Reformist officers still hold sway

By Hendrajit

JAKARTA (JP): In a seminar on nationalism last month, Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei spoke frankly and firmly about the possibility of the Army waging a coup against the existing government (Jakarta Post, April 21, 1997).

According to the former chief of the Udayana regional military command which encompasses, among others, the East Timor province, from a historical perspective a coup d'etat is not in the Indonesian vocabulary. "Even thinking about it is a sin. So, don't even think (about it)," said Syafei.

In one way or another, Syafei's view is relevant when considering the nature of the Indonesian Army and the situation at the time. Like in other countries, military coups are related to military interference in politics and army disunity.

It appears evident that the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), especially the army, is the only national institution with both security and political functions. Moreover, the army has also served as a national "melting pot" for a crucially influential part of Indonesia's new elite.

But in the early years of independence, the Armed Forces was subject to many ethnic, religious and ideological divisions which have plagued the country at large. The army has a long history of conflict within the Armed Forces.

The revolutionary years of 1945-1949 left Indonesia with an officer corps of people from diverse backgrounds who had developed a spirit of independence like guerrilla fighters but who failed to acquire the ideological indoctrination needed to discipline and unify their action.

This was all the more so because the army's various divisions sprung up on several islands during the Japanese occupation and the independence revolution. Some officers started their career in paramilitary formations created by Japan, which later became the nuclei of irregular guerrilla units, the so-called Laskar.

They made a large contribution to the struggle for independence from 1945 to 1949, but at the same time were also a source of considerable political turbulence in the fledgling republic. The Japanese occupation produced a number of militant groups with ideological differences and varying amounts of weapons at their disposal. Most important among these groups were the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pesindo), the Moslem Youth Group (Hizbullah), The Buffalo Legion (The Barisan Banteng), initially loyal to the Nationalist Party (PNI), and the People's Army (Laskar Rakyat) which leaned toward the extreme left.

On the other hand, most of the above related developments took place in Java. Sumatra, which had little liaison with Java, was administered together with Malaya by the Seventh Imperial Japanese Army, with its headquarters in Singapore. Auxiliary military organizations similar to the Defenders of the Fatherland (PETA) were trained in Sumatra. From their ranks came such important officers as the former commander of South Sumatra Colonel Barlian and the former commander of North Sumatra Colonel Maludin Simbolon, who became one of the leaders of the counter government proclaimed on Feb. 15, 1958, in Padang.

It can be said that the Japanese military administration left a heritage of two distinct armies, one based in Java, the other in Sumatra. They fought separate revolutions between 1945 and 1949 and never fully merged until they clashed openly in 1958.

The PRRI/Permesta revolt of 1957-1958 was essentially trying to exert pressure on the Jakarta political scene in the hope of bringing to power the groups who were most likely to be sympathetic to their demands. They were not "secessionist" in a crude sense and their demands for greater autonomy were not carefully formulated, but the political crisis they generated in 1957-1958 posed a real threat to Indonesia's national unity. In 1958, civil discontent in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi spread to local army personnel, and then, as the most likely men for the job, regional officers took over the leadership.

With such a history of political and internal disunity before 1965, it is hard to believe that the army has been successfully united under the leadership of Gen. Soeharto since 1966. The 1965 coup attempt led to a purge of the Armed Forces, firstly for those thought to have been associated with the communists and then of president Soekarno's supporters. By doing so, the new Order government succeeded in creating a military elite dependent on the President as a supreme command of the Armed Forces. Army leaders locked in conflict with each other were transferred to remote areas or non-influential civilian positions.

As a result, the military headed by President Soeharto, is the main pillar of power. In terms of authority structure, it is not a polity with a collective leadership, nor can it be seen as possessing any relatively important centers of power independent of the central authority. It is confined to fully supporting President Soeharto's government without interfering in the decision-making process. Although many members of the cabinet have military backgrounds, they mostly owe their positions to appointment by the President as the supreme command of the Armed Forces, not military backing.

To achieve horizontal cohesion, the power center reduced the size of the Armed Forces, amalgamated territorial commands, strengthened the primacy of the army over the navy and the air force, and rotated officers to ensure their loyalty to the center and not the region where they were assigned. As a new generation of professional officers, trained at the Magelang military academy after the revolutionary rise through the ranks, it could be expected that the old factional and inter-divisional rivalries will become even less important.

The long road toward consolidation and professionalism means it is unlikely that junior officers will be drawn into plots and coup attempts directed against the senior officers in control of the government. Although personal and group rivalries are normal in any organization, professional ethos, discipline, and respect for hierarchical authority of the new generation will serve to limit internal conflict and make officers less inclined to take political action against the existing administration.

But while their military education and their professionalism make them disciplined professional soldiers whose respect for hierarchy prevents them from taking political action against their superiors, it seems likely that their professionalism might become the source of their disillusionment with the present military elite who lack the values that the academy extols.

Likewise, the influence of younger reform-minded officers as well as retired officers are likely to grow, especially if the patrimonial character of the present leadership is considered an obstacle to economic development and a responsive government.

To some extent, the struggle between elite groups in Indonesia appears to involve contrasting perceptions of how the government should behave and the objectives that it should pursue. While patrimonial struggles for power can be settled through compromise, conflicts which involve contrasting perceptions of what the government should be doing are more difficult to resolve.

The writer is a freelance journalist and political observer based in Jakarta.

Window: Likewise, the influence of younger reform-minded officers as well as retired officers are likely to grow, especially if the patrimonial character of...