Reformist officers still hold sway

Reformist officers still hold sway

By Hendrajit

JAKARTA (JP): In a seminar on nationalism last month, Maj. Gen.
Theo Syafei spoke frankly and firmly about the possibility of
the Army waging a coup against the existing government (Jakarta
Post, April 21, 1997).

According to the former chief of the Udayana regional military
command which encompasses, among others, the East Timor province,
from a historical perspective a coup d'etat is not in the
Indonesian vocabulary. "Even thinking about it is a sin. So,
don't even think (about it)," said Syafei.

In one way or another, Syafei's view is relevant when
considering the nature of the Indonesian Army and the situation
at the time. Like in other countries, military coups are related
to military interference in politics and army disunity.

It appears evident that the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI),
especially the army, is the only national institution with both
security and political functions. Moreover, the army has also
served as a national "melting pot" for a crucially influential
part of Indonesia's new elite.

But in the early years of independence, the Armed Forces was
subject to many ethnic, religious and ideological divisions which
have plagued the country at large. The army has a long history of
conflict within the Armed Forces.

The revolutionary years of 1945-1949 left Indonesia with an
officer corps of people from diverse backgrounds who had
developed a spirit of independence like guerrilla fighters but
who failed to acquire the ideological indoctrination needed to
discipline and unify their action.

This was all the more so because the army's various divisions
sprung up on several islands during the Japanese occupation and
the independence revolution. Some officers started their career
in paramilitary formations created by Japan, which later became
the nuclei of irregular guerrilla units, the so-called Laskar.

They made a large contribution to the struggle for independence
from 1945 to 1949, but at the same time were also a source of
considerable political turbulence in the fledgling republic. The
Japanese occupation produced a number of militant groups with
ideological differences and varying amounts of weapons at their
disposal. Most important among these groups were the Indonesian
Socialist Youth (Pesindo), the Moslem Youth Group (Hizbullah),
The Buffalo Legion (The Barisan Banteng), initially loyal to the
Nationalist Party (PNI), and the People's Army (Laskar Rakyat)
which leaned toward the extreme left.

On the other hand, most of the above related developments took
place in Java. Sumatra, which had little liaison with Java, was
administered together with Malaya by the Seventh Imperial
Japanese Army, with its headquarters in Singapore. Auxiliary
military organizations similar to the Defenders of the Fatherland
(PETA) were trained in Sumatra. From their ranks came such
important officers as the former commander of South Sumatra
Colonel Barlian and the former commander of North Sumatra Colonel
Maludin Simbolon, who became one of the leaders of the counter
government proclaimed on Feb. 15, 1958, in Padang.

It can be said that the Japanese military administration left a
heritage of two distinct armies, one based in Java, the other in
Sumatra. They fought separate revolutions between 1945 and 1949
and never fully merged until they clashed openly in 1958.

The PRRI/Permesta revolt of 1957-1958 was essentially trying to
exert pressure on the Jakarta political scene in the hope of
bringing to power the groups who were most likely to be
sympathetic to their demands. They were not "secessionist" in a
crude sense and their demands for greater autonomy were not
carefully formulated, but the political crisis they generated in
1957-1958 posed a real threat to Indonesia's national unity. In
1958, civil discontent in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi spread
to local army personnel, and then, as the most likely men for the
job, regional officers took over the leadership.

With such a history of political and internal disunity before
1965, it is hard to believe that the army has been successfully
united under the leadership of Gen. Soeharto since 1966. The 1965
coup attempt led to a purge of the Armed Forces, firstly for
those thought to have been associated with the communists and
then of president Soekarno's supporters. By doing so, the new
Order government succeeded in creating a military elite dependent
on the President as a supreme command of the Armed Forces. Army
leaders locked in conflict with each other were transferred to
remote areas or non-influential civilian positions.

As a result, the military headed by President Soeharto, is the
main pillar of power. In terms of authority structure, it is not
a polity with a collective leadership, nor can it be seen as
possessing any relatively important centers of power independent
of the central authority. It is confined to fully supporting
President Soeharto's government without interfering in the
decision-making process. Although many members of the cabinet
have military backgrounds, they mostly owe their positions to
appointment by the President as the supreme command of the Armed
Forces, not military backing.

To achieve horizontal cohesion, the power center reduced the
size of the Armed Forces, amalgamated territorial commands,
strengthened the primacy of the army over the navy and the air
force, and rotated officers to ensure their loyalty to the center
and not the region where they were assigned. As a new generation
of professional officers, trained at the Magelang military
academy after the revolutionary rise through the ranks, it could
be expected that the old factional and inter-divisional rivalries
will become even less important.

The long road toward consolidation and professionalism means it
is unlikely that junior officers will be drawn into plots and
coup attempts directed against the senior officers in control of
the government. Although personal and group rivalries are normal
in any organization, professional ethos, discipline, and respect
for hierarchical authority of the new generation will serve to
limit internal conflict and make officers less inclined to take
political action against the existing administration.

But while their military education and their professionalism
make them disciplined professional soldiers whose respect for
hierarchy prevents them from taking political action against
their superiors, it seems likely that their professionalism might
become the source of their disillusionment with the present
military elite who lack the values that the academy extols.

Likewise, the influence of younger reform-minded officers as
well as retired officers are likely to grow, especially if the
patrimonial character of the present leadership is considered an
obstacle to economic development and a responsive government.

To some extent, the struggle between elite groups in Indonesia
appears to involve contrasting perceptions of how the government
should behave and the objectives that it should pursue. While
patrimonial struggles for power can be settled through
compromise, conflicts which involve contrasting perceptions of
what the government should be doing are more difficult to
resolve.

The writer is a freelance journalist and political observer
based in Jakarta.

Window: Likewise, the influence of younger reform-minded officers
as well as retired officers are likely to grow, especially if the
patrimonial character of...