Sat, 26 Jul 1997

Reforms needed to curb violence

By A. Wisnuhardana

YOGYAKARTA (JP): The new year was greeted with apprehension and fears of more unrest instead of good cheer and hope. The prevalence of violence in recent years has left the Indonesian community unconvinced that these incidents will decline. Last year, in the towns of Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Sanggau Ledo, Tanah Abang, Rengasdengklok, etc., there were a series of deplorable acts. The general election, it was thought, was a likely explanation for the violence which was mushrooming as a social phenomenon. This hypothesis became a certainty and people were convinced that violence would subside after the election.

However, the hypothesis became void when social mass violence recurred after the election. Dissatisfaction among community members was apparently not dependent on the outcome of the election. And such a simple political analysis cannot explain the ferocity which followed the election brutalities.

It would not be wise, either, to look for scapegoats for the various cases of violence, as the security forces and bureaucracy attempted. Why? First, looking for scapegoats leads people to question and then disbelieve the accusations. Take the riot in Jember some time ago. It was supposed to have been generated by communists and other left-wing groups. (The Jakarta Post, June 17, 1997.) Why should people doubt such an assumption? Because in the history of the New Order government the roots underlying incidents of large-scale political violence have never been found. Most of the solutions have been accusations well beyond the grasp of the community.

Second, raising this kind of awareness in the community, which was historically shaped from the trauma of the communist revolt in 1965, creates the idea that it is impossible to eradicate the communist movement. In that context, a distortion has emerged between our hopes and the suggestive mechanism introduced by the state to the community. As a result, an impression is created that it is the security apparatus and bureaucracy who are keeping alive the communist ideology in the community. (Compare Y.B. Mangunwijaya's article in Forum Keadilan of August 26, 1996.)

We often observe hidden violence which is committed by the security forces and bureaucracy. Behind the shield of political stability and security there is room for structural violence. With the passing of laws and regulations, violence has been institutionalized within the power structure, starting from political power at high levels down to the lowest level. The control of the community in this way has caused people to become apathetic toward involvement with the bureaucracy.

In middle class intellectual circles, the root of violence is seen as the laws which put shackles on a person's freedom of association and expression. In public life, there is almost always a curbing of civil and political rights. One source of restriction is the package of five laws issued by the government in 1985. These laws not only reflect the excessive fear of differences in opinion in the political community and of inefficiency as a result of the differences, but also suppress the opportunity for the community to grow independently. Such an opportunity would allow the infrastructure of a democratic order to grow.

Now, the community is increasingly aware of the limited political space. Honestly speaking the economic development of the New Order has in fact brought about tremendous changes in the economic structure. However, the choice of economic development strategy has also introduced people to an awareness of their political rights.

In many Asian countries with miraculous economic development, there is often a paradox between economic growth and the implementation of democratic life. Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea have had extraordinary economic success, but many civil and political rights have not been recognized.

In Indonesia, the general election, as one of the mechanisms for power change, is touted as a time to create a power balance among the existing political groups. The increasingly sharp polarization between community groups that wish for sociopolitical change and those who want to maintain the power structure, could actually be dealt with in the general election. In democratic countries, the general election really is a forum for the peaceful exchange of power.

The failure to create a constitutional framework that provides a bridge between those wishing a change and those wanting a status quo, has resulted in violence and other unconstitutional measures. Previously, there was a successful end to the general election, subscribed to by all the contestants, but it did not automatically solve the sociopolitical gaps and differences.

This was illustrated by PDI-Megawati supporters celebrating the disastrous result achieved by PDI-Soerjadi in the election. The PDI's defeat in the election was viewed as a brilliant victory for the party's own members and sympathizers who were loyal to Megawati's leadership. For them, PDI's disaster was a moral victory that deserved joyous celebration.

The logic used by present-day political parties is to gain an opportunity within the narrow limitations of politics. Golkar's dominance in the House of Representatives does not make the executive power controllable due to the centralized nature of political culture in the executive institution itself. Therefore, the new idea of a dual party proposed by some intellectuals remains difficult to carry out if the ultimate objective is to have control over the implementation of power.

As described above, political violence remains real in our eyes. The arguments used by the power implementors -- who in the recent election gained a victory de jure -- did not indicate a change of policies toward the creation of a better democracy. As a result, conflict and violence are undeniable sine qua non. In daily life, violence can take the form of a strike by a group that is harmed by a policy relating to them. The spread of strikes by public transportation drivers in several cities recently, mainly in Jakarta and its surrounding areas, can be interpreted in the same context.

A crisis in the community's trust, relating to bureaucratic policies, is continually occurring and a basic change of policies is needed to shape the political structure at the national level. If social risk is calculated, the increase in continued civil disobedience may result in cost far greater than political reform that takes into account the people's interests and aspirations.

Without considering the possibility of political reform at the national level, continued violence may result in something more frightening and inclined to crush the positive things we have achieved.

The writer is an observer of social affairs. He is also a researcher at the Forum of Social and Humanistic Studies in Yogyakarta.