The question should be raised, however, whether it could provide some guarantee for a smooth relationship between the two countries for the coming years. This remains to be seen, because the agreement appears to have some disturbing implications for both countries.

The military establishment in Australia has been arguing for a three-stage implementation of the strategic partnership, i.e. "increased defense contacts, followed by the establishment of a formal security dialogue and culminating in the formulation of a collective regional force". Although these have not yet been implemented, it shows some indication of an increasing militarization of Australia's foreign policy, which could have some effects on broader foreign policy objectives, particularly on what former foreign minister Gareth Evans termed "good international citizenship", and on the public and parliamentary oversight of Australia's foreign policy dealing with security.

Both countries realize that the common interest between the two countries is preventing hegemony in Southeast Asia and Asia in general. This is why Indonesia and Australia remain on friendly terms, despite ups and downs in the past. Disputes between the two countries in the last few years have centered on domestic issues like democracy and the violation of human rights, but both have managed to balance other interests against those issues.

Canberra so far has tried to understand Indonesia's sensitivities about being told how to conduct its domestic affairs, despite pressure from the press and the general public. Previous Australian governments, at least under former prime minister Keating, on various occasions have tried to make clear that although Australia is prepared to defend fundamental international principles, it should not be forced to engage in every dispute, which could harm relations between the two countries.

In terms of human rights, Canberra also believes that the best way to guarantee the preservation of good relations is to view the issue as an Indonesian problem. The attempt to mobilize international pressure is going to run into the same difficulties as it did when Australia used this approach to condemn Indonesia on the integration of East Timor, which is bound to provoke the most intense resistance by Indonesia.

Although some circles in Australia believe that in some cases, international pressure may do some good in cases like human rights violations, previous Australian governments were sufficiently aware of the danger of a deliberate strategy, as proposed by non-governmental organizations, to create certain institutions and then rely on international pressure to maintain them. Therefore, any attempt to internationalize certain issues will only elicit anti-Australian sentiments in Indonesia.

The Agreement on Maintaining Security has, in fact, focused on one dimension of the threat factor: its nature and the dangers it posed. Therefore, the effort on both sides to reach such an agreement does not sufficiently reflect a common awareness of a much wider set of pressing problems, apart from a possible military attack on each other or by a third party.

Already in his report a few years ago, Paul Dibb has noted that Indonesia's "principal security concerns are internal stability and potential threats from its north", and any change in attitude which identified Australia as a potential threat would still leave it without the required military capabilities to sustain "intensive joint operations against Australia". In 1991, then defense minister Robert Ray still foresaw no threats to Australia, and foreign minister Gareth Evans described Australia's regional security environment as "relatively favorable".

Despite some suggestions that the end of the Cold War rendered Australia's security environment less certain and potentially hostile, with the possibility that regional powers such as Japan, China and India might fill the void left by the reduced presence of the United States and Russia, no subsequent analysis has departed from these assessments.

It therefore now seems puzzling that, despite an awareness by both governments about the many dimensions of the concept of security -- such as economic security, environmental security and political security -- the military dimension has been given a prominent part in the agreement.

Especially, in the post-Cold War era, one could argue that economic security would benefit Indonesia as well as Australia. For Australia, it can be achieved in integrating 'win-win' ways with other states, where all parties share in the gains, and enter into transactions with an expectation of mutual opportunity and advantage.

In addition, Australia's economic connection with Southeast Asia is having profound cultural consequences within Australia. Regional economic integration will be far more fundamental for Australia's future identity and security than the regional projection of Australia's military power or "joint responses" if Indonesia or Australia -- or both of them -- is attacked by a third party, as stated in the agreement.

Furthermore, the question becomes problematic if "joint responses" mean joint military operations by the two countries in responding to such an eventuality. This is question is particularly relevant, given the ambiguous wording of the agreement, which may contribute to a situation where, in an operational context, the line between external and internal "challenges" becomes extremely blurred.

In 1986, Harold Crouch, an observer on the role of the military in Indonesia, pointed out that because of their internal security role, the Indonesian Armed Forces are poorly equipped to fight an external war. Therefore, if large numbers were transferred to a conventional role, "the (Indonesian) government would run the risk of not being able to deal with local political upheavals".

In view of the ambiguous wording of the agreement, particularly on where to draw a clear line between external and internal challenges, both countries could be facing a hypothetical situation in the future where Australian Defense Force could be employed alongside the Indonesian Armed Forces, thereby indirectly reinforcing Indonesia's internal security capabilities.

For example, the wording of Article 2 of the agreement, which needs some clarification, refers to "adverse challenges" rather than "external threats", which is the standard term in defense agreements. Similarly, an interpretation of Article 3, which says that "mutually beneficial cooperative activities in the security field in areas to be identified by the two parties," could be extended to areas facing an internal threat.

If this is the case, then the agreement has breached a significant threshold, as it clearly contradicts Indonesia's "non-aligned" foreign policy. On the other hand, however, it also should be stated from the outset that the Australian government so far has given some assurances that Australian forces would never be used in direct or indirect support of other countries which are facing internal security threats.

No one can deny that the possibility of a military threat remains, even in the post-Cold War era. Yet the new threats in the era of global interdependency would take many non-military forms that have no military solutions. Therefore, to equate the problem of security with the problem of armed conflict is to oversimplify the nature of the threat.

In short, to seek military solutions in conflict management as the only option can be regarded as a counter-productive response to most security challenges. It seems that contrary to such a view, both governments consider the agreement as the culmination of a defense relationship now forming a second (and possibly primary) diplomatic track.

The increase in defense links in the context of a lack of consideration of other foreign policy objectives could have some consequences for the relationship between the two countries in the future. It could threaten to unbalance their broad diplomacy objectives and remove them from the purview of those responsible for the implementation of foreign policy in general.

Dr. Hilman Adil is Director at the Center of Social and Cultural Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.